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LIVES OF
General Alvin P. Hovey

—AND—

IRA J. CHASE.

BY CHARLES M. WALKER,
Of the Indianapolis Journal.

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INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA :
UNION BOOK COMPANY, PUBLISHERS, 59 VANCE BLOCK.
1888.





Alvin Mowry

HOVEY AND CHASE.

LIFE OF GENERAL ALVIN P. HOVEY,

Lawyer, Judge, Soldier, Diplomat and Statesman ;


TOGETHER WITH A SKETCH OF

IRA J. CHASE,

*Soldier, Preacher, Orator, and Commander of the G. A. R., Department
of Indiana.*

BY CHARLES M. WALKER.

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PREFACE.

This little book has been prepared under the usual embarrassments attending the writing of "campaign lives," and the results are doubtless apparent in defects of matter, form and arrangement. It has been compiled in great haste, and makes no pretension to literary merit, or to any other, except presenting in outline the record of a self-made man and a busy life. The subject is worthy of a more complete narrative.

CHAPTER I.

ANCESTRY, BOYHOOD AND EARLY LEGAL CAREER.

In 1810 the white population of the Territory of Indiana was confined to a small area in the southern and southwestern portion, mainly near the large river courses. At that time the Territory had only four counties, viz.: Clark, Dearborn, Harrison and Knox; but their boundaries were extensive and almost undefined. Clark had a population of 5,670; Dearborn, 7,310; Harrison, 3,595, and Knox, 7,945. The total population of the Territory was 24,520. Vincennes was the capital, and continued to be till 1814, when the seat of government was removed to Corydon. In 1816 the Territory was admitted as a State. In 1820 it had twenty-nine organized counties and a total population of 147,178. Posey, one of the newly organized counties, had been carved out of Knox, and had a population of 4,061. It was named after Thomas Posey, who had been appointed Governor of the Territory in 1813. He was an officer in the Revolutionary army, and, previous to his appointment as Governor, was United States Senator from Louisiana. He

than the country for a poor boy who had to make his own way. Charles Hovey, an older brother of Alvin P., was a brick-mason, and worked at his trade in Mount Vernon, the county seat. With him Alvin learned the trade, and followed it for several years. There are still standing in Mount Vernon and vicinity brick chimneys built by him when a boy in his teens, silent witnesses of his honest work. Possibly a recollection of this early experience may have influenced him long afterward, when a member of Congress, to vote for the admission to his seat of a contestant who was himself a workingman. He continued to labor at his trade for several years, helping his sisters, who were very poor, and evincing the devotion to his family that has always characterized him. Those who knew him at this time say that, though extremely poor, he was full of ambition, pluck and aggressiveness. "The boy is father of the man," and these have been his ruling traits in later life.

While he was yet a poor boy "roughing it" in Mount Vernon he attracted the attention of Hon. John Pitcher, a leading lawyer of the place, whose keen discernment saw there was outcome in him, and who kindly interested himself in his education and development. This was grateful encouragement to the young man. Bricklaying was not altogether to

his taste. He felt he would like to qualify himself for a different line of employment, and determined to do so. He could make a living at his trade and help his sisters, but he felt that with the talents and energy nature had given him he ought to do rather better than that, and, perhaps, even make something of a mark in the world. It is every man's duty to make the most of himself and of his opportunities, and when a young man feels this sort of prompting he should obey it.

Young Hovey determined to become a lawyer. This required a better education than he possessed, but he resolved to acquire it. There were no colleges in the west in those days, and the facilities for obtaining an education were exceedingly limited. But where there is a will there is a way, and this youth had a will. He had a bright, receptive mind, a desire for knowledge and a taste for reading. By attending the local school when he could, studying at night, availing himself of such instruction as he could get, and, above all, by devouring and digesting a few good books, he laid the foundation of a good, practical education. A local teacher named Hull, who was the author of an English grammar, gave him private instructions one year. Alvin had a taste for language, and became a thorough master of grammar. All this time he was working at his trade as a brick-mason,

though not yet twenty years old. The physical as well as the mental training of that period was of lasting benefit to him. In 1840 he taught school for a year, thus paying his way and improving himself while instructing others. He had already formed the habit of systematic reading, and was familiar with Shakespeare and other English classics, and had been an extensive reader of history. There were few books in those days compared with the present, but they were more thoroughly read. A dozen good books read, re-read and thoroughly digested are better than a dozen libraries superficially skimmed. A liberal education may even be obtained without teachers. Colleges, professors and the appliances of education do not necessarily make scholars, nor even supply mental training. Men grow from within, not from without. The adventitious aids of education are almost as often an injury as a benefit.

When the young man felt he had done enough in the way of preliminary education to justify him in beginning the study of law, he commenced reading with Judge John Pitcher, then and for many years one of the leading lawyers of Southern Indiana. Judge Pitcher had already done much to encourage him in obtaining an education, and, with so good a friend and instructor in the law, young Hovey found himself be-

ginning his new career under bright auspices. He had a sound mind in a sound body, and his ambition to become a lawyer was aided by that other great incentive to hard work—poverty. Under these circumstances he studied hard. Teaching school by day, reading law at night, and reciting at intervals to Judge Pitcher, he made such satisfactory progress that in February, 1843, he was admitted to the bar.

By this time he was, for a young man, well known and popular. Having lived in Posey county all his life, he knew almost everybody, and almost everybody knew him. The story of his life, his orphanage, his work at his trade, his struggle with poverty, his kindness to his sisters, his difficulty in obtaining an education and his final mastery of the law were matters of common and good report among the people. Such things would naturally win a young man friends, and he had many. Fortunately, he possessed elements of character that enabled him to retain friends as well as to make them, and it soon became evident that he had a future before him.

He began to get business at once, and, by prompt and faithful attention to it, had the satisfaction of seeing it steadily increase. The year after his admission to the bar, in November, 1844, he married Miss Mary Ann James. This furnished a fresh incentive and necessity for effort, and he devoted himself with renewed energy to his profession.

The Posey county bar at that time was one of the oldest and ablest in the state ; but Hovey held his own and obtained his share of business in the circuit. It is said that as a practitioner he was fearless and energetic, but was not a brilliant advocate ; he must, however, have been an effective one. His qualities were not of the dashing kind, but were solid and substantial, and he possessed that invaluable quality in a lawyer of always having a thorough knowledge of his case and a thorough mastery of his own resources.

He had been practicing law a little more than two years when the war with Mexico began (1846). Indiana furnished five regiments of volunteers in that war, and Posey county raised one company, of which Enoch R. James was commissioned Captain, and Alvin P. Hovey First Lieutenant. Captain James was his father-in-law. The company was assigned to the 2d Indiana regiment, but the regiment and the State's quota being already filled, it was not mustered into service. Hovey's enlistment, however, within little more than a year after his marriage, shows that even then he was actuated by the same sense of duty and patriotism that impelled him to obey his country's call many years later. Perhaps, also, he had an instinctive taste for military life, as he certainly did possess marked talent in that direction.

After this episode he resumed the practice of his profession with all the energy of his nature. The career of a country lawyer is not particularly eventful, and the next few years ran along smoothly and prosperously. Hovey was now rated among the leading lawyers of the circuit, and got his share of business.

A somewhat noted case in which he was engaged about this time illustrates his kind feeling for laboring men and his characteristic tenacity in conducting a lawsuit. "It was," says Mr. P. S. Heath, "what is popularly known as the William Maclure case. Maclure died leaving an estate valued at between \$150,000 and \$200,000, which, at that period, was an immense fortune. He was a philanthropist, and devised the distribution of his property for the benefit of the poor. His will provided that all of his property should be given in the purchase of libraries for the 'men who labored with their hands, and who earned their living by the sweat of their brows.' It provided, further, that sums not exceeding \$500 should be expended in the purchase of libraries wherever there was an accumulation for a library amounting to fifty volumes. Alexander Maclure was appointed executor of the estate, and E. J. Rogers was his bondsman. Alexander contended that the will was invalid, without effect, and soon after he took possession of the estate began to dispose of the lands the same as though they were his

own. Rogers viewed the distribution of the property with some alarm, and went to Hovey for his advice. He stated that a retainer of \$50—which was considered a large fee at that time in Indiana—would be given for a thorough investigation of the law, and a carefully prepared opinion as to whether the will was binding, and whether the bondsman was liable for the estate on account of the manner in which it was being distributed. Hovey replied that he would make an investigation of the law and render a decision in two weeks. At the end of that time he informed Rogers that the surety could be held for all of the personal property disposed of; that the will was valid, and that it would be sustained in court. The opinion was rendered upon the basis of a very old English law—a statute passed in the forty-third year of Queen Elizabeth. The decision, of course, excited a good deal of local comment, and many lawyers took issue with Hovey. They questioned his judgment and his authority, and some of them went so far as to ridicule the opinion.

“Mr. Rogers was satisfied, and immediately ordered Hovey to present the case to the court in such form that the bondsman might be released from all further liability. Proceedings were instituted against Alexander Maclure for violation of his duty. Judge Pitcher, who was Hovey’s preceptor, and who yet lives in Southwestern Indiana, and is almost a cente-

narian, was pitted against him. The case was bitterly contested, and attracted wide-spread attention. It is a matter of local history, and is fresh in the minds of all the old residents of the State. The battle which Hovey was fighting was regarded by all as a patriotic and philanthropic one. The heirs on one side were struggling for the property, while the poor people, the laboring classes who were anxious for libraries, were interested upon the other side. The Circuit Court decided against the position taken by Hovey, and he immediately took an appeal. The court above overruled the decision of the court below. The case can be found in the Fifth Indiana Reports, under the title, 'Sweeny against Sampson, Ex'r.' The victory was one which gave Hovey a State reputation. He had not only unearthed the fine points in a very old and what was regarded an obsolete law, but he had successfully combated a great issue with one of the best lawyers of the country. The case before the Supreme Court was closely watched by the ablest lawyers at the bar. After the decision of the Supreme Court Rogers moved to have Hovey made executor of the estate, and the people interested in the proceedings immediately indorsed the motion. Hovey objected, upon the ground that he could not give the necessary \$200,000 bond. The people, however, would not permit that to stand as an obstruction, and they procured the bond

themselves. He then began lawsuits against more than fifty of the men to whom the lands had been deeded, and he won in every instance. He reduced the estate to cash, and it amounted to over \$150,000. All of this he distributed in the purchase of libraries for the laboring people, as provided in the will, and hundreds of thousands have been benefited by that work. There are scores of libraries now open to the public in the State which had as a basis a share of the Maclure estate."

A gentleman who lived in the immediate vicinity of General Hovey during the long period covering these contests in the courts, and the establishment of the libraries, says the earnestness evinced by the General in his work elicited the admiration and the gratitude of everybody. He was very enthusiastic in his work, and took great pride in carrying out the letter of the will, and seeing the benefits it brought about. He says, further, that in that early day the beneficiaries of this will, and, in fact, every one who was conversant with the merits of the case and the part General Hovey had borne in the matter, were deeply impressed by his disinterested and extra-professional efforts for the public good. His services in this matter are still remembered to his credit.

Thus, working patiently and faithfully year after

year, the young lawyer laid broadly and solidly the foundations of his future career. Now as a lawyer, just as ten years before a brick-mason, he did good, honest work.

It is the experience of most men that the early years of their adult life, when they are working hard, and perhaps living economically, to lay the foundation of a competence, are the happiest of their lives. No doubt General Hovey looks back to the early years of his law practice in Mount Vernon, before he had entered on a broader career, as among the happiest of his life. He had hosts of friends, a loving wife to whom he was fondly devoted, an interesting family of little children, a comfortable home, a good practice, excellent health and bright prospects. What more should a man want to make him happy?

By this time Hovey was beginning to take a pretty active part in politics—a business that has both made and marred many careers. Many a promising young lawyer has sacrificed his prospects, and many an older one his practice, by engaging in politics to the neglect of business. But it is also true that many lawyers have made politics a means of honorable advancement in their profession, and of bringing them into a wider sphere of action than they would otherwise have reached. Hovey was one of the latter.

The Democratic party was then strongly in the ascendancy in Southern Indiana, and he had hardly begun to take part in politics before he was called upon to serve the people in important public capacities. His legal ability and political activity caused him to be elected, in 1850, a delegate to the convention to frame a new State constitution. At this time he was thirty years old. In ten years he had risen by his own unaided efforts from the position of a poor, hard-working mechanic to that of a leading lawyer at one of the best bars in the State, and had been elected by the people of his native county to assist in framing the organic law for the State. So rapid an advancement as this was not due to accident or luck. It evidenced ability that was likely to bring its possessor still higher honors.

CHAPTER II.

SERVICE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AND
ON THE BENCH.

Mr. Hovey came to the Constitutional Convention with an established reputation as a good lawyer and a pronounced Democrat. The work of framing a new constitution for the State was, of course, mainly a legal and non-partisan work, yet the political views of delegates would inevitably find some expression in their speeches and votes, and, to some extent, in the constitution itself. The political parties at this time were Whig and Democratic. The State was Democratic, and a majority of the delegates to the convention were of that party. Hovey's colleague from Posey county, the distinguished Robert Dale Owen, was, like himself, a Democrat, and both took a leading part in the discussions and proceedings of the convention. It was an able body, embracing many of the best men and brightest minds in the State, of both parties, and, in the main, was actuated by a sincere desire faithfully to discharge the important duty devolved upon it—that of framing a constitution for a

great and growing State, which, if adopted by the people, would become the organic law for a long term of years. That they should frame a perfect constitution was not to be expected, but that they made a very good one certainly can not be denied. With some amendments, it has served its purpose well, though some of the amendments, it should be added, have been very material.

Hovey's appearance in the convention was his first entrance in public life. He had practiced in the Supreme Court, and was known in professional circles at the capital, and was also known to the Democratic party managers as a rising young politician, but he had not what could be called a State reputation. At this time he was twenty-nine years old, of fine commanding presence, genial disposition, ready in making acquaintances and friends, and with an intellectual equipment sufficient to enable him to take and hold a leading place among the brightest minds in the State.

The convention met October 7, 1850, and adjourned February 10, 1851. Mr. Hovey took an active and influential part in its proceedings. He spoke on a variety of important questions, and always spoke well. He had the style of a practiced speaker and good debater. His speeches show a thorough knowledge of law, a wide acquaintance with history, and sound

views of the theory and science of government. He believed thoroughly in the capacity of the people for self-government, and that they were the true source of all power.

Among other things, Mr. Hovey spoke against a proposition to abolish the grand jury system. In concluding an able argument on the subject he said: "Those who sent me here want but a few reforms, such as have been amply discussed throughout the State at large and known by experience to be necessary. They want no new-fangled ideas, no experiments, no Utopian plans; they want that which is known to be good to be given them now, and leave all that is uncertain and doubtful to be tested by the future. This I consider to be sound doctrine, and I believe it is 'better to bear the ills we have than fly to others which we know not of.' "

He spoke against a provision to make the State officers ineligible for re-election on the broad ground that it denied the capacity of the people for self-government, was an unnecessary restriction of their natural rights, and was anti-republican in principle.

He spoke against a provision to restrict the power of the State in borrowing money and contracting debt for public purposes. He took the ground that the people ought to have the right, through the General Assembly, to borrow money whenever the public wel-

fare or necessities required it, and that this right should not be restricted by the constitution. In concluding this speech, after citing various reasons and arguments against the proposed measure, he said :

“There is still another contingent event which might happen which would call for the exercise of the full sovereign power of this State. I approach its consideration reluctantly and with diffidence. I allude to the dissolution of our glorious Union. The storms and black clouds that seem hovering over the northern and southern horizon may break upon us much sooner than we anticipate. I hope and pray that such will not be the case ; but unless a better state of feeling shall calm the frenzied passions of the madmen of the South and the fanatics of the North, such a result is not to be classed among the impossibilities. And now, sir, in that event Indiana would resume her sovereignty with a constitution prohibiting her borrowing, if necessary, the means to sustain it. If the dissolution should be peaceable, no war, no public insurrection, even though the people in mass should feel disposed to fortify our frontier, not one cent could be borrowed to do it. For these reasons, and a thousand more that time may teach us, I think we should reject the amendment.”

In the course of this speech he also said : “What is the duty of the constitutional reformer? Surely, not to try experiments ; surely, not to try in how many ways he can impose checks and restrictions upon

the people. He should leave the people as free and untrammelled as a due regard to their prosperity and happiness will admit. Every unnecessary restriction that he imposes on the people is but an additional link in the chain that deprives them of their liberty. This wild course of adopting untried restrictions seems to me to be striking at the very root of government."

The Select Committee on Homestead Exemption made a majority and minority report. The majority report favored homestead exemption, "to consist of land or farm property not less in value than five hundred dollars." The minority report said, "That it is inexpedient to engraft untried principles into the organic law of the State, and that more especially where the experiment can be much more readily and safely made by the legislative department. That it is both unwise and impolitic to distinguish between those who own, or may own, lands and those who have personal estate; and that, if the exemption principle is established at all, it should be upon the broad basis of equality. The minority of the committee are of the opinion that a healthy credit system is one of the greatest blessings that the citizens of this State can enjoy, and are fearful that the sections reported by the majority of said committee, if adopted, would materially injure, if not destroy, that system."

The minority report was signed by A. P. Hovey

and Hiram Prather (of Bartholomew and Jennings counties).

When this subject came up for debate Mr. Hovey spoke against the proposed homestead exemption provision on the general grounds that it favored a particular class and would prove injurious to the credit of the State. He concluded an able argument on the subject by saying: "If an exemption of five hundred dollars should be established in regard to real estate, I can see no sound reason why a like exemption should not be made to the owners of personal property. We should avoid making laws for one class to the injury of another. Without strong reasons to the contrary, the general rule should be, no law for the rich, no law for the poor, but a law for the whole people." He might have erred in his views, but there was much sound reason in his argument.

In the course of another debate Mr. Pettit, of Tippecanoe county, speaking in behalf of homestead exemption, drew an historical illustration from the condition of the ancient Jews. Replying to this, Mr. Hovey said: "The gentleman from Tippecanoe has brought before the convention the fact that the ancient Jews lived under institutions giving to each a home, and argues their happiness and prosperity from that fact. Now, sir, I think there was some higher cause than that institution which guided that favored nation

to happiness and prosperity. Yes, the same God that led their fathers through the wilderness and the Red Sea was around and about them for protection, until they forsook Him, and then even their homesteads could not shield them from destruction."

He spoke strongly in favor of extending and protecting the property rights of married women and widows, especially with reference to separate property.

The above are some of the topics on which Mr. Hovey addressed the convention at some length. He also took an active part in the running debates, and was always listened to with interest. Those who remember the proceedings of the convention say he was one of the readiest speakers and ablest debaters in the body.

Hovey's service in the convention brought him into prominence and made him acquainted with the leading men of the State. Among the prominent Democrats of that day was Joseph A. Wright, an excellent man, possessing many admirable qualities, and at that time Governor of the State. He served as Governor from 1849 to 1857—the longest service of any Governor the State ever had. This happened through his serving one term under the old constitution and one under the new. A few years later he became the leader of the Douglas wing of the Democratic party

in Indiana, and still later a prominent war Democrat and loyal supporter of the government. In 1850, the Legislature having authorized him to send a stone as a contribution from Indiana to the Washington monument, he caused it to be inscribed, "Indiana knows no North, no South—nothing but the Union." He and Hovey had been acquainted before, but during the convention they became warm friends. They were somewhat alike in temperament, and had many things in common besides their political views. At that time Judges were appointed by the executive, and in the spring following the Constitutional Convention, Governor Wright appointed Hovey Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit, embracing Posey and ten other counties. He was appointed May 31, 1851, and took his seat as Judge the following October.

A good *nisi prius* Judge needs to be thoroughly versed in the law, prompt in his decisions, patient and courteous in his dealings with lawyers and litigants, and conscientious in his administration of justice. Hovey made an excellent Judge. His legal knowledge proved ample, his decisions were prompt and clear, and his dispatch of business was remarkable. When he assumed the duties of Judge he also assumed the dignity that belonged to the office, and was rigid in maintaining the dignity of his court.

Some lawyers, who preferred a loose and slipshod style, criticised Judge Hovey on this account, but all will admit that he was right. A Judge should maintain the dignity of his court under all circumstances, and he can hardly err on the side of rigidity. Judge Hovey served two years as Circuit Judge, making an excellent record, and retiring from the circuit bench early in 1854.

An official indorsement of his service and record as Circuit Judge followed almost immediately, for in May, 1854, he was made a Judge of the Supreme Court, receiving this appointment, like the former one, from Governor Wright. Both were to fill vacancies and unexpired terms. His service on the Supreme bench was short, less than a year, but he extended his reputation as an able jurist and a master of the learning as well as the principles of the law. He was nominated by the Democrats for Supreme Judge, but in the ensuing election was defeated by Hon. Samuel Gookins, who ran as the candidate of the Republican party—a party just then coming into notice, but destined to be heard from later.

Judge Hovey was now deep in politics, and recognized as one of the leading Democrats in the State. He was a party man, but neither he nor anybody else foresaw the coming disruption of the party, or the

extraordinary events which were impending in the not distant future.

Early in 1856 he was appointed by President Pierce United States District Attorney for Indiana, and held the office two years. Its duties were directly in the line of his profession, and he discharged them with conscientious fidelity.

This was the last office Hovey ever held as a Democrat. He was appointed to it by one Democratic President and removed from it by another. The Kansas-Nebraska struggle, the Lecompton and anti-Lecompton war, the Douglas and anti-Douglas fight, were now fully developed, and the Democratic party was rent by internal dissensions. Factional lines within the party were closely drawn, and the bitterness of the opposing factions was intense. Politics and parties were in a chaotic state. The Democratic party was undergoing a process of disintegration, while the Republican party was not yet formed. Thousands of men who had hitherto acted with the Democracy were reluctant to do so any longer, but were not yet quite ready to enlist under a new name and banner. Cautious men hesitated and timid men feared to make a complete transfer of their political allegiance from an old and powerful organization to a new and untried one. Yet great principles and motives were at work which were destined to triumph in the end. It was

the beginning of the end of the Democratic party as then organized.

When the issue became clearly defined Judge Hovey ranged himself on the side of what was then called "squatter sovereignty" in the territories, as against the constitutional extension and establishment of slavery. He was a "Douglas Democrat," and for this reason President James Buchanan removed him from the office of District Attorney. His successor was a young Democrat whose views accorded with those of Mr. Buchanan, and who was destined to figure somewhat in Indiana politics—Daniel W. Voorhees.

By this time, 1858, the split in the Democratic party was complete. The party was, in fact, going to pieces. The Republican party was fully organized, and was coming rapidly to the front as the party of the people and of the future. It was receiving immense accessions of persons of all shades of previous political opinions, including large numbers of Democrats who refused longer to follow that party in the direction it was going.

Among those who left the Democratic party at this time and joined the Republican was Judge Hovey. He was nominated for Congress this year, 1858, by the Republicans in the old First District, but was defeated by Hon. W. E. Niblack. After the election

Judge Hovey resumed the practice of his profession in Mount Vernon, and was so engaged in 1861 when the call to arms came, which was to mark the beginning of a new era in his own history, as well as in that of the nation.

CHAPTER III.

MILITARY SERVICES.

The long series of events which had been used by the plotters of secession as a pretext for an attempted dissolution of the Union culminated in the election of Abraham Lincoln as President. This event was a turning point in the history of the nation. The steady aggression of the slave power had reached the open avowal of a purpose to dissolve the Union in the event of Republican success in 1860. While using the cry of "sectionalism" against the Republican party, the Southern Democracy had themselves erected the sectional standard by practically asserting that the government was nothing without slavery, and the constitution worthless unless slavery was to be both protected and extended. Public sentiment, already debauched by a long and systematic course of Southern intrigue, was still further demoralized by the weakness and treachery of James Buchanan's administration. Public corruption was the rule, and honesty the exception. Patriots blushed with shame, and traitors laid their plans openly.

The election of Lincoln threw the South into a frenzy of rage. Four months of Buchanan's administration still remained in which to work their policy of rule or ruin, and they no longer attempted to conceal their purposes. Dissolution of the Union was the Southern ultimatum—peaceably if they could, forcibly if they must. The doctrine of secession was boldly avowed as a constitutional remedy against a Republican triumph, and the idea of preventing or “coercing” a State from going out of the Union was hooted at by every Southern Democrat, and a majority of those in the North. Thus, the fair and honest election of a Republican President was made a pretext for an attempt to dissolve the Union.

The firing on Fort Sumter, April 12, 1861, was the first overt act of war on the part of the aggressors, and the opening scene of the great drama which was to convulse the country and engage the attention of the civilized world. Its effect upon the North was magical. Party lines were at once obliterated, and, for a time at least, the only line of demarcation among the people was between those who supported the government and those who sympathized with the South. The former were an overwhelming majority. The attack upon, and surrender of, Fort Sumter was followed by the greatest popular uprising the world ever saw.

The border States felt the shock and the strain more than others, and the border counties of these States most of all. One of these, separated only by the Ohio river from Kentucky, and more or less subject to Southern influence, was Posey county. While the storm was gathering, and before hostilities had actually commenced, some of the border counties realized the necessity of taking steps for local self-defense. Judge Hovey was one of the first to fully realize the significance of the attack on Fort Sumter, and the necessity of making military preparations. Loyal to the core, and ardent and impulsive by nature, he was roused to the highest pitch of patriotic indignation by this practical declaration of war against the government, and he at once became one of the most prominent and active in devising measures of safety and defense. On the 21st of May the Board of Commissioners of Posey county "ordered that Robert Dale Owen and Alvin P. Hovey be, and they are hereby, authorized and directed to go to Indianapolis, or any other place they may deem proper, to negotiate for arms for Posey county. The said agents are authorized and empowered to propose to the State of Indiana, on behalf of Posey county, to advance \$10,000 for the purchase of arms, for the use of Posey county, in consideration of receiving from the State a like sum in State bonds. Said arms to be delivered to the Board of Commissioners of said county,

and subject to their disposal under the laws of the State.”

This mission to Indianapolis brought Hovey into personal contact with Governor O. P. Morton, who immediately recognized in him a valuable and powerful aid in the great work now about to be devolved upon him. They were acquainted before this time, and each knew something of the other's ability, but they had not been thrown into close relations. Hovey was two years the older. Both had been Democrats, and both had left the party on account of the slavery question or questions growing out of it. Both realized the gravity of the present situation, and foresaw the coming storm.

Governor Morton was quick to read men, and had a keen eye for such as he could trust and utilize. In the gigantic work and responsibility devolved upon him he had need of all the loyal aids and helpers he could get, and most loyally did the noble sons of Indiana respond to his call and that of President Lincoln through him. Hovey was one of those whom he early selected as one of his trusted helpers. From the first visit of Hovey and Owen to Indianapolis to obtain arms for Posey county until the end of the war he and Morton were close friends and co-workers in the Union cause. Hovey was a man after Governor Morton's own heart—loyal, brave, fearless, zealous and

untiring, true to his country, his government and his party.

The people of Indiana do not need to be reminded of the great labors performed and the immense services to the State rendered by Governor O. P. Morton during the war period. A volume might be written concerning them and the half not told. They will be remembered as long as the history of the war continues to be read. It would be impossible here even to catalogue them. Among other things he did in the first months of the war was to organize what was known as the Indiana Legion for the defense of the State and other duty independent of the national government. It proved a very valuable organization in more than one emergency, and became a sort of training school for the army, out of which a large number of officers and men subsequently passed into the active service.

Shortly after his return to Mount Vernon from his mission to Indianapolis concerning arms, Hovey, at the request of Governor Morton, assisted in raising and organizing a regiment for the Home Legion. It was the First Regiment, First Brigade, of the Legion, and was raised wholly in Posey County. Hovey was commissioned Colonel of the regiment "He evinced," says the Adjutant-General's report, "the utmost zeal, energy and tact, to which the loyal people of his

county responded with cordial alacrity, and his command was making rapid progress toward military efficiency when, about three months from the date of his appointment, he resigned his commission to accept the Colonelcy of the Twenty-fourth Indiana Volunteers." His father-in-law, Colonel Enoch R. James, succeeded him as Colonel of this Posey county regiment.

By this time it had become pretty evident that the government had a long and hard struggle before it. The first battle of Bull Run, fought July 21, 1861, and resulting disastrously to the Union cause, had been followed by a call for additional troops, which opened the door for many who did not get in under the first call. The Twenty-fourth Regiment was recruited in the counties of Posey, Knox, Vanderburgh, Lawrence, Pike, Orange and Daviess. Hovey was commissioned Colonel of the regiment August 13, 1861. The following brief sketch of its service will interest old members:

The Twenty-fourth Regiment was organized and mustered into service at Vincennes July 31, 1861, with Alvin P. Hovey as Colonel, and on the 19th of August marched to St. Louis, joining Fremont's army at that place; it moved into the interior of Missouri, where it remained until February, 1862, when it was ordered to reinforce the army then investing Fort Donelson. Reaching Paducah, Ky., the day after the

surrender of Fort Donelson, it proceeded to Fort Henry, where it remained until the march of Grant's army to Pittsburg Landing. It was engaged in the battle of Shiloh, losing many men and officers. Colonel Hovey being promoted a Brigadier-General on the 28th of April, Major Spicely became Colonel of the regiment. In May and June following it participated in the siege of Corinth, and after the evacuation proceeded across the country to Memphis. In July the regiment was transferred to Helena, Arkansas, where it remained during the winter, engaged in sundry expeditions sent out from that post. In the spring of 1863 it joined Grant's army, and was with Hovey's division of the Thirteenth Corps during the campaign against Vicksburg, engaging in all the battles and skirmishes, including the battles of Port Gibson and Champion Hill. During the siege of Vicksburg it was actively engaged in the trenches from the 19th of May until the 4th of July, and after the surrender sailed for New Orleans, reaching that city in August. In the fall of 1863 the regiment was on duty at New Iberia, Louisiana, and subsequently at Algiers, near New Orleans, where, January 1, 1864, it re-enlisted as a veteran organization, and soon after visited Indiana on furlough. During the year 1864 it was stationed at different points in Louisiana. In January, 1865, it was transferred to Florida, remaining there until the movement was made against Mobile in April, when it moved to the vicinity of that city and participated in the siege, taking part in the battles and assaults. From here it was sent to Selma,

Alabama, and thence again to Galveston, Texas. Five companies of the regiment were mustered out July 19, 1865, and had a public reception at Indianapolis on the 4th of August, at which General Hovey and others delivered addresses. The rest of the regiment was not mustered out till the fall of 1865.

The regiment, while organizing, rendezvoused at Vincennes. Along with Colonel Hovey's commission came marching orders, directing it to proceed at once to St. Louis. All old soldiers remember how green and undisciplined, yet how patriotic and warlike, new regiments were. "Scarcely had the Twenty-fourth pitched its tents in St. Louis," says Mr. Heath, "and entered upon the regular preparations for war, till the boys became anxious to fight. Colonel Hovey's combative disposition seemed to be catching, and it spread throughout the command an anxiety to move to the front. The Colonel went to General Fremont and told him that he wanted to move his troops outside of the city, to which Fremont responded that the Twenty-fourth could be taken to any point in the vicinity desired, but that it should not be permitted to go beyond easy signal. Colonel Hovey moved to Carondelet, just outside of St. Louis, where an open space suitable for drilling ground was found. Here the regiment was daily drilled from daylight to dark. The discipline was kindly but very positively enforced.

Some of the boys complained at that time at the hard work they were compelled to undergo, and it was here that the commander was accused of being "tyrannical," but not many months were permitted to elapse before those same soldiers saw the wisdom of Colonel Hovey's action, and they praised him for it. He insisted upon company and battalion drills, and dress parade late in the afternoon, and a night school for the officers. It was extremely hard work, but upon none did the duties fall so arduously as upon the commander.

"When the new forces then at St. Louis were formed into divisions, Hovey was given command of one, although he was the youngest Colonel in that army. The ability he displayed in drilling his men recommended him for the confidence which was thus imposed."

The service of the regiment in Missouri, though involving some laborious marches and useful expeditions, was not marked by any conspicuous military events. Its real history began after it was ordered to Tennessee. There it was brigaded with the Eleventh Indiana and the Eighth Missouri and attached to the Third Division of the Army of the Tennessee, General Lew. Wallace commanding. The brigade was in the battle of Shiloh, April 6 and 7, 1862, and the Twenty-fourth lost fifty-one men killed and wounded. In his

official report of the battle, General Wallace mentions Colonel Hovey among those to whom "the gratitude of the whole country is due." Colonel Hovey's official report shows that the regiment had hot work and hard fighting. He said: "I say, with a pride I can not conceal, that the Twenty-fourth never faltered nor gave back one inch from the first charge in the morning until the enemy gave way in the evening. In an exposed condition in the open field, over hill, valley and woodland for more than three miles, assailed by every missile known in modern war, their march was onward, with loud cheers, and full of confidence in victory." For gallantry and services in the battle of Shiloh Colonel Hovey was promoted to Brigadier-General, his commission dating April 28, 1862.

The next few months were spent in scouting, skirmishing, etc. Without entering into detail as to General Hovey's movements and services, it is enough to say they were varied and important, and show that he had the confidence of his superior officers. June 24, 1862, General U. S. Grant, writing to General Halleck, from Memphis, Tenn., said: "On my arrival, General Wallace applied for a leave of absence. I granted it to the extent of my authority, the command being left with General Hovey, who is fully qualified to fill the place of the former commander."

Memphis at this time was a hot-bed of disloyalty. When General Grant established his headquarters there he found that constant communication existed between soldiers in the rebel army and their friends in Memphis, and he accordingly ordered the families of all persons in the rebel army or in the service of the rebel government to move south beyond the lines in five days from the date of his order, or take an oath that they had not furnished information to the enemy, and that they would not give intelligence to him in the future.

After a short administration General Grant returned to Corinth, leaving the reins in the hands of General Hovey, who, still increasing the rigor of Federal rule, required all male residents of the city between the ages of eighteen and forty-five to take the oath of allegiance. Between one and two thousand succumbed, and five hundred who refused were exiled from the city.

The measure subjected General Hovey to severe criticism. The New York *Herald*, echoed by minor papers, sneered at the Indiana commandant, insinuating that, clothed with a little brief authority, he was led into indiscreet arrogance, and accused him of increasing the strength of the rebel army by the addition of at least a thousand men. Admitting the accusation, General Hovey considered a thousand armed

enemies without the Federal lines less dangerous than a thousand enemies within, even though the latter should be armed only with a bitter and venomous tongue.

General Sherman was of the same opinion, and on taking command of the post confirmed Hovey's order, and added restrictions upon trade for the purpose of preventing the passage of gold, silver and treasury notes into the Confederacy.

General Hovey remained in command at Memphis only a short time, and was then ordered to Helena, Arkansas. On the 2d of November, 1862, he was assigned to the command of the district of Eastern Arkansas, Department of the Missouri, headquarters at Helena. Here he commanded about 30,000 men, many of them Indiana troops, including the Eighth, Eleventh, Twenty-third, Twenty-fourth, Twenty-sixth, Thirty-third, Thirty-fourth, Forty-third, Forty-sixth and Forty-seventh Regiments, and some Indiana batteries and cavalry.

A characteristic incident which occurred at Helena is thus related: "While in command here another General Hovey figured in the history of the Federal army at Oldtown, near Helena. The second Hovey was in no way connected by blood or otherwise with General Alvin P. Hovey. The former's name was Charles E. Hovey, from Illinois, and he was called by

the boys in blue 'Cotton Hovey,' while the Indianian was known as the 'Anti-Cotton Hovey.'

"There was a great deal of cotton speculation going on among some of the Federal commanders, and the intense opposition to jobbery of this character on the part of the Indiana General was outspoken at all times. He never missed an occasion to denounce the speculators in the bitterest terms. Instead of participating in or countenancing the speculations in cotton, General Hovey burned cotton-gins and seed wherever he found them in the hands of the enemy, and advocated the depletion of the country as one of the surest means of driving the Confederates to a final surrender.

"The connection of several Federal officers with cotton speculations resulted in an investigation by a court of inquiry under Major-General McDowell at St. Louis. The reports and complaints made by General Hovey doubtless had much to do with bringing about this court of inquiry. The General flatly informed his superior commanders that he did not propose to longer wink at these transactions, and that he was very weary of placing his soldiers to guard the cotton belonging to speculators. On one occasion the Forty-sixth Indiana had lost several men who were placed to guard cotton under command of General Curtis, and this made General Hovey extremely impatient, and led him

to call the attention of the Secretary of War to these affairs officially.

“An incident occurred precipitating this action which was very fortunate for General Hovey, as it put an end to the cotton trafficking. A man named Sprague, connected with immense cotton-mills in New Jersey, passed up the river one day on a steamer loaded with cotton. General Hovey discovered and hailed the steamer with a cannon-ball, bringing it in. When Sprague stepped ashore and advanced toward General Hovey, the sight of the man made the latter’s blood almost boil. General Hovey told him that if it was in his authority to do so he would like to stretch the neck of every cotton jobber until they would not be recognized by their friends. Sprague was taken aback; but he parried the thrust by coolly drawing from his pocket an order signed by Secretary Stanton, who had given him authority to pass through the Federal lines for that business. The authority to do this work did not, however, cool the indignation of the officers and soldiers. General Townsend, Adjutant-General United States army, soon came down to Helena, and the soldiers being assembled in the new ‘Fort Curtis,’ just finished he addressed them on matters pertaining to the condition of the country.

“The boys in blue cried aloud, ‘Hovey!’ ‘Hovey!’ and the General responded. He told the Adjutant-

General to go back to Washington and tell President Lincoln that he and his men were tired of fighting for cotton; that he had lately marched into the very heart of Mississippi, and found Yankees and Jews dealing in cotton and acting like spies in every direction. Then General Hovey went to General Grant, at Young's Point, and told him that he wanted to leave the army and go home and enter private life if he could not be dissevered from every officer or man who was engaging in cotton speculation and barter, which were costing the lives of good men every day. He said that he would not further protect those who were dealing in cotton, and that he wanted to know then and there whether he should resign his commission in the army, or be relieved from further service at Helena. General Grant told him to go back and pick out 10,000 of the best men he had and come to him. This, General Hovey did; and this explains why he left Helena.

"While the court of inquiry was pursuing its investigation General Hovey wrote General McDowell in reference to the confusion in the public mind about the two Hoveys. He received the following reply, which was a complete exoneration:

"ST. LOUIS, MO., April 11, 1863.

"GENERAL—I received last night your letter of the 6th. There is no misapprehension in the minds

of the court as to which 'General Hovey' has been referred to in connection with traffic, etc., in cotton. The record of the court is clear on the same point. It may have happened, in the course of examination, that a witness, after having stated which Hovey he referred to, has stated that General Hovey did this or that without again saying General C. E. Hovey, or General Hovey, of Illinois. I have shown your letter to one of the reporters, and he will see that a notice is made of it in the papers. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

“ IRVIN McDOWELL, Major-General.

“ *Brigadier-General Alvin P. Hovey, commanding Twelfth Division, Thirteenth Army Corps, Helena, Ark.*”

On the 27th of November, 1862, he left Helena in command of an expedition to the vicinity of Grenada, Mississippi, intending to create a diversion in favor of Grant's movement in another quarter. On this expedition Hovey commanded 5,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and fourteen field-pieces. After a long and hard march he succeeded in cutting the railroads, stampeding the rebel forces at Grenada, and returning safely through the enemy's country with slight loss. These aggressive expeditions were kept up during most of the winter.

After General Hovey went to Helena, General W. T. Sherman wrote to him from Memphis, October 29, 1862: “ I was pleased to hear that you had succeeded

to the command at Helena. We should keep up a correspondence of ideas, for although we are in different departments we are near together." The rest of the letter was semi-personal and very friendly. A constant correspondence and close relations were kept up between Sherman at Memphis and Hovey at Helena.

Following is General Hovey's official report of an expedition made about this time :

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION INTO MISSISSIPPI, }
MOUTH OF COLDWATER, Dec. 5, 1862. }

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that, in conformity with your orders, and orders heretofore received by me from Major-General Curtis, I embarked five thousand infantry of the Second and Fourth Divisions, and two thousand cavalry, together with two sections from each battery belonging to said divisions, on board sixteen steamers at Helena, and disembarked the same at Delta on the 27th ultimo. The cavalry, on the following day, under command of Brigadier-General Washburn, was pushed forward to the mouth of Coldwater, a distance of forty-five miles, and, after a spirited skirmish, drove the enemy's pickets from the east bank of the Tallahatchie. The pioneer company, under command of First Lieutenant, immediately commenced building a bridge across the Tallahatchie, which was finished by 4 o'clock P. M. on the next day, by which time the head of the infantry column had reached the west bank of the river. Be-

fore dark, the cavalry, with six small guns, the Eleventh Indiana, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dan. Macaulley, Twenty-fourth Indiana, under Lieutenant-Colonel Barter, both commanded by Colonel W. T. Spicely, Twenty-fourth Indiana, had crossed the bridge.

On the same night, November 29th, General Washburn dashed forward to within seven miles of Grenada. On the next morning, November 30th, to support his column and protect his rear, Colonel Spicely was ordered to advance the Eleventh and Twenty-fourth Indiana to Mitchell's Cross-roads, a point about twelve miles northeast of our camp, on the Tallahatchie. On the succeeding day, December 1st, the pickets of the Eleventh and Twenty-fourth, under command of Major Darnell, Eleventh Indiana, commenced a lively skirmish with the enemy across a small stream known on the maps as the Goe-na-pa-la-pha, which continued without much injury for several hours, and until our cavalry returned, when General Washburn caused his small guns to be brought to bear upon the enemy and they precipitately fled. A bridge was soon constructed over this stream, and the cavalry camped that night, with the infantry, on the field of the late skirmish.

Brigadier-General Washburn fully and accurately describes his movements and several dashes in detail in his report, a copy of which is herewith transmitted.

It gives me great pleasure to say that Brigadier-General Washburn's conduct during the expedition was dashing, bold, fearless and effective, and could not have been excelled. To the enemy our cavalry seemed

ubiquitous—at Charleston, near Grenada, at Panola, Oakland, all within so short a time that the enemy supposed several columns were advancing on the rear of General Pemberton's army, and gave rise to the wildest conjectures as to the magnitude of our forces and designs.

Major-General Grant in the mean time had been pressing the enemy near Abbeville, and as soon as the rebels were apprised of our presence in their rear an order was promulgated in their camp ordering three days' rations and preparations for retreat. Intercepted letters, prisoners and citizens confirm the fact beyond doubt.

Our demonstration and diversion was complete, and before your order expressing satisfaction with our labors and ordering our return was received the whole body of the rebel forces under Pemberton had broken camp on the Tallahatchie and retreated to the south and east of our camp.

On the 30th I ordered Captain Owen, First Indiana Cavalry, to proceed down the Tallahatchie and capture or burn the steamer New Moon. This he fully accomplished by burning her, and returned the same evening.

In our several skirmishes we had many horses killed, and one man killed and fourteen wounded. I have every reason to believe the enemy suffered far more severely.

Besides burning bridges on both railroads, cutting telegraph wires and tearing up the track, our troops destroyed one locomotive and about thirty freight cars, and took forty prisoners.

As for bravery, energy, endurance, forbearance and cheerfulness, the conduct of officers and men was admirable. Exposed for ten days to storms and cold, they seemed as fresh and ready for service on their return as they were on the day of their embarkation. Their health, under the circumstances, is remarkable, and I can not refrain from saying that it may, to a great extent, be attributed to the watchfulness and care of Surgeons Jessup and Casslebury, and the medical corps under their charge.

To the members of my staff, Captain John E. Phillips, Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Owen, and Lieutenant McQuiddy, I am under many obligations for their untiring energy, bravery and endurance. They fully performed their respective duties.

I can not refrain from stating to you the effects of the great evil growing out of our commercial intercourse with the rebels. Unprincipled sharpers and Jews are supplying the enemy with all they want. Our forces penetrated ninety miles into the very heart of Mississippi, and everywhere we were met with boots, shoes, clothing and goods purchased by open and avowed rebels at Delta and Friar's Point. The "Yankees" are deluging the country with contraband goods, and letters intercepted from the army show from whence they are receiving their supplies. War and commerce with the same people! What a Utopian dream! Every secret of our camps is carried by these same men, who formerly sold their God for thirty pieces of silver, to our worst enemies for a few pounds of cotton.

I have made three expeditions into the enemy's country beyond Helena, and everywhere I find the blighting effects of their cupidity. No expedition has ever been dreamed of at Helena that the bloodhounds of commerce have not scented out and carried to our enemies days in advance.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

ALVIN P. HOVEY,

Brig.-Gen. Commanding Expedition.

To Brig.-Gen. Frederick Steele, Commanding Eastern District Arkansas.

An attempt has been made, for political purposes, to pervert the spirit and meaning of this report by giving an offensive construction to that part relating to the operations of "unprincipled sharpers and Jews." It is plain on the face of the report that General Hovey's indignation was directed indiscriminately against trading Jews, trading Yankees, and all who were engaged in contraband traffic. These commercial camp-followers and cotton-thieves of different nationalities traded in contraband information as well as contraband goods, and supplied the rebels with military secrets as well as with the necessities of life. It was too much to expect a loyal officer to regard such transactions with composure. Certainly, General Hovey was not the man to do it, and when his indignation found vent he was not particularly choice in his language of denunciation. No fair-minded man, how-

ever, can fail to see that his mind was dwelling principally on the disloyal traffic that was being carried on, and that his indignation embraced all who were engaged in it. The actors in a great war, and under such circumstances as General Hovey was placed in, can hardly be expected to weigh their words as carefully as the writer of a diplomatic note or a magazine article. But, fairly construed, there is nothing in the reference to trading Jews or Yankees to give offense to honest and loyal men of either class.

The activity of the "Copperheads" in Indiana during the winter of 1863 caused great indignation among the soldiers at the front. It was regarded, and rightly, as an attack in the rear, and the soldiers omitted no opportunity to express their opinion in regard to the treasonable machinations of the rebel sympathizers and cowards at home. While General Hovey was in command at Helena the following address was issued. It was written by him, and signed by four other officers who had entered the service as Democrats:

To the Democracy of Indiana:

Having a deep interest in the future glory and welfare of our country, and believing that we occupy a position in which we can see the effects of the political struggles at home upon the hopes and fears of the rebels, we deem it to be our duty to speak to you openly and plainly in regard to the same.

The rebels of the South are leaning on the Northern Democracy for support, and it is unquestionably true that unjustifiable opposition to the administration is "giving aid and comfort to the enemy." While it is the duty of patriots to oppose the usurpation of power, it is alike their duty to avoid captious criticisms, that might create the very evils which they attempt to avoid.

The name of *Democrat*, associated with all that is bright and glorious in the history of the past, is being sullied and disgraced by demagogues, who are appealing to the lowest prejudices and passions of our people. We have nothing to expect from the South, and nothing to hope, without their conquest. They are now using their money freely to subsidize the press and politicians of the North, and with what effect the tone of some of our journals and the speeches of some of their leaders too plainly and painfully testify.

We see, with deep solicitude and regret, that there is an undercurrent in Indiana tending toward a coalition of the Northwest with the South against the Eastern States. Be not deceived. Pause, for the love you bear to your country, and reflect. This movement is only a rebel scheme in disguise, that would involve you, alike with themselves, in the crime of rebellion, and bring to your own hearthstones the desolation of a French revolution. Separation on either side, with peace in the future, is impossible, and we are compelled by self-interest, by every principle of honor, and every impulse of manhood, to bring this unholy contest to a successful termination.

What! admit that we are whipped? That twenty-three millions of Northern men are unequal to nine millions of the South? Shame on the State that would entertain so disgraceful a proposition! Shame upon the Democrat who would submit to it, and raise his cowardly voice and claim that he was an Indian! He, and such dastards, with their offspring, are fit "mud-sills" upon which should be built the lordly structure of their Southern aristocracy! And with whom would this unholy alliance be formed? With men who have forgotten their fathers, their oaths, their country and their God; with guerrillas, cotton-burners; with those who force every male inhabitant of the South capable of bearing arms into the field, though starving wives and babes are left behind! Men who persecute or hang, or drive from their lines, every man, woman and child who will not fall down and worship the Southern god. And yet free-born men of our State will sympathize with such tyrants, and dare even to dream of coalition! Indiana's proud and loyal legions number at least seventy thousand effective men in the field; and, as with one great heart, we know they would repudiate all unholy combinations tending to the dismemberment of our government.

In this dark hour of our country's trial, there is but one road to success and peace, and that is *to be as firmly united for our government as the rebels are against it*. Small differences of opinion amount to nothing in this grand struggle for a nation's existence. Do not place even one straw in the way, and remem-

ber that every word you speak to encourage the South nerves the arm and strikes the blow which is aimed at the heart's blood of our brothers and kindred.

ALVIN P. HOVEY, Brigadier-General.

WILLIAM T. SPICELY, Colonel 24th Ind.

WILLIAM E. MCLEAN, Colonel 43d Ind.

GEORGE F. MCGINNIS, Colonel 11th Ind.

JAMES R. SLACK, Colonel 47th Ind.

Helena, Arkansas, February 2, 1863.

While at Helena General Hovey had command of about thirty thousand men, including twelve or fifteen Indiana regiments. He commanded brigades or divisions in the battles of Shiloh, Corinth, Port Gibson, Champion's Hill, Big Black, siege of Vicksburg, siege of Jackson, Rocky-faced Ridge, Dalton, Resaca and Altoona Church, besides being engaged in many skirmishes and small affairs, and was with Sherman in his march to the sea, down to Kenesaw. A mere mention of most of these must suffice.

During the siege of Vicksburg General Hovey commanded the Twelfth Division of the Thirteenth Army Corps (McClelland's). The division consisted of two brigades of infantry, the first commanded by General George F. McGinnis, embracing the Eleventh, Twenty-fourth, Thirty-fourth and Forty-sixth Indiana and the Twenty-ninth Wisconsin regiments. The second brigade, commanded by General James A. Slack, consisted of the Forty-seventh Indiana, Twenty-fourth

and Twenty-eighth Iowa, and Fifty-sixth Ohio regiments. The division had, also, four batteries of artillery and a small battalion of cavalry. General Hovey commanded this division during the preliminary operations against and during the siege of Vicksburg, and it did its full share of the fighting. He was fortunate in his brigade commanders, and in the rank and file composing his command. His officers and men contributed in large measure to his success and that of the common cause.

The battle of Champion's Hill, May 16, 1863, was the most important of those immediately preceding the siege of Vicksburg. As the turning point of the final movement against Vicksburg, and virtually decisive of the final result, it was really one of the pivotal battles of the war. It was so regarded by General Grant, who remarked afterward that Vicksburg was virtually won at Champion's Hill. So it was, and the great battle decisive of the control of the Mississippi river, and the fate of the Mississippi valley, was won by the valor of Western troops, mostly Indiana troops, under an Indiana general. General Hovey's division bore a leading part in this engagement, and it would hardly be exaggerating to say that it and he were the heroes of the battle.

With the surrender of Vicksburg and the battle of Gettysburg, General Sherman says the civil war was

practically ended in favor of the North. All that followed was simply carrying the war into "the last ditch." The importance of the possession of Vicksburg to the Union cause was early recognized. Immediately after the capture of New Orleans, Admiral Farragut proceeded up the river with a little fleet of mortar-boats. But the necessity of keeping Vicksburg had been quite as well understood by the South. It was called the "Gibraltar of the Southern Confederacy." In April, 1862, New Orleans had been captured by the North. Memphis, Island 10, and the chief points on the Mississippi above Vicksburg, were already in the hands of the United States. With Vicksburg, the Confederacy would lose its last hold on the great river. The Southern authorities, therefore, held to their Gibraltar with a death grip. The struggle for its possession was a most determined one, and brought out very conspicuously General Grant's great and indomitable qualities. It was, in fact, a turning-point in his career as well as in the war. Several attempts to capture it had been made without success, and Grant now determined upon a new plan of operations, the success or failure of which might involve his own, and possibly that of the rebellion. A military critic says:

"Grant was now at the turning-point, not only of this campaign, but of his whole career. He had not

then the world-renowned fame with which we have so long been accustomed to associate his name; at that time he occupied a position in popular estimation similar to that held by Hooker, Rosecrans and Banks, who then commanded the other principal armies, and, like them, he was on trial. He had gained a great victory at Fort Donelson, and he had fought a most desperate battle, which was not a defeat, yet hardly a victory, at Shiloh, in the previous year. But for twelve months he had apparently done nothing, the defense of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and its attendant battles of Iuka and Corinth, having made but little impression on the public mind. For the last three months his army had been lost to sight in the overflowed swamps of the Mississippi, whence came rumors of abortive expeditions, camp-fevers and dissatisfaction. Many people were beginning to believe that Grant belonged to the same dreary class of failures as McClellan, Burnside, Fremont and Buell, and they importuned the President to relieve him. It was a gloomy period. The war had been in progress for two full years, and as yet the North had gained no really decisive victory except at Fort Donelson. During the preceding summer the Army of the Potomac had been driven back to Maryland, and the Army of the Cumberland to the Ohio river. Both armies had partially regained their ground, and then everything had come to a stand-still for months, in trying to break which the Army of the Potomac had only incurred renewed defeat and slaughter at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Such was the general

situation, and in Grant's particular operations the prospect was as unpromising as everywhere else. He was on a wrong trail—that was evident to every one; and it would not have been difficult to prove that the responsibility for it did not rest upon Grant. But Grant's mind did not run in the direction of arguing responsibility upon other people's shoulders. He was accustomed to take things as they were, and to devote his whole energies to making the best of them. He had now for two months tried every conceivable plan for crossing the low lands of the Yazoo delta, and reaching the high ground beyond the enemy's right flank. They had all failed. What should now be done? Three plans only were possible: First. To assault the enemy's batteries. Second. To go back to Memphis and recommence a campaign along the Mississippi Central Railroad. Third. To find a way through the swamps opposite Vicksburg, cross the Mississippi near Grand Gulf, and operate against the rear of Vicksburg, trusting to victory for supplies."

General Grant decided on the last plan, and, after a series of difficult movements involving immense labor and the overcoming of almost insuperable obstacles, he finally succeeded, with the co-operation of the gunboats and transports, in placing his army across the Mississippi river south of Vicksburg. He had intended to cross the river at Grand Gulf, but that place proved to be too strongly fortified to be reduced by a river attack from the front, and he determined to try

a little lower down, and, if possible, flank the batteries. The crossing was finally effected at Bruinsburg, a small landing place a short distance below Grand Gulf, from which point a road led to Port Gibson. The crossing was made April 30, 1863. The next few weeks were to witness a great deal of hard fighting. Within eighteen days from the time the first regiment of Grant's army landed at Bruinsburg the rebels had been defeated in several battles, and the defensive forces at Vicksburg had been driven into and shut up within their fortifications, never to come out except as prisoners. A military writer says: "In that time he had marched about 200 miles, and, by keeping his army together, had defeated the enemy's scattered detachments in four engagements, all fought within six days; he had inflicted a loss upon them of 8,000 in killed, wounded and missing; had captured eighty-eight pieces of their artillery, and, finally, had driven them into the narrow defenses of Vicksburg, causing their outworks at Haines' Bluff, Warrenton and Grand Gulf to be abandoned, and establishing his own base on the Yazoo river in easy and safe reach of his gunboats and transports. He had not only prevented the junction of the enemy's detachments, but had still further scattered their forces, so that they had fully 14,000 less men available in Vicksburg at the close of the period than at the beginning. During these

eighteen days Grant's men had had but five days' rations, having lived, for the rest, on the country. Their own losses had been a little less than 3,500. We must go back to the campaigns of Napoleon to find equally brilliant results accomplished in the same space of time with such small loss." In all these operations General Hovey's division bore a large and important part.

The first battle that occurred after Grant's forces crossed the Mississippi was that of Port Gibson, May 1, the day after crossing. Of this battle a correspondent says: "Here General Hovey again won his spurs. He was the first of the relief upon the field, and found an opportunity to achieve a signal victory by quick action and a very dangerous decisive move. The enemy was directly in front and in full view. Preparations were immediately made for a great charge upon Slack's brigade, which was at the edge of a ravine. General Hovey formed his lines, called his staff about him, and told his officers that the battery must be taken. Colonel Cameron, Colonel Raynor and other officers begged the honor of leading the attack. There was that confidence in the commander which made a brave and eager soldier of every officer and private on the field. The order was given, and a grand dash toward the enemy was made. It was an

assault which can only be likened to the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava. The battery was taken, with seven hundred prisoners, on the field, General Hovey himself dashing over it and beyond.

“Over three hundred of the Federals were killed. In returning from the ravine where the capture of the battery was made, General Hovey’s horse became frightened by the cheers of the men and made a run in the direction of General Grant, who witnessed the charge. In the mad flight of the horse across the field Hovey was thrown over the pommel of the saddle, and when the spot at which General Grant was stationed was reached the Hoosier commander presented a sad plight. Riding far upon the horse’s neck, his head uncovered, hair streaming over his face, and his spurs dangling over the horse’s back, he was unrecognizable at first to the commander-in-chief. The successful maneuver of General Hovey resulted in his being placed in command of the forces on that part of the field, and the successive charges made on that day elicited expressions of admiration from Grant himself.

“A desperate effort on that day was made by the sharp-shooters of the enemy, who occupied positions in the trees throughout the ravine, to take the life of General Hovey. These sharp-shooters were so well located and distributed that their work became very

destructive, and General Hovey's command finally dragged the ravine, as with a seine, and dislodged every one of them."

Following is General Hovey's official report of the battle of Port Gibson :

HEADQUARTERS 12TH DIVISION, 13TH A. C., }
IN THE FIELD, May 8, 1863. }

COLONEL—On the 28th we embarked on steamers for the purpose of aiding in the attack on Grand Gulf, and on the 29th witnessed the brilliant assault by the gun-boats upon that place. As it was supposed at that time that a battle would take place at Grand Gulf, the horses of all officers, except those commanding divisions, and all kinds of transportation were left behind. Subsequent events made this very onerous upon the officers and upon the command. On the 30th we again disembarked at Bruinsburg Landing, Mississippi, below Grand Gulf, and at 3 o'clock P. M. took up our line of march for Port Gibson, the order of march by divisions being, Carr's (Fourteenth), Osterhaus' (Ninth), Hovey's (Twelfth), Smith's (Tenth).

The organization of the Twelfth Division at that time was :

FIRST BRIGADE—GENERAL GEORGE F. M'GINNIS,
COMMANDING.

Twenty-fourth Indiana, commanded by Colonel W. T. Spicely.

Forty-sixth Indiana, commanded by Colonel T. H. Bringham.

Eleventh Indiana, commanded by Colonel Dan Macauley.

Twenty-ninth Wisconsin, commanded by Colonel Charles R. Gill.

Thirty-fourth Indiana, commanded by Colonel R. A. Cameron.

Sixteenth Ohio Battery, commanded by Captain I. A. Mitchell.

Second Ohio Battery, commanded by First Lieutenant Aug. Beach.

SECOND BRIGADE—COLONEL JAMES R. SLACK, COMMANDING.

Twenty-fourth Iowa, commanded by Colonel E. C. Byram.

Twenty-eighth Iowa, commanded by Colonel John Connell.

Fifty-sixth Ohio, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Raynor.

Forty-Seventh Indiana, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. McLaughlin.

First Missouri Battery, commanded by Captain Schofield.

Peoria Light Artillery, commanded by Second Lieutenant Fenton.

We continued our march through the night. Near 2 o'clock in the morning of the 1st of May cannonading was heard in our front, which continued for several moments. The column pressed forward, and at daylight reached Center creek, about three miles west of Port Gibson. At this point, at 5:30 o'clock A. M., my division was ordered to take position a few

hundred yards in advance, upon the right of the road, on the crest of two hills, nearly opposite the Schaffer farm-house, at that time the headquarters of Major-General McClelland. The First Brigade occupied the position in front, nearest the enemy's line, and at right angles to the road, and the Second Brigade on a similar ridge in the rear of the First Brigade.

The lines of each brigade were formed under fire from the enemy, who were being engaged by Brigadier-General Benton to my left, and near the center of the line of battle.

At this juncture I received orders from Major-General McClelland to hold my division as a reserve until the arrival of the Tenth Division, commanded by Brigadier-General Smith, at which time my whole command was to be in readiness to take part in the action. On receiving this command I ordered my division to lie down under the cover of the brows of the hills. In less than thirty minutes afterward General Smith arrived, and the fact was announced to the Major-General commanding. In the mean time, the brigade under General Benton was engaged in a severe conflict with the enemy upon our left, and gallantly resisting almost overwhelming numbers. About 7 o'clock A. M. aides from Major-General McClelland came rapidly forward with orders directing me, without the least delay, to support General Benton's line. I immediately ordered Brigadier-General McGinnis to march the infantry of the First Brigade in line of battle, across a deep and rugged ravine, to his support. All concur in describing this ravine as being about

forty rods wide, and filled with vines, cane, deep gulches, and exceedingly difficult of passage. The enemy, no doubt, regarded it as impassable.

As soon as the First Brigade had commenced moving, I ordered the Second Brigade, Colonel Slack commanding, to march by the right flank around the head of the ravine in support of our forces engaged in the center. They reached their proper position in line of the division beyond the ravine about the same time the left of the First Brigade arrived, the right of the First Brigade being still engaged in working through the tangled vines and underbrush of the ravine. As I rode down the road toward the front and middle of my line, I met Captain Klaus, First Indiana Battery, who had been gallantly fighting the rebel batteries. The field around him and one disabled gun testified to the nature of the conflict. He at once pointed out the position of the rebel battery, the guns of which, with a line of rebel heads in their rear, were plainly visible. I immediately rode down under cover of the brow of the ravine to the head of the Second Brigade, where Colonels Slack and Cameron were standing. Lieutenant-Colonel Raynor, of the Fifty-sixth Ohio, who had been supporting Captain Klauss' battery, here joined us. Here I attempted to communicate with General McGinnis, who was in the rear of his brigade, but the ground was impassable for my aides on horseback, and my voice could not be heard on account of the noise around him. I pointed out the battery first to Colonel Cameron, and told him it must be taken. Colonel Slack claimed the honor for his command, but I set-

tled the matter by directing Colonel Cameron, of the Thirty-fourth Indiana Regiment, to make the charge, and Lieutenant-Colonel Raynor, Fifty-sixth Ohio, to support it. I also directed Colonel Slack to hold his brigade ready to move forward at any instant. The distance of the rebel battery from the point of my attack could not have exceeded 150 yards. Upon receiving the order to charge, Colonel Cameron commanded his battalion to leap the fence, which, with the Fifty-sixth Ohio, rushed, with loud shouts and fixed bayonets, toward the battery. Their advance was met with grape from the rebel battery and a shower of ball from the rebel line. The fire became intense and concentrated, and both regiments, to shield themselves, fell to the ground, whilst the fire continued for two or three minutes longer on both sides. At this juncture I gave the command, "Forward," as loud as I could, and had the satisfaction of seeing the Thirty-fourth and Fifty-sixth spring to their feet, and, with two companies of the Eleventh Indiana, which I knew by their dress, and several other companies from my division, which I could not then distinguish, rush forward to the charge. Again the bright bayonets of the Twelfth Division were glittering in the sun! Again a wild shout of triumph reverberated through the hills! The enemy were beaten back, between two and three hundred were taken prisoners, and one stand of colors, two twelve-pound howitzers, three cannons and three six mule-teams loaded with ammunition was the reward of this chivalric action. The particular men or companies who seized

the colors, took the guns and turned them upon the enemy, wounded and took the prisoners, I can not tell, as in the hot contest of the moment but momentary daguerrean sketches could have fixed the fact. One thing is certain, the honor of the charge belongs to the Twelfth Division. I gave the command, my men obeyed and made the charge, manned the guns and discharged them at the enemy, took the prisoners and have the battle-flag of the battery, now in possession of the gallant Colonel Raynor. That other gallant men were there after the inception of the charge, and sustained it, may be so, as officers and men of this corps are not only ready, but more than willing, to do their duty; but that any organized body of troops from any other division participated in the capture is, I think, contrary to the position of the corps at the time and "the truth of history."

Immediately after the charge was made, several regiments formed on the same ridge in line of battle, and the wildest enthusiasm prevailed as Major-General Grant and Major-General McClelland rode down our lines. General Grant and General McClelland commanded me to press the whole line forward immediately and drive the enemy from the field before they could be reinforced. I gave the command to the brigades of my own division and to the gallant Colonel William Landram, commanding the Second Brigade, Tenth Division, who, with my division, immediately marched across a ravine in the direction the enemy had taken. On reaching the plateau or ridge beyond, our line again received the enemy's fire, from

a long, woody ravine, which lay at the base of the ridge. Skirmishers at different points opened fire upon the enemy for several minutes. Passing through a slight opening in this ravine, Colonel Slack formed the Forty-seventh Indiana and Fifty-sixth Ohio in a line of battle, and opened fire upon the enemy. Being severely pressed, he was subsequently reinforced by the Twenty-fourth Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel W. T. Spicely commanding, and Twenty-ninth Wisconsin, Colonel Gill, and after a hot and spirited contest of an hour and a half, with about equal numbers, they forced the enemy to retire before them. Here these gallant regiments met with severe loss. During this contest and when passing down our lines to the right I met General McGinnis, who informed me that the enemy were moving on our right, with the probable intention of flanking us. He had previously sent to the right three companies of skirmishers from the Eleventh and Twenty-fourth Indiana, Colonel Cameron, with the Thirty-fourth. As we passed down the line my aide, Lieutenant I. P. Pope, discovered a rebel battery moving in the same direction, supported by a large force of infantry marching hidden by the woody ravine. I plainly saw their heavy column advancing. In a few minutes the rebel battery opened on our lines, firing shell and shot from a twenty-four-pounder and twelve-pound howitzers. The shell and shot picked up on the field demonstrated their caliber. As my infantry were already in close supporting distance, I moved my four batteries on the

brow of the ridge and concentrated their fire into the ravine in the direction of the rebel lines and battery.

The position of my guns and infantry at this time is shown by a sketch accompanying this report. I am indebted to First Lieutenant William R. McConnal, aide on Major-General McClernand's staff, for the sketch and other similar favors. The fire from my batteries was well directed, and continued for over one hour, and drove the rebel battery and infantry from that part of the field. The honor of repulsing the enemy at this point unquestionably belongs to the battery of the Twelfth Division, who have my sincere thanks for their efficient service during the day. When the fire from the enemy ceased on the right, General McClernand sent orders to have two regiments move in line of battle, from our right, through the ravine in which the enemy had been concealed. Colonel Cameron, being on the extreme right at this time, was ordered, in conjunction with one regiment from General Smith's First Brigade, to perform this duty. The length of the ravine was nearly one mile, with its width ranging from a few yards to over one hundred. About equi-distant from its ends is a narrow neck through which the hills and ground beyond are plainly visible. To this neck the regiments last named marched in line of battle through the ravine, capturing several prisoners. Skirmishers from the Second Brigade continued firing some time in the upper end of the ravine, above the neck, when the enemy abandoned this part of the field and fled. The firing continued at irregular intervals along the line for some

time afterward, but the indications plainly proved that they were covering a rapid retreat. Thus ended the battle of Port Gibson, and we slept upon the fields two miles in advance of the morning's contest. It will be impossible for me to particularize each movement of the respective regiments. Their special actions are clearly in the reports of their commanders. I have no fault to find with any officer or private in my command. If any faltered I knew it not. Each brigade was handled in a masterly manner, and too much praise can not be bestowed on the veteran General McGinnis and the gallant Colonel Black, who commanded them. Faithfully, nobly and unfalteringly they, with their officers and men, performed their full duty of thorough soldiers. Their country must thank and reward them.

Throughout the day, in the hottest of the hail and on almost every part of the field where man or horse could go, Captain John E. Phillips, Assistant Adjutant-General, and my aides, First Lieutenant John T. McQuiddy and Joseph P. Pope, were carrying orders and making observations. Their assistance was invaluable to me, and their services deserve the highest praise.

George W. Bonnell, private, Company C, First Indiana Cavalry, who acted as my mounted orderly, proved himself worthy of promotion for his fearless bearing and services throughout the day.

To Surgeon Robert B. Jessup, Medical Director, and the medical corps who co-operated with him, the command is under great obligations for their services under the very trying difficulties which surrounded them.

The sick and wounded have been thoroughly cared for, although no ambulance or medical wagon accompanied my division. The surgeons carried all their medical stores on foot, and not only performed their whole duty by attending to the noble men who were wounded in my command, but, like the good Samaritan of other days, gave balm and bound up the wounds of suffering rebels by the wayside.

The prisoners taken by my command on the field of battle can not fall short of 400.

My casualties, as shown by accompanying reports, are, forty-two killed, 263 wounded, and three missing; total, 308.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

ALVIN P. HOVEY,

Brig.-Gen. Com'd'g 12th Div., 13th A. C.

Lieut.-Col. W. B. Scales, A. A. Gen. 13th A. C.

Hardly a day passed now without heavy fighting, and Hovey's division was in the thick of it. This is not, however, a military history, and only some salient points of the campaign can be touched upon.

The battle of Champion's Hill was one of those in which the rebels attempted to contest General Grant's approach toward Vicksburg. It occurred on the 16th of May, about two weeks after the crossing of the river, the scene of the battle being about twenty-five miles east and, of course, in the rear of Vicksburg. When Grant crossed the river it was with the intention, as understood at Washington, to unite his forces

with those of General Banks, and reduce Port Hudson. He knew his own design, and did not let General Halleck know it until he was too far gone on the road to be recalled. It was necessary, then, to his vindication that he succeed, and it was necessary that every officer under him should be the right man in the right place that he might succeed.

General Hovey was one of those officers, and the result proved that in him, at least, he had the right man, and that he had been put in the right place. Grant was between the two wings of the Confederate forces. Pemberton had been ordered by Johnston to attack the Union troops at Clinton, but had disobeyed, but on receiving a more pressing order to join the troops under his superior he undertook to do so. It was while trying to make the junction that he occupied the crest and slopes of Champion's Hill, and here it was that General Hovey struck him.

The following is General Hovey's official report of the operations of his command from the 1st to the 20th of May, including the battle of Champion's Hill:

HEADQUARTERS 12TH DIVISION, 13TH A. C., }
BEFORE VICKSBURG, May 25th, 1863. }

COLONEL—In compliance with an order from Major-General McClelland, I herewith send you a report of the action of my division from the battle of Port Gibson, on the 1st instant, to the date of my arrival at the works before Vicksburg, on the 20th instant.

On the 16th my division moved in the direction of Midway, or Champion's Hill, on the extreme right of the corps, General Osterhaus', General Carr's and General Smith's divisions moving in the same direction on other roads still farther to the south and left. My route lay on the Clinton and Vicksburg road, nearest to, and on the south of, the railroad. During the morning I had thrown forward a part of my escort under First Lieutenant James L. Carey, First Indiana Cavalry, to make reconnaissance in front of the advance guard and skirmishers of General McGinnis' brigade. On arriving near Champion's Hill, about 10 o'clock A. M., he discovered the enemy posted on the crest of the hill with a battery of four guns in the woods near the road, and on the highest point for many miles around. At the time, I was marching between the First and Second Brigades, so as to be ready for an attack on either flank. I immediately rode forward, and ordered General McGinnis to form his brigade in two lines, three regiments being in advance and two in the reserve.

Before my arrival, General McGinnis had formed his three advanced regiments in line of battle and had thrown out skirmishers in the front and flank of his command. The Second Brigade, Colonel James R. Slack commanding, was immediately formed on the left of the First Brigade, two regiments in advance and two in reserve. Skirmishers were at once sent forward covering my entire front, and had advanced to within sight of the enemy's battery. They were directed not to bring on the action until we were en-

tirely ready. At this point I attempted to communicate with Brigadier-General Osterhaus, but my messengers, not knowing the country nor his exact locality, were unable to find his division. In the mean time Major-General Grant arrived, and with him Major-General McPherson with his command. Before proceeding further it is necessary that the topography of the field should be described. Midway, or Champion's Hill, is equi-distant from Jackson and Vicksburg, and is near the Midway station, on the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad. It is a high promontory, some sixty or seventy feet above the common level of the country, and covered with woods, the Vicksburg and Clinton road leading over the crest. To the right and northeast of the hill are undulating fields, and on the left a woody, tangled ravine, through which troops might pass with great difficulty. (See map accompanying this report.)

About one-half of a mile from the points of the hill General McPherson formed his line of battle, in the open field, facing toward the side of the hill, at the distance from the hill of about four hundred yards, his front and the main front of my division being nearly at right angles. As my division ascended the hill its line conformed to the shape and became crescent-like, with the concave toward the hill. As soon as General McPherson's line was ready to take part in the contest, about 10:30 A. M., I ordered General McGinnis and Colonel Slack to press their skirmishers forward up the hill, and follow them firmly with their respective brigades. In a few minutes the fire opened

briskly along the whole line from my extreme left to the right of the forces engaged under Major-General McPherson ; and at 11 o'clock the battle opened hotly all along the line. The contest here continued for an hour by my forces. For over six hundred yards up the hill my division gallantly drove the enemy before them, capturing eleven guns and over three hundred prisoners, under fire. The Eleventh Indiana, Colonel Macauley, and Twenty-ninth Wisconsin, Colonel Gill, captured the four guns on the brow of the hill at the point of the bayonet. Colonel Bringham, with the Forty-sixth Indiana, gallantly drove the enemy from two guns on the right of the road ; and Colonel Byam, with his brave and eager Twenty-fourth Iowa, charged a battery of five guns on the left of the road, driving the enemy away, killing gunners and horses and capturing several prisoners.

At this time General McGinnis requested me to permit him to take one section of the Sixteenth Ohio Battery, commanded by Captain Mitchell, up the hill. The section was taken up, and after fighting gallantly, and firing sixteen rounds, was withdrawn, the danger of capture being imminent. Captain Mitchell, who fell during this attempt, will prove a great loss to his friends and country. First Lieutenant Murdock acted very gallantly during this affair, and deserves much praise for his coolness and bravery. In the mean time, the enemy, being rallied under cover of the woods, poured down the road in great numbers upon the position occupied by my forces. Seeing, from the character of the ground, that my division was likely to be

severely pressed, as the enemy would not dare advance on the open ground before General McPherson, who had handled them roughly on the right, I ordered our captured guns to be sent down the hill. A short time afterward I received a request to send support to General McGinnis, on the right. At this time my whole division, including reserves, had, for more than one hour, been actively engaged, and my only hope of support was from other commands.

Brigadier-General Quimby's division, commanded by Colonel Crocker, was near at hand, and had not yet been under fire. I sent to them for support, but, being unknown to the officers in command, considerable delay ensued, and I was compelled to resort to Major-General Grant to procure the order for their aid. Colonel Boomen, commanding Third Brigade of Quimby's division, on receiving the command from General Grant, came gallantly up the hill; Colonel Holmes, with two small regiments—Tenth Missouri and Seventeenth Iowa—soon followed, the entire force sent amounting to about 2,000 men. My division, in the mean time, had been compelled to yield ground before overwhelming numbers. Slowly and stubbornly they fell back, contesting with death every inch of the field they had won. Colonel Boomen and Colonel Holmes gallantly and heroically rushed with their commands into the conflict, but the enemy had massed his forces and slowly pressed our whole line, with the reinforcements, backward to a point near the brow of the hill. There a stubborn stand was made. The irregularity of our line of battle had previously

prevented me from using artillery in enfilading the enemy's line ; but as our forces were compelled to fall slowly back the line became marked and distinct, and about 2:30 o'clock P. M. I could easily perceive by the sound of fire-arms through the woods the positions of the respective armies.

I at once ordered the First Missouri Battery, commanded by Captain Schofield, and the Sixteenth Ohio Battery, under First Lieutenant Murdock, to take position in an open field beyond a slight mound on my right, in advance of and with parallel ranges of their guns with my lines. About the same time Captain Dillon's Wisconsin Battery was put in position, two sections of the Sixteenth Ohio Battery on the left, the Wisconsin Battery in the center and Captain Schofield's Battery on the right. Through the rebel ranks these batteries hurled an incessant shower of shot and shell, entirely enfilading the rebel columns. The fire was terrific for several minutes, and the cheers from our men on the brow of the hill told of the success. The enemy gave back, and our forces under General McGinnis, Colonel Slack, Colonel Boomen and Colonel Holmes drove them again over the ground which had been hotly contested for the third time during the day—five more of the eleven guns not taken down the hill falling a second time into our possession. I can not think of that bloody hill without sadness and pride. Sadness for the great loss of my true and gallant men, pride for the heroic bravery they displayed. No prouder division ever met as vastly superior foe and fought with more un-

flinching firmness and stubborn valor. It was, after the conflict, literally the hill of death. Men, horses, cannon and the *debris* of an army lay scattered in wild confusion. Hundreds of the gallant Twelfth Division were cold in death or writhing in pain, and, with large numbers of Quimby's gallant boys, lay dead, dying or wounded, intermixed with our fallen foe.

Thus ended the battle of Champion's Hill at about 3 o'clock P. M., and our heroes slept upon the field with the dying and dead around them. I never saw fighting like this. The loss of my division on this field alone was nearly one-third of my forces engaged. Of the Twenty-ninth Wisconsin, Twenty-fourth and Twenty-eighth Iowa, in what words of praise shall I speak? Not more than six months in the service, their record will compare with the oldest and best-tried regiments in the field. All honor is due to their gallant officers and men, and Colonel Gill, Colonel Byram and Colonel Connell have my thanks for the skill with which they handled their respective commands, and for the fortitude, endurance and bravery displayed by their gallant men.

It is useless to speak in praise of the Eleventh, Twenty-fourth, Thirty-fourth, Forty-sixth and Forty-seventh Indiana, and Fifty-sixth Ohio. They have won laurels on many fields, and not only their country will praise, but posterity be proud to claim kindred with the privates in their ranks. They have a history that Colonel Macauley, Colonel Spicely, Colonel Cameron, Colonel Bringham, Lieutenant-Colonel Me-

Laughlin and Colonel Raynor, and their children's children, will be proud to read.

My brigades could not have been managed with more consummate skill than they were by Brigadier-General McGinnis and Colonel James R. Slack. Their services deserve the highest reward that a soldier can claim.

My staff, as usual, did their whole duty. Captain John E. Phillips, Assistant Adjutant-General, and First Lieutenant J. T. McQuiddy, and First Lieutenant J. P. Popè, my aides, were untiring during the whole day, and, by their promptitude, coolness and energy, aided me in every trying emergency. I am also much indebted to First Lieutenant George Sheeks, A. A. Q. M., and to First Lieutenant W. H. Shurp, and Second Lieutenant T. C. Withers, of the Signal Corps, for valuable services throughout the day.

It is no easy task to specify individual gallantry where the field is filled with deeds of fame, but I can not forbear giving the full meed to those who have suffered. The division lost, in killed and wounded, fifty-four officers—twenty-nine in the First Brigade and twenty-five in the Second.

Colonel W. T. Spicely, of the Twenty-fourth Regiment Indiana Volunteers, conspicuous for his daring gallantry throughout the day, was wounded, but remained upon the field until the victory was ours.

Colonel Dan. Macauley, Eleventh Indiana, was wounded through both thighs, near the close of the fight, while leading his noble regiment through the hottest part of the field. Lieutenant-Colonel Barter,

Twenty-fourth Indiana, while bearing the colors of his regiment, was severely wounded.

Lieutenant-Colonel Swaine, Thirty-fourth Indiana, was severely wounded while cheering his men and encouraging them in the performance of their duty.

Major Bradford Hancock, Twenty-ninth Wisconsin, was severely wounded while nobly discharging his duty.

The true and trusted Majors L. H. Goodwin, of the Forty-seventh Indiana, and Ed. Wright, Twenty-fourth Iowa, were severely wounded in the thickest of the fight.

Among the dead of the Second Brigade are the honored names of Captain Silas D. Johnson, Twenty-fourth Iowa; Captain William Carbee, Twenty-fourth Iowa; First Lieutenant Lawrence, Twenty-fourth Iowa; First Lieutenant James F. Perry, Forty-seventh Indiana; Second Lieutenant George W. Mannering, Fifty-sixth Ohio; Second Lieutenant A. S. Christie, Fifty-sixth Ohio; Second Lieutenant J. J. Leagan and First Lieutenant Ben. F. Kirby, Twenty-eighth Iowa.

Of the First Brigade, Captain Felix G. Wellman fell on the outer edge of the field while being pressed with overwhelming numbers. He rose from the ranks, was gallant and good, and beloved by all who knew him. Second Lieutenant Jesse Kane, of the same regiment, fell mortally wounded at the same time, and died in a few hours afterward. A better man sleeps not upon that bloody field.

First Lieutenant Joseph Ferris, Forty-sixth Indi-

ana, died like a true soldier, with his face to the foe.

A complete list of the killed and wounded accompanies this report.

The effective force of my division at the commencement of the action was as follows: First Brigade, 2,371; Second Brigade, 1,809; making a total of 4,180. Of this number our casualties were: 211 killed, 872 wounded, 119 missing; total, 1,202. When it is considered that this loss, being more than 28.7 per cent., took place in less than four hours, it is believed that few parallels can be found in the history of the present war. The greatest loss per cent. took place in the Twenty-fourth Indiana, being over 40 per cent., 201 being their casualties, out of less than 500 engaged in action. My division captured in the field over 300 prisoners under fire and 400 after the conflict ceased, making a total of 700. Besides this, General McGinnis paroled sick and wounded prisoners and nurses amounting to 569, and buried 221 rebel dead. Colonel Slack also paroled 189 wounded rebels and nurses, making a grand total as follows:

Prisoners taken by division	700
Wounded prisoners paroled by General McGinnis.	455
Nurses, rebels, paroled by General McGinnis . .	114
Rebels buried by General McGinnis	221
Paroled by Colonel Slack	189

Making a grand total 1,679

Eleven guns were captured before we received support from Quimby's division, and two of them brought off of the field. The second capture of the remaining five was the joint labor of my division and the rein-

forcements sent to me from General Quimby's division. Colonel Macauley has the battle-flag of "Fowler's Battery."

By the aid of Dr. Robert B. Jessup, Medical Director of my division, and the untiring labor of Captain George W. Jackson, with his famous pioneers, comfortable bowers were made, and the wounded well provided with every necessary and luxury that could be found within their reach. The medical corps of my division have again distinguished themselves, and deserve particular mention. Dr. T. W. C. Williamson, Twenty-fourth Indiana, was severely wounded while fearlessly attending to his duties on the field. Dr. J. W. H. Vest, Twenty-eighth Iowa, rendered most efficient service in rallying the men in his command at a critical moment. Chaplain Simmons, Twenty-eighth Iowa, and Chaplain Robb, Forty-sixth Indiana, were found where good men should be, among the wounded and dying, rendering all the consolation and aid in their power.

On the 17th my Second Brigade marched to Edwards' Station, the First, under General McGinnis, remaining to care for the dead, wounded and prisoners. On the 19th the First Brigade arrived at Edwards' Station, and with the division marched to Black river bridge. On the 20th the First Brigade marched to the Vicksburg fortifications, the Second Brigade remaining at Black river to guard the bridge. I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

ALVIN P. HOVEY,

Brig.-Gen'l Com'd'g 12th Div.

Lieut.-Col. W. B. Scales, Ass't Adj.-Gen'l on Major-Gen'l McClelland's staff.

The following is General Grant's account of the battle as given in his "Memoirs":

"Champion's Hill, where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. It is one of the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in range. On the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a ravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at Baker's creek. It was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. The ridge occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns westerly. The left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge. The Bolton and Edwards' Station wagon road turns almost due south at this point, and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile; then, turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to Baker's creek, nearly a mile away. On the west side the slope of the ridge is gradual, and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. There was, when we were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit, west of the road.

"From Raymond there is a direct road to Edwards' Station, some three miles west of Champion's Hill. There is one also to Bolton. From this latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half miles before reaching Bolton, and leads direct to the same station. It was along these two roads that three divisions of McClernand's corps, and Blair of Sherman's, temporarily under McClernand, were moving.

Hovey, of McClernand's command, was with McPherson, further north on the road from Bolton to direct to Edwards' Station. The middle road comes into the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west and descends to Baker's creek; the southern road is still several miles south, and does not intersect the others until it reaches Edwards' Station. Pemberton's lines covered all these roads, and faced east. Hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed parallel to that of the enemy, and confronted his left.

By 11 o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested battle. Hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. But he was not able to hold his position, and had to abandon the artillery. McPherson brought up his troops as fast as possible, Logan in front, and posted them on the right of Hovey and across the flank of the enemy. Logan reinforced Hovey with one brigade from his division; with his other two he moved further west, to make room for Crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads would admit. Hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on me for more reinforcements. I ordered Crocker, who was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division. McPherson ordered two batteries to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and they did good execution.

From Logan's position now a direct forward movement carried him over open fields in view of the enemy, and in a line parallel with them. He did

make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance. Up to this time I had kept my position near Hovey, where we were the most heavily pressed; but about noon I moved with a part of my staff, by our right, around, until I came up with Logan himself. I found him near the road leading down to Baker's creek. He was actually in command of the only road over which they could retreat. Hovey, reinforced by two brigades from McPherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; Crocker, with two brigades, covered their left flank; McClernand, two hours before, had been within two miles and a half of their center with two divisions, and the two divisions, Blair's and A. J. Smith's, were confronting the rebel right; Ransom, with a brigade of McArthur's division of the Seventh Corps, had crossed the river at Grand Gulf a few days before, and was coming up on their right flank. Neither Logan nor I knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. Just at this juncture a messenger came from Hovey asking for more reinforcements. There were none to spare. I then gave an order to move McPherson's command by the left flank around to Hovey. This uncovered the rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by the enemy.

During all this time Hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade from Logan and another from Crocker, and by Crocker coming gallantly up with two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one about the time was opened to the

rear. The enemy fled precipitately. This was between three and four o'clock. I rode forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north road, and found the skirmishers of Carr's division just coming in. Osterhaus was further south, and soon came up with skirmishers advanced in like manner. Hovey's division, and McPherson's two divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not in the best condition to follow the retreating foe. I sent orders to Osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to Carr, whom I saw personally, I explained the situation, and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as the Big Black, and to cross it if he could, Osterhaus to follow him. The pursuit was continued until after dark.

The battle of Champion's Hill lasted about two hours' hard fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose to the dignity of a battle. Every man of Hovey's division and of McPherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle. No other part of my command was engaged at all, except that as described before. Osterhaus' and A. J. Smith's divisions had encountered the rebel advanced pickets as early as half-past seven. Their positions were admirable for advancing on the enemy's line. McClernand, with two divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon, and in easy hearing. I sent him repeated orders by staff officers fully competent to explain to him the situation. These traversed the woods separately and without escort, and directed him to push forward; but he

did not come. It is true, in front of McClernand there was a small force of the enemy, and posted in a good position behind a ravine obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road my staff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back or been cut off. Instead of this, he sent orders to Hovey, who belonged to his corps, to join on to his right flank. Hovey was bearing the brunt of the battle at that time. To obey the order he would have had to pull out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as McClernand had to advance to get into battle, and substantially over the same ground. Of course, I did not permit Hovey to obey the order of his intermediate superior.

We had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged. This includes those that did not get up—all of McClernand's command except Hovey. Our loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing. Hovey alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and missing—more than one-third of his division. Had McClernand come up with any reasonable promptness, or had I known the ground as I did afterward, I can not see how Pemberton could have escaped with any organized force. As it was, he lost over 3,000 killed and wounded, and about 3,000 captured in battle and in pursuit. Loring's division, which was the right of Pemberton's line, was cut off from the retreating army, and never got back into Vicksburg. Pemberton himself fell back that night to the Big Black river. His troops did not stop before midnight, and many of them left before the general retreat commenced, and no

doubt a good part of them returned to their homes. Logan alone captured 1,300 prisoners and eleven guns. Hovey captured 300 under fire, and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500 sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1,200.

McPherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill their cartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded. The pursuit was continued as long as it was light enough to see the road. The night of the 16th of May found McPherson's command bivouacked from two to six miles west of the battle-field, along the line of the road to Vicksburg. Carr and Osterhaus were at Edwards' Station, and Blair was about three miles southeast. Hovey remained on the field where his troops had fought so bravely and bled so freely.

Hovey had in the fight, first and last, about 15,000 men, but with those he drove the enemy from a very strong position, inflicting a loss of more than 3,000 men and a large portion of his artillery. Why it was that McClernand did not come to his assistance has never been explained; but the facts remain that he, with four divisions of his corps, were in hearing distance of the battle and proffered no help, while another division was being cut to pieces, but winning a glorious victory.

No one account of a battle can present anything like a complete description of all its features and phases.

In fact, it is probable that no number of narratives could do that. Having given General Grant's story of Champion's Hill in his own condensed and comprehensive style, we give another account of the battle by General George F. McGinnis, who commanded the First Brigade in Hovey's division, and was himself a model soldier and officer. General McGinnis says:

The campaign of General Grant against Vicksburg was the boldest in conception, the most brilliant in strategy and the most vigorous in prosecution of the war of the rebellion, and was second only to his campaign against Richmond, which resulted in the capture of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox.

The battle of Champion's Hill was the battle of the campaign, and the battle of Vicksburg. That field was the key to the approaches to the rebel strongholds on the Mississippi river. When Grant cut loose from his base of supplies after the battle of Port Gibson he ventured all upon the issue of one great battle, and the two armies met and decided that issue at Champion's Hill.

The battle of Port Gibson, fought on the 1st day of May, 1863, resulted in the defeat of the rebels under General Bowen, after a very gallant and brilliant defense, lasting all day.

It is not necessary to recount the numerous skirmishes and more important actions, all very important in themselves, resulting in every instance in a rebel defeat, which took place between the 2d and 12th of May, during which time the movements between Grant

on the one side and Pemberton on the other, each striving for advantage, position and concentration, occurred, and which led up to the decisive battle of the 16th. On the afternoon of the 12th the advance of McClernand's Thirteenth Army Corps, the Twelfth Division, met and skirmished with a force of rebels at Fourteen-mile creek, about five miles south of Edwards' Station, on the railroad leading from Vicksburg to Jackson, where the enemy were known to be in force. Colonel Spicely, of the Twenty-fourth Indiana, led our forces across the creek and drove the rebels back to their main line, after which we bivouacked for the night, fully expecting a general engagement on the next day.

Early on the morning of the 13th our columns were in motion, with a heavy line of skirmishers, which, soon after crossing the creek, commenced an exchange of compliments with the skirmishers on the other side. All, but the very few especially posted, fully expected that they would soon be engaged in a desperate and deadly conflict, which would decide the fate of Grant's army and of Vicksburg. It was not then to be, however. Grant was not ready to risk all that he had gained on the result of a battle at that time. Our skirmishers crossed the Clinton road and advanced several hundred yards beyond, sharply engaging the rebel skirmishers, who fell back stubbornly and slowly. When the head of the column reached the Clinton road it suddenly changed direction to the right and moved off toward the town of Clinton, and away from Edwards' Station, just as if nothing had or was ex-

pected to happen. After the whole column had got well on the new direction our skirmishers were withdrawn, leaving the rebels in quiet possession, wondering what the movement meant, and what the next move would be. The enemy were so completely deceived and outwitted by the flank movement that, as we were afterward informed by prisoners captured at Champion's Hill, they actually remained in line of battle till next morning, looking for an immediate attack.

On our side it was subsequently developed that during the night of the 12th there had been a conference of the Federal commandants. It was well known that Johnston was at Jackson with a considerable force, estimated at 12,000, and, fearing that he might give us trouble by an untimely interference, it was decided that he must be disposed of before a general engagement should be risked with Pemberton's force of 25,000 to 30,000 men. This decision was promptly and fully executed by Sherman. It was a good job, and well done, and Johnston "ceased from troubling." Grant's splendid strategy was now developing. The uneducated soldiers (in military affairs) of Grant's army had heard and read a good deal about strategy, especially on the Potomac. They had not understood perfectly just what it meant, but now they knew from practical experience, which was much better than the theory. It was certainly a magnificent piece of work, and nothing better was done during the war. During these movements the Thirteenth Army Corps was commanded by General McClelland, the Fifteenth by

General Sherman, the Seventeenth by General McPherson. Logan and Crocker commanded divisions in the Seventeenth; Hovey, Carr, Osterhaus and Smith commanded divisions in the Thirteenth; and Blair commanded a division in the Fifteenth. I mention these names and divisions especially for the reason that they were all intimately connected (or should have been) with the battle of Champion's Hill. General Grant's daring movement resulted in the capture of Jackson and the complete rout of Johnston's army on the 14th of May. On the same day Hovey's Twelfth Division of the Thirteenth Corps was in the neighborhood of Clinton; Carr and Osterhaus were near Raymond, while Smith guarded a train between Auburn and Raymond. Blair followed Smith. On the 15th Hovey's division marched from Clinton to Bolton's Station. The other division of the Thirteenth Corps, and Blair's, of the Fifteenth, moved on different roads in the direction of, and converging on, Edwards' Station. During the afternoon of the 15th the enemy showed himself in considerable force near Bolton, and, believing an attack was intended, our lines were prepared to receive them. A strong skirmish line, with a few cavalry, was sent forward. The rebels retired as we advanced, utterly refusing to fight, which was entirely satisfactory to Grant, as he was not yet ready for a general engagement. On the morning of the 16th of May the Twelfth Division of the Thirteenth Corps moved out from Bolton on the direct road to Edwards' Station. The divisions of Osterhaus and Carr were moving on the middle road,

while A. J. Smith, followed by Blair, was marching on the direct road from Raymond to Edwards' Station. The five divisions numbered about 22,900 men, and all were marching on nearly parallel roads, within four miles of each other, and, considering the position occupied by the rebel force, within easy supporting distance. At about 9:30 o'clock Sergeant David Wiley, in command of a squad of Company C, of the First Indiana Cavalry, discovered the enemy in position on Champion's Hill. This information was received at the head of the Twelfth Division, and immediately transmitted to General Hovey, who was near the center of the column. The First Brigade was immediately thrown into line of battle on both sides of the road, and as soon as possible General Hovey came up with the Second Brigade, Colonel Slack commanding, and formed on the left of the First. Four six-gun batteries took up their positions, and the Twelfth Division was ready for work. Not knowing Grant's wishes in the matter, nor desiring to bring on an engagement without orders, and knowing that Grant was on the road from Clinton, where he encamped the night before, and would soon be up, General Hovey determined to wait, and act on the defensive in case the enemy made an attack. General Grant arrived on the field at about half-past ten o'clock, and feeling assured, from the information he received, that the great battle of the campaign was to be fought then and there, determined to make no mistake. Desiring to know the exact position of all the troops in his command in the vicinity, he directed Hovey to

wait until McClernand, with his three divisions of the Thirteenth Corps, could be communicated with.

At 11:30 a message was received from McClernand informing Grant of his position. Grant replied with an order to attack the enemy in force if opportunity offered. McClernand was but two and one-half miles from Grant's headquarters when this order left, but, from some cause not yet explained, it did not reach McClernand until 2 P. M., when he gave the order (using his own words) to "attack the enemy vigorously and press to victory." At the same time, Hovey's and Logan's divisions had been engaged in a desperate and bloody conflict for nearly two hours in plain hearing of Osterhaus, Carr, Smith and Blair's divisions, and in plain view of hundreds, if not thousands, of officers and men of those commands, who were looking on and discussing the chances of Hovey and Logan being whipped. What excuse could there have been for not fighting under such circumstances, even without orders?

What excuse for not attacking "vigorously and pressing to victory?" Soon after eleven o'clock Logan's division arrived, and promptly deployed on the right of Hovey, and then Grant, having every reason to believe that McClernand was ready, and occupying the same relative position to the enemy as did Hovey and Logan, and that the attack would be simultaneous by at least five divisions, ordered an advance along the whole line. From the time the enemy was discovered in position to the order of Grant to attack was about two hours. The position occupied by the enemy was on and to the rear of the brow of a hill, which was

seventy-five or one hundred feet above the plain below. His movements were hidden from our view by the heavy woods which covered the hill-side, while all our movements could be observed by them. While our dispositions were being made the enemy had not been idle. They had been drawing troops from their right to their left flank, evidently hoping to crush Logan and Hovey, get to our rear and join Johnston. That movement was in accordance with Johnston's orders, and was the movement Pemberton had been endeavoring to execute from the first, when the plan was deranged by Grant's success at Jackson, and the rapid concentration of a considerable portion of his army, which was now in his front and threatening him at Champion's Hill.

The draft of troops from Pemberton's right left the enemy very weak at the point where McClelland should have been with his three other divisions, and Blair's of the Fifteenth Corps. Opposite our left there was but little more than a vigorous skirmish line, which held them back for hours, while the conflict raged along the line of Logan and Hovey's divisions, and in plain view of Osterhaus, who was next on the left of the Twelfth Division. About twelve o'clock General Grant gave orders to force the fight. Hovey's and Logan's divisions advanced simultaneously. The Twelfth had moved forward about 500 yards, meeting with little resistance, when, suddenly, two batteries of four and one of three guns opened with volley after volley of grape. The division went to the ground as one man, and remained there until a

knowledge was obtained of the location of the guns and nature of the ground between the opposing lines. After a brief halt, another advance was ordered. The division moved forward in excellent order, with bayonets fixed. When within seventy-five yards of the batteries, every gun again opened, and again the division went down. As soon as the shower had passed over, the order was given to charge, and the division rushed forward. So sudden, and apparently unexpected, was the movement that, after a short, sharp, hand-to-hand conflict, the batteries were in our possession, and the whole supporting rebel force was in rapid retreat. A portion of the captured batteries were hauled off by hand, and the remainder were spiked. Eleven guns were captured by Hovey's division in this charge. Four of them were taken by the Eleventh Indiana, Colonel Macauley, and the Twenty-ninth Wisconsin, Colonel Gill; three by the Forty-sixth Indiana, Colonel Bringham; and four by the Twenty-fourth Iowa, Colonel Bynam. Soon after the rebel repulse, their reinforcements from the right, which should have been held by the divisions of Osterhaus, Carr and Smith, began to appear heavily before Hovey, and were concentrated against the lines of Hovey and Logan. The enemy had been driven six or seven hundred yards to the rear of their first position, and here occurred one of the most obstinate and bloody conflicts of the war. For over one hour each side took its turn at driving and being driven. Seeing that we were largely outnumbered, and likely to be overwhelmed by the large rebel reinforcements

arriving, the writer, who was in command of the First Brigade, sent messengers to General Hovey asking for assistance, and at the same time ordering the captured artillery to be hauled back by hand.

Having driven the enemy before us, captured their artillery, and fought over the same ground three different times, having been engaged in a continuous conflict for three hours, our ammunition nearly exhausted, many of the men being entirely out, having fired eighty rounds, and relying on what could be got from the boxes of the dead and wounded, threatened with being actually overwhelmed by superior numbers, the division began to fall back, at first slowly, and in good order, contesting every foot of the ground, finally in great confusion, and saved from a general rout only by the personal exertions of Colonel Slack, commanding the Second Brigade, and Colonels Bynam, Bringhurst, Spicely, McLaughlin, Gill, Raynor, and others not now remembered, but equally brave, who threw themselves into the breach, encouraging and urging the brave men to maintain their ground, with assurance of immediate assistance. At length, having reached the point whence the enemy had first been driven at the opening of the conflict, and just as it appeared as though the rebels would regain all they had lost, we were greeted by the shouts of the long-looked-for reinforcements, and Boomer's brigade, closely followed by Holmes' brigade, both of Crocker's division, came up and took position between us and the enemy. The rebel advance was at once checked, but for a few minutes only. They came down upon the new line in

such numbers that, in a very short time, the whole line, reinforcements and all, was forced to give way. Immediately, however, our artillery on the right, in position by the foresight of Grant, opened an enfilading fire upon the advancing masses of the enemy, which effectually checked their progress, turned the surging tide back upon itself, and they soon gave way and fled in great confusion, leaving our brave boys in full and undisturbed possession of the field.

At the time Hovey's division was being forced back, after the enemy's recovery from their first repulse, General Grant ordered Logan to push his right brigade against the left flank and rear of the enemy. This third brigade, commanded by General Stevenson, advanced rapidly, ran over and captured a rebel six-gun battery and swung across the Vicksburg road, while the other two brigades, under Generals John E. Smith and M. D. Leggett, passed over the ridge into the valley beyond and struck the enemy directly on their left flank. In the movement of the third brigade to reach Pemberton's rear, Stevenson had become somewhat detached from the other two brigades of Logan's division. General Logan was not aware at the moment that he had possession of the Vicksburg road, in the rear of the enemy, so he almost immediately withdrew Stevenson sufficiently to have his brigade connect with the others. Immediately upon the enemy finding that Logan had cut their line of escape they ceased pressing Hovey and faced against Logan's right, and escaped as soon as Stevenson was withdrawn, and were vigorously followed to the Big Black by Logan's di-

vision. Logan's division did not meet the heavy fire that opposed Hovey's division, nor the same dogged resistance; as the list of casualties shows, it had generally its own way. The writer is unable, from personal observation, to give a full and detailed account of the part taken by General Logan and his division in this action, but the country knows the gallant work there done by him, and that he and his command covered themselves with glory. If as much could be said of all the division commanders who were upon the ground there would have been no siege of Vicksburg. It is easy to find fault; equally easy to show, after a battle, how a different management would have produced different and more satisfactory results; but the writer feels that he can not justly avoid a reference to circumstances and facts that came near bringing disaster to our army in this important battle. In my humble opinion the management of Crocker's division was not only bad, but inexcusable. It was as good a division as was in the army. Its presence early in the action would have produced great and decisive results. It should have been engaged an hour before it was—an hour of slaughter to the Twelfth Division. While that division was being so heavily pressed, and a certain defeat before it, three separate messengers were sent, explaining the situation and asking assistance. For over an hour before Crocker's division advanced it occupied a position in line of battle at the foot of the hill, within 1,000 yards of the raging battle, and made no movement in relief. The third demand for help was sent directly to General Grant, with the in-

formation that without immediate assistance our position could not be maintained. Then Crocker's division advanced, and by Grant's direct order. Instead of coming up in line of battle, the division came up the road, marching by the flank, and, after passing the Twelfth Division, attempted to form their line of battle by filing to the right in the face of the murderous fire. The result was that in less than twenty minutes the division was compelled to retire, with a loss of 650 men. Had this division come into action an hour earlier, or as soon as it came upon the field, it is quite certain that the casualties of both it and the Twelfth Division would have been much less than they were; the forces on each side more nearly equal, the enemy could not have held out so long against us, and the victory won much more decisive.

But what of Osterhaus, Carr and A. J. Smith's divisions of the Thirteenth Corps, while this famous battle was being fought? I call it a famous battle for the reason that General Grant has frequently expressed the opinion that it was the pivotal and most important battle of the war. On the morning of the 16th of May those divisions were much nearer Champion's Hill than were those of Logan and Crocker. Logan and Crocker, after marching many miles, found the enemy, went into the fight, and lost about 1,000 men. Osterhaus, Carr and Smith could have found the enemy, knew just where he was, in fact, were under the sound of his guns from the beginning to the close of the battle, could and should have been vigorously engaged, but were not. Had they all moved forward and

"pressed for victory," as ordered by McClernand, there would have been no siege of Vicksburg.

A very determined effort has been made to hold General McClernand responsible for the short-comings of the three division commanders. McClernand was a good soldier, ambitious it is true, but as brave as ambitious; full of life and vigor, a tireless worker, very popular with his command, and having the cause in which he fought very much at heart. It appears impossible that he could have failed in the performance of any duty required of him, or in obeying any order from his superior in command. It will be remembered that during the siege of Vicksburg McClernand was relieved of the command of the Thirteenth Army Corps. After the corps was sent to the Gulf Department, McClernand was reinstated, came to New Orleans and took command of the corps again. Soon after, on a Sunday afternoon, while riding out with him to visit the camp of one of the regiments of his command, the battle of Champion's Hill was one of the subjects of conversation. I was free in the expression of my opinion that the Twelfth (Hovey's) Division had been compelled to submit to a great slaughter, and one that could have been avoided had the other three divisions of his corps done their duty. McClernand said in reply that there was no reason why Osterhaus, especially, should not have been as hotly and as closely engaged as was Hovey, provided the enemy in the same force was in his front; that he had sent him (Osterhaus) three positive orders to advance and attack vigorously, but that Osterhaus had replied to every order that the

enemy was in such force in his front that he could not advance. McClelland knew that this excuse was not a valid one, and that Osterhaus was held back by a strong skirmish line with two or three pieces of artillery. I asked him why, under such circumstances, Osterhaus was not at once relieved of his command, placed in arrest and court-martialed for disobedience of orders on the field of battle. His reply astonished me: "Because everything turned out favorably; had the battle gone against us, Osterhaus would have been cashiered." General T. W. Bennett, at that time Colonel of the Sixty-ninth Indiana, of Osterhaus' division, has frequently told me that, from the position he occupied, he could plainly see the rebels withdrawing troops from their right, in front of Osterhaus, Carr and Smith, to reinforce their left, and that in a short time the whole rebel army appeared to be concentrated against Hovey, Logan and Crocker; that he notified Osterhaus of the condition of affairs, and begged him to advance, and, finally, when he became convinced that he was determined not to order an attack, he asked permission to advance with his regiment alone for the purpose of affording some relief to the three divisions that were being so sorely pressed, and that his request was refused. His Lieutenant-Colonel, Orin Perry, fully corroborates General Bennett in his statement.

Carr and Smith had no better excuse for not being actively engaged than Osterhaus, except that they were a little further away when the battle commenced, and either of them could have found the place where duty called them in much less than four hours. As to A.

J. Smith, General Grant says, in his memoirs, that he was the first to exchange shots with the enemy on the morning of the 16th. At about 4 o'clock P. M., just as the rebels were being driven from the field, the three divisions appear to have got on to the ground where they should have been hours before, and where, if they had been, they could have assisted very materially, and no doubt successfully, in cutting off Pemberton's retreat to Vicksburg, and the probable capture of his whole army.

F. V. Green, Lieutenant of engineers, U. S. A., in his work on the Mississippi campaign, describes the situation completely, to wit: "The rout of Pemberton was complete. But if McClernand had acted with the energy shown by McPherson, and the three division commanders with him—Logan, Hovey and Crocker—every man in Pemberton's army would probably have been captured. Hovey and Logan's divisions brought on the battle by an energetic attack, and when Pemberton threw his whole force upon them the three together bore the brunt of the battle. McClernand had four divisions, more than half of the army, on the middle and Raymond roads. Had he thrown his men in with the vigor displayed by Hovey and Logan, he would have brushed aside the small force in front of him and cut off the retreat by the Raymond road to the ford in the same manner that Logan cut off the Clinton road to the bridge. Pemberton would have been confronted with superior forces on three sides, and an impassable stream on the fourth, and, in

the demoralized condition of his men that evening, he would have had no option but to surrender."

I agree with him fully, except wherein he holds McClelland responsible instead of his division commanders. They not only failed to assist in whipping and capturing Pemberton's army, but permitted the rebel General Loring to escape with 4,000 men. If they had captured him or driven him back so that he would have been corralled with the balance of Pemberton's army in Vicksburg, and finally captured, it would have been something to their credit in connection with Champion's Hill.

The official report of losses is as follows:

Hovey's division	1,202
Logan's division	403
Crocker's division	662
Osterhaus' division	110
A. J. Smith's division	28
Carr's division	3
(One killed and two missing.)	
Blair's division	0
<hr/>	
Total	2,408

It will be seen from this that the loss in Hovey's division was only two less than one-half the total. The total rebel loss, according to their own reports, was 3,839.

Both of these accounts, as well as the official reports and contemporary histories, show that General Hovey's division bore the brunt of the fighting at Champion's Hill.

After Champion's Hill Grant's movements followed in rapid succession, leading to the investment and siege of Vicksburg. The siege proper lasted from May 22 to July 4. It was a contest of brave men and veterans on both sides, but the result was a foregone conclusion. Fate and Grant had so decreed.

The Twelfth Division remained at Champion's Hill two or three days, burying the dead, caring for the wounded, establishing hospital service, etc., and then moved to Jackson.

A member of the late Sixteenth Ohio battery relates the following incident: "We crossed the Mississippi river at Bruinsburg the night of April 30 with five days' rations, which was all we drew for eighteen days. In that time we were fighting and skirmishing constantly. On May 16 the battle of Champion's Hill was fought, in which General Hovey's command displayed great gallantry, losing about one-third of the division, 1,202, about half the loss sustained in our army. The next day our division was left on the battle-field to bury the dead. While passing through Edwards' station the following day, hungry and tired, we discovered a lot of captured sugar, and we wanted a little 'sweetening.' But it was guarded—probably for the benefit of some Quartermaster—and while we were vainly trying to get a taste, General Hovey came up, and the following dialogue took place:

“General Hovey to Sergeant of the guard—‘By whose order are you guarding this sugar?’

“Sergeant—‘Major ——, Quartermaster —— regiment.’

“General Hovey—‘Sergeant, give my compliments to the Major, and consider yourself relieved from further duty as a guard here;’ and, turning to the hungry boys, he said: ‘Boys, help yourselves, but don’t waste it. You have fought hard enough for it, and there is nothing too good for the boys.’”

Another incident of this campaign is related by E. T. Lee, present Secretary of an Illinois Veterans’ Association, who says: “In the dreadful charge at Jackson, Miss., in July, 1863, the Twenty-eighth Illinois, the Third Iowa, the Forty-first Illinois and Fifty-third Illinois Regiments were sent into that valley of death by the General’s command. We went in 880 strong, and 645 of our gallant boys were killed or wounded. At the close of this unequal contest General James G. Lanman, our division commander, was placed under arrest, charged with the responsibility of the great slaughter. It was then that the gallant General Hovey took command of Hurlbut’s old fighting Fourth Division. General Hovey came around to see us just after we had returned from that desperate struggle. General Lanman accompanied him. He called the regiment out. When the fragment of as

good a regiment as ever bore the banner from Illinois gathered around our old riddled flag and saluted General Hovey, our new commander, he said to General Lanman, 'My God, General! is this all there is left of the Forty-first Illinois?' General Lanman, with tears streaming down his cheeks, said: 'No, General; the rest of them are lying over there,' pointing to the battle-field. We remained under General Hovey's command some time, and learned to honor and to love the gallant Hoosier General, who was ever interested in the welfare of all his men."

A little later the division took its place in the lines around Vicksburg, and remained there during the siege, doing its share of the work and participating in the honor and glory of the final victory.

The following summary of principal events in the operations against Vicksburg, with dates in chronological order, is compiled from official sources, and will interest surviving participants. The dates are in 1863:

January 11—Capture of Arkansas Post.

January 11 to February 28—Expedition on Bayou Teche.

January 16—McClelland's river expedition returns to vicinity of Vicksburg.

January 20 to March 7—Work on canal opposite Vicksburg.

January 29—General Grant takes command of river expedition.

February 5 to March 18—Work on Lake Providence project.

March 14—Farragut's fleet passes the batteries at Port Hudson.

March 16 to March 27—Steele's bayou expedition.

March 25 to May 14—Expedition on Bayou Teche.

March 29 to April 30—Movement from Millikin's Bend to Bruinsburg.

April 12—Engagement at Fort Bisland, Louisiana.

April 14—Engagement at Franklin, Louisiana.

April 20—Capture of Butte la Rose, Louisiana.

April 29—Engagement at Grand Gulf.

April 30—Grant's army crosses the Mississippi.

May 1—Battle of Port Gibson.

May 2—Evacuation of Grand Gulf by rebels.

May 7—Occupation of Louisiana, Louisiana.

May 12—Battle of Raymond.

May 14—Battle of Jackson.

May 16—Battle of Champion's Hill.

May 17—Battle of Big Black Bridge.

May 19—Assault at Vicksburg.

May 19—Evacuation of Haines' Bluff.

May 22—Assault at Vicksburg.

May 22 to July 4—Siege of Vicksburg.

May 24 to July 9—Siege of Port Hudson.

May 27—Assault at Port Hudson.

June 14—Assault at Port Hudson.

June 28—Engagement at Donaldsonville, Louisiana.

July 4—Battle of Helena.

July 4—Surrender of Vicksburg.

July 9—Surrender of Port Hudson.

The capture of Vicksburg brought to a successful conclusion one of the most remarkable and brilliant military campaigns in history. The victorious army was fatigued and worn out with forced marches and the labors of the siege, and General Grant reported that many of the troops absolutely required rest.

Shortly after this General Hovey came home on leave of absence. His wife was in poor health. She had visited him once or twice with her daughter, and had spent a short time in the South in the hope of being benefited. General Hovey used to carry her up and down stairs in his arms like a sick child. November 16, 1863, she died. The daughter, a few years later, accompanied her father to South America, when he went out as Minister to Peru. There she met and was subsequently married to Hon. G. W. Menzies, then an officer in the United States navy, now an honored citizen of Mt. Vernon, and for many years a law partner of General Hovey.

CHAPTER IV.

MILITARY SERVICES—CONTINUED.

General Hovey was brevetted Major-General July 4, 1864. Shortly after the opening of the campaign in 1864, General Grant, desiring to secure his services in reinforcing the army, commissioned him to raise 10,000 new troops. Under this commission he made an earnest appeal to the young unmarried men of Indiana to enlist. At this stage of the war it was not easy to raise 10,000 new troops, but General Hovey's military reputation, and his earnest efforts in the cause, gave a new impetus to enlistments. The young men responded promptly to his call. Many of the new recruits were not over sixteen years old, and on account of their youth they became known as "Hovey's Babies." But their youth was no detriment. They were a bad lot of babies. They were almost as bad as men. They had all the qualities of good soldiers, and soon became young veterans. He took them South, where they were attached to Sherman's army, and marched with him to the sea. Many of them be-

came famous foragers, and some took deservedly high rank among "Sherman's bummers."

Of this special assignment, and the incidents growing out of it, General Hovey writes:

In January, 1864, I was directed to proceed to Indianapolis and aid Governor Oliver P. Morton in raising and organizing an Indiana division of volunteers. On the 9th of February following General Grant wrote me as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE }
MISSISSIPPI, NASHVILLE, TENN., Feb. 9, 1864. }

"Brigadier-General A. P. Hovey, Indianapolis, Ind.:

"DEAR GENERAL—The early winter we have had betokens an early spring. I am very desirous of being ready to take advantage of the first dry roads to commence a campaign. Before I can start, however, many of our veterans must return, and the new levies be brought into the field. Now, General, my particular object in detailing you for the service you are now in was to have some one who knew the importance of organization and discipline with new troops from their enlistment. In this way I expected to have troops ready for duty from the moment they report for duty. I wish you would urge upon Governor Morton the importance of this, and ask him, for me, to organize into companies and regiments all those who are to go into new regiments, and to attach those who are destined to fill up old organizations at once. We will have some sharp fighting in the spring, and, if successful, I believe the war will be ended within a year; if

the enemy gain temporary advantages, the war will be postponed. I want 10,000 new troops badly. With such a number, I could let my veterans go, and could drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee. I wish you could prevail on the Governor to organize all the forces he has and send you here at once. I would keep the division together, and where, by contact with other troops, they would improve more in one day than in six where they are.

"I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT, Major-General."

To stimulate the young men of Indiana in rapidly volunteering for the defense of the Union, I published throughout the State the following hand-bill :

"TO THE YOUNG MEN OF INDIANA :

"I have been ordered by Major-General Grant to take command of the United States volunteers now being raised in Indiana, and organize them into brigades and divisions. For the first time during the war you will have a chance to belong to an Indiana brigade. Come and let us place the proud name of our State still higher on the scroll of fame. This is no ordinary opportunity ; it is one that has been ardently sought by almost every regiment that has entered the service. This may be the only chance you will have, of serving your country, and those who stand back will hereafter deeply regret that they have failed to respond to their country's call. YOUNG MEN, DO NOT PERMIT FATHERS AND HUSBANDS TO FILL THE RANKS

THAT PROPERLY BELONG TO YOU IN THE FIELD OF
GLORY AND OF DANGER.

“ALVIN P. HOVEY,
“ Brigadier-General U. S. Vols.
“ *January, 1864.*”

Under this call, ten regiments, of over 1,000 each, and aggregating over 10,000, officers and men, marched to the front with orders to report to Major-General Sherman. This was speedily done, and only six of the regiments so raised were assigned to my command. I need not advert to the silent and deeply-felt disappointment that followed upon the separation of these Indiana volunteers. They expected to be formed into one Indiana division; but there was no redress when General Sherman decreed their separation.

“Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do or die.”

The First Division of the Twenty-third Army Corps, commanded by Major-General Schofield, was assigned to me, and embraced the following regiments: One Hundred and Twentieth Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel Richard F. Barter; One Hundred and Twenty-third Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel John C. McQuieston; One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel James Burgess; One Hundred and Twenty-eighth Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel Richard P. DeHart; One Hundred and Twenty-ninth Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel Charles Chase; One Hundred and Thirtieth Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel

Charles S. Parish. The other regiments raised by me under the above call were scattered in other directions. A very large proportion of the men in the above regiments were, in conformity with my call, unmarried, and under the age of twenty-one years, and, hence, as they marched before the old veterans in front, were humorously called "Hovey's babies," or "Hovey's seedlings," but no better troops ever fought under the stars and stripes. I will give only one illustration.

The skirmishing and fighting around Resaca, Ga., had continued for several days, with severe losses on both sides. On the 14th of May my division was ordered to the front, on the extreme left of our army. On that part of the field there was a chain of high hills, or ridges, forming a horseshoe around a level open field. The rebel forces occupied the hills on the northern and western sides, while the Federal forces faced them on the east, across the field. On the morning of the 15th day of May, 1864, I was ordered to charge across the open field with my 6,000 "babies," while both armies could look down upon my charging columns. As we debouched through a valley into the open field, General Sherman and General Thomas stood, as we passed, with watches in hand, carefully regarding our movements. Slight barricades at this point had been erected by our forces the night before. Shells and rifle balls cut down several men in front. Bayonets were fixed, and it was a splendid sight, in the full glare of the morning sun, to see 6,000 men charging over an open field, with the two armies, of

over 40,000 men, on the hill-sides as spectators. With fixed bayonets my troops rushed forward by battalions in close echelon. The cheers of our comrades and the shouts of defiance by the enemy could be distinctly heard above the din of battle. The enemy gave way without waiting to cross bayonets, the "babies" were triumphant, and the battle of Resaca was over. We slept that night upon the enemy's field of battle, and saw, for the first time in that campaign, the dead and wounded of the army of the gallant and able Johnston. Let the author of "The Memoirs" deny this, and thousands of men, friends and former foes, will answer. On the next morning our whole army was in hot pursuit of the retreating foe. Thus ended the battle of Resaca, Ga. No historian has deigned to mention this brilliant and effective charge, although there are thousands of men now living, on both sides of that battle, who saw the grand and chivalrous dash of "Hovey's babies" from the hill-sides. It is doubtful if any similar charge of 6,000 bayonets can be found in the pages of history. In conclusion, I will only say that I have never understood why General Sherman thought proper to deprive me of a part of my Indiana troops, nor can I understand his silence of my charge, under his eye, at Resaca. But his "Memoirs" are silent.

ALVIN P. HOVEY.

During the raising of this force, and while still awaiting orders from the War Department in Indiana, General Hovey led an expedition into Kentucky to disperse a gathering rebel force and prevent a threat-

ened raid into the State. He was resting at Mount Vernon. Colonels Johnson and Seipert had appeared in Southwestern Kentucky with a rebel force of about 1,000. Johnson had previously led the Newburg raid into this State, and there was reason to believe he was planning another. At this time General James Hughes was in command of the Indiana Legion. The situation in the State was critical, and it was necessary to meet every threatened danger promptly. Reliable information reached General Hovey that Colonels Johnson and Seipert's forces were rendezvousing in Kentucky with the apparent intention of raiding Indiana, destroying property, railroads, etc. On the strength of this information General Hovey addressed General Hughes a letter August 14, in which he proposed, if a sufficient force could be raised, to cross the river and disperse the rebels. General Hughes approved the plan, and the officers and men of the Legion coöperated heartily. In two days a force of 750 men, infantry and cavalry, were rendezvoused at Mount Vernon, being parts of several regiments and detached companies. Five pieces of artillery were added, and horses were pressed into the service. With this force General Hovey crossed the river at Uniontown, Ky., and soon succeeded in locating the rebel camp. Arrangements were made to attack, but before they could be completed the main

body of the rebels fled. The cavalry skirmished slightly and took a few prisoners, but there was no general collision. The rebel camp having been broken up and the object of the expedition accomplished, the force recrossed the river.

On the 25th of August, 1864, General Hovey was, by order of the Secretary of War, assigned to the command of the military district of Indiana. This assignment devolved upon him an entirely new class of duties. His previous service at the front and in the field had familiarized him with every phase of war in an enemy's country. He had now to discharge the very different duties of a military commander brought into direct coöperation with the civil authorities of his own State. These duties were varied, difficult and important, relating to the military operations at the front and to the preservation of peace and the suppression of disloyal movements within the State. In this position General Hovey was brought into direct and close coöperation with Governor O. P. Morton.

The situation in Indiana was peculiar, and can only be described by using plain language, but facts are facts. The war record of Indiana is an enduring monument to the loyalty and patriotism of her people who stood by the government; but there was another class who did all in their power to embarrass and cripple

ple the efforts of the government to uphold its authority and preserve its existence. If the noble sacrifices of the former are worthy to be honored as long as the sentiments of loyalty and patriotism survive in the breasts of men, the infamous conduct of the latter deserves to be held up for execration to the last syllable of recorded time.

There were disloyal men and rebel sympathizers in nearly all the Northern States, but nowhere were they so numerous, active and well organized as in Indiana. For a little while after the firing on Fort Sumter the voices of these domestic traitors were hushed in the great roar of public patriotism; but they soon recovered confidence, and entered on a course of political intrigue and revolutionary plotting, which was kept up during the entire war. They held meetings and conventions, and passed resolutions denouncing the prosecution of the war. They labored to produce discontent and disloyalty among the soldiers by sending them papers and letters condemning the war, urging desertion and promising protection to deserters. In nearly every county of the State they formed an organization for resisting the draft, protecting deserters and obstructing enlistments. Finally, they organized a secret treasonable society known as the "Sons of Liberty," for the express purpose of aiding the rebellion by resisting the necessary demands of the govern-

ment, and prepared by the arming and drilling of its members to resort to active hostilities in the prosecution of its infamous designs.

That this organization intended to plunge the State into revolution and precipitate civil war within its borders admits of no doubt. Space would fail to relate the open acts of disloyalty perpetrated by it. Union men had been driven from their homes, their houses and barns had been burned, draft officers had been killed, squads of soldiers sent to arrest deserters had been fired upon, and companies of rebel sympathizers drilled in open day, with the avowed purpose of resisting the draft and assisting in a general uprising when the time should be ripe for it.

This brief outline of the situation in Indiana in the summer of 1864 shows how serious it was. While the soldiers in the field were fighting one rebellion at the front there were all the elements of another at the rear. It was to deal with this situation that General Hovey was appointed in command of the district. It was a position that required the knowledge of a lawyer, the fidelity of a patriot, and the bravery and experience of a tried soldier. Investigations already set on foot by Governor Morton had developed the nature and extent of the treasonable organization referred to. General Hovey lost no time in possessing himself of

this information, and obtaining more. He was acting under special instructions from the War Department, and his powers were as large as his responsibility.

Following are the instructions from the War Department which accompanied the order assigning him to the command :

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GEN'L'S OFFICE, }
WASHINGTON, Sept. 14, 1864. }

GENERAL: In assigning you to the command of the military district of the State of Indiana, only general instructions can be given to you to take such measures as may be in your power to encourage enlistments in the army, to arrest and return deserters, and for the preservation of the peace, the enforcement of the draft, and the repression of any efforts that may be made by disloyal persons to resist the drafting officers, or to discourage enlistments or facilitate desertions; and, also, for the secure detention of prisoners of war in their respective camps which are in your command. The performance of these duties will require vigilance, energy and discretion, which it is believed you possess, and in respect to the exercise of which detailed instructions can not be given. You are authorized to exercise within your district the powers of the commander of a department in making military arrests, in the organization of courts-martial, and carrying their sentences into effect. You will render to the executive authority of Indiana whatever aid may be needed in the enforcement of the laws and the preservation of peace. The cordial relations

which are understood to exist between you and his excellency Governor Morton will, no doubt, lead to that harmony of action between the Federal and State authorities which it is highly desirable should obtain.

The frequent and thorough inspection of the camps of prisoners of war is directed, and also a close supervision of the administration and expenditure of the several staff departments.

You will exercise command over the militia forces of the State whenever called into service by direction of the President. You will also recommend to this department such measures as may be needed to protect your district from hostile invasion, or from insurrection by domestic enemies of the government. It will be proper to bear in mind, in all your measures and recommendations, that all the military power of the government is needed for the army in the field, and that whatever forces are drawn from the army or kept back impair the means for subduing the enemy. One of your most important duties, therefore, will be to urge forward the draft and volunteering, and hurry troops forward to the field. Your usefulness will, in a great degree, be measured by your alacrity and success in this direction. It has been the unfortunate experience of this department that officers exercising your command are all the while calling for troops, or inventing excuses for not raising them, or for keeping them back from the field. To cure this evil has been one of the reasons for assigning an officer of your merit, activity and patriotic zeal to the duties now in-

trusted to you. The presence of such a chief ought to be "worth a thousand men."

It will be the disposition of this department to give to you every support and confidence which the delicate and responsible trust committed to your charge may require; and you are authorized to apply for specific instructions from time to time either to the commander of the department or (through the Adjutant-General) to the Secretary of War, as circumstances may require.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. D. TOWNSEND, Ass't Adj't-Gen'l.
*Brev. Major-General A. P. Hovey, commanding, etc.,
Indianapolis, Indiana.*

A report of his predecessor in command of the district gave General Hovey the main points of the situation, and he had soon mastered the details. The result was a complete exposure of the organization and its treasonable plans. The exposure embraced the signs, grips, pass-words, oaths, ceremonies, principles and purposes of the order. The membership in the State at that time was about 50,000. Its officers had \$200,000 in their hands for the purpose of buying arms. The leaders were in constant communication with the rebels. An outbreak had been planned, to take place in August, 1864. The arsenal at Indianapolis was to be seized, railroad and telegraph lines to be cut, and the rebel prisoners confined here to be liberated. Governor

Morton was to be captured, and, if necessary, put out of the way. The combined forces of released prisoners and Sons of Liberty were to join the rebel forces, who were to advance to meet them in Kentucky.

With such information as this in their possession, the authorities were fully prepared to act, and deemed it their duty to do so. On or about September 1, 1864, General Hovey, by order of President Lincoln, arrested Harrison H. Dodd, Grand Commander of the "Sons of Liberty" in Indiana, and confined him in the military prison in Indiana. A few days later, upon his promise not to attempt to escape, he was removed and confined in a room of the United States Court building. About the same time William A. Bowles, Lambdin P. Milligan, Andrew Humphreys, Stephen Horsey and Horace Heffren were arrested and confined in the guard-house of the Soldiers' Home at Indianapolis. Evidence in the hands of the authorities showed three of these persons to be Major-Generals of the "Sons of Liberty" in Indiana, and the other two were officers of the order. It was decided to try these men by a military commission, and this course was approved from Washington. On the 17th of September General Hovey issued an order appointing a commission, consisting of Brevet Brigadier-General Silas Colgrove, late Colonel of the Twenty-seventh Indiana Volunteers; Colonel William E. McLean, of the

Forty-third; Colonel John T. Wilder, of the Seventeenth; Colonel Thomas J. Lucas, of the Sixteenth; Colonel Charles D. Murray, of the Eighty-ninth; Colonel Benjamin Spooner, of the Eighty-third, and Colonel Richard P. DeHart, of the One Hundred and Twenty-eighth, to try the prisoners. Dodd was tried first and alone, and the commission which tried him was, by a special order from General Hovey, increased by the addition of Colonel A. D. Wass, of the Sixtieth Massachusetts Regiment, then stationed at Indianapolis; Colonel Thomas W. Bennett, of the Sixty-ninth Indiana; Colonel Reuben Williams, of the Twelfth Indiana, and Colonel Albert Heath, of the One Hundredth Indiana.

The trial of Dodd began on the 22d of September. The charges against him were: (1) Conspiracy against the Government of the United States; (2) affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States; (3) inciting insurrection; (4) disloyal practices; (5) violation of the laws of war. He pleaded "not guilty," and the examination of witnesses commenced at once. The evidence of the conspiracy and of his connection with it was very strong. The trial continued from day to day until, on the night of the 6th of October, Dodd, with the help of friends from outside, escaped from the window of the room

where he was confined, by means of a rope, and fled to Canada. He never returned to the State.

The charges against the other prisoners were precisely the same as those against Dodd. Their trial commenced October 21, 1864. The evidence against them was much stronger than that against Dodd. It was made conclusive against four of them by Heffren's turning State's evidence. Bowles, Milligan, Horsey and Humphreys were found guilty, and the first three were sentenced to death, and the last to imprisonment for life. The finding and sentence of the court were approved, and the day was fixed and preparations made for the execution of the condemned men. At this juncture executive clemency intervened, and a telegram from the President commuted the punishment to imprisonment for life. General Hovey was directed to take the prisoners to the penitentiary at Columbus, Ohio, and he did so. After the war they were pardoned. The object of the arrests was gained by their conviction and imprisonment.

These "treason trials," as they were called, caused much excitement in the State, and attracted general attention throughout the country. As commander of the district and the executive officer of the government, the entire responsibility of the proceeding fell on General Hovey. He met it, as he did every other responsibility, with unflinching courage and high de-

votion to duty. It was an exceedingly unpleasant duty, and even attended with danger, as a very vindictive spirit prevailed among the members of the order he was fighting, and his life was constantly threatened. But bravery which had been tested at the cannon's mouth and in "the imminent deadly breach" was not likely to fail in dealing with "copperheads" and "Sons of Liberty." The threats of rebel sympathizers in the rear would hardly disturb a soldier who had faced rebel batteries at the front.

General Hovey continued in command in Indiana till the close of the war and for some time afterward. The few months following the close of the war were a critical period. Although the storm had ceased, the waves were still rolling, and it took firm and experienced hands to guide the ship of state. There was, besides, a great deal of work to be done which required military knowledge and experience. In all this work General Hovey rendered valuable service.

The passions of the war have subsided, and its events have become history. Many of the actors in the great drama have passed away, and those who survive will soon be old men. New duties and new issues confront them, but the duties of that day were none the less serious, nor the issues any the less vital, because nearly twenty-five years have passed. As a matter of history, therefore, and a condensed narrative of events relating

to the period under consideration, we give General Hovey's report of the situation and operations in Indiana during his command of the district. It can be read now without reviving the passions of the war, and in the cold light of history. It is as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF INDIANA, }
INDIANAPOLIS, Aug. 10, 1865. }

Brigadier-General L. Thomas, Adjutant-Gen. U. S. A.:

GENERAL—On the 25th day of August, 1864, by authority from the Secretary of War, I assumed command of the district of Indiana. Since that time I have made many military arrests, committed many citizens to prison, under charges of crime against the United States, exercised the power of martial law, and executed several prisoners under the sentence of courts-martial, where I believed the sentences to be politic and just.

This unusual exercise of military power demands, at my hands, an explanation before the facts shall fade from the memories of men. Even now, in less than one short year, many are looking back at my course, and, being unable to grasp the facts which have surrounded me, are ready and willing to condemn my acts and asperse my character.

Every movement in an active campaign—marches, battles, sieges—demands from the commanding officer a true and succinct report. It is of as much, if not of more, importance that I, under the circumstances, should show the facts which impelled my action, so

that the historian and my country may properly understand and record the stirring events of this age.

A large portion of the people of Indiana are emigrants from the South, or their descendants, and their ties of relationship and love of former locality were not easily forgotten. When the war first broke out, the people of this State, as with one accord, and without distinction of party, were shocked and indignant. True, there were many who deeply sympathized with the rebel movement, and justified the firing on Sumter—who were willing to look with a favorable eye on the rebellion, and disposed to indulge in harsh words and feelings against every movement of the executive for its suppression. This feeling was not common at first, but soon assumed a definite form, and when the necessities of the service compelled a resort to conscription their numbers were augmented by the timid and the fearful. The rigidity with which the party lines had been drawn in former years enabled the unscrupulous demagogues of the hour to make use of all the disaffected of every party, and by the mere fact of opposing the administration large numbers of the Democratic party who felt it to be their duty to oppose Mr. Lincoln, right or wrong, swelled this opposition. Demagogues, seizing the apparent opposition to the administration, carried the election in 1862, and returned a majority to the House of Representatives in this State unfavorable to the prosecution of the war.

The records of that body show a determined opposition to the administration, and a desire to find fault with every act of the commander-in-chief of our ar-

mies. The trickery resorted to on every occasion clearly shows that the majority were determined to throw every obstacle in the way of aiding the government in prosecuting the war.

On the first day of the session, January 8, 1863, Mr. Jones, of Wayne county, offered the following resolution :

“ WHEREAS, The suppression of the rebellion, the restoration and preservation of all the States, is the great and paramount object of all loyal citizens; therefore, be it

“ *Resolved*, That the members of this Legislature will vote for no man for office who is not in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war, and who is not unalterably opposed to the severance of any State or States of the Union.”

This resolution was buried by referring it to a committee on Federal relations, from whence, like other resolutions which favored the prosecution of the war, it was never permitted to reappear.

On the following day a strong and bitter resolution was passed by the opposition, styling themselves Democrats, condemnatory of the action of the President and military authorities in making arrests, attempting to curb the press of the North and the suppression of the writ of *habeas corpus*. This resolution styles these acts as “arbitrary, violent, insulting and degrading to a degree unknown to any government on earth, except those avowedly and notoriously wicked, cruel and despotic.” And yet, up to this time, I have not learned of a single arrest that was not based upon crime com-

mitted against the government, and which was not justified in the eyes of all loyal men who desired the suppression of the rebellion.

The attempt was also made at the same session, by these partisans, to deprive Governor Morton of his constitutional right, as commander-in-chief, to control the militia of the State, and confer his powers upon three officials—since proved to belong to the disloyal organizations, “Knights of the Golden Circle” and “Sons of Liberty.” Opposition throughout the State to the enforcement of the respective drafts found ready and willing supporters in those who raised these representatives into power.

A few extracts and statements from the resolutions of this class of public enemies, who were fighting us in the rear, will show the spirit which animated them in their unjustifiable and treasonable course toward our government.

RESOLUTIONS.

Carroll county, January 1, 1863—Opposed to the war and the President’s proclamation of emancipation.

Brown county, January 1—In favor of an armistice, compromise and amnesty to rebels.

Lawrence county, January 24—Anti-war and anti-emancipation.

Starke county, January 24—Anti-war, for cessation of hostilities and national convention.

Rush county, January 31—“War a murderous sacrifice of men,” and in favor of peace, armistice, etc.

Resolutions passed at a festival given to Senator Hendricks, in Shelby county, February 5, denounce

the administration, arbitrary arrests, the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*, oppose emancipation, favor a cessation of hostilities, and oppose the conscript laws.

Bartholomew county, February 7—Same as Hendricks festival.

De Kalb county, January 31—Denounces the war as "An unholy crusade, to which they will not give one cent or send one single soldier."

Martin county, January 31—"We regard the administration at Washington as an usurpation and tyranny, and oppose giving another man or another dollar to the war."

Greene county, February 7, 1863 (Andy Humphreys one of the Committee on Resolutions)—Denounces the emancipation proclamation as a "palpable usurpation of executive power," and declares that "We are not in favor of furnishing the present administration another man, gun, or dollar for such a hellish crusade" (the war); "that arbitrary arrests, if persisted in, should be resisted by the strong arm of the people."

Scott county, January 26—Anti-war, and in favor of a State Military Board, which would have taken away the constitutional right of the Governor over the State militia.

Putnam county, February 21—Similar to the Greene county resolutions.

Jackson county, February 19—Revolutionary and anti-war.

De Kalb county, February 21—Revolutionary, and against the war.

March 18—Democratic club of Indianapolis demanding a State convention because the Legislature had failed to protect the citizens against the tyranny of the administration, and declaring in favor of a cessation of hostilities.

Warren county, March 7—Anti-conscription and anti-administration.

Tenth and Eleventh districts, in convention at Fort Wayne—Resolutions arraign the administration as tyrannical, and propose revolution as the last resort.

At the Logansport mass-meeting, June 13, the eighth resolution denounces arrest and trial of Vallandigham as a flagrant crime against liberty.

March 21, 1863—The Democracy of Wayne county, Indiana, met at Cambridge City, and resolved:

1. "That the further prosecution of this war will result in the overthrow of the constitution, in the overthrow of civil liberty, in the elevation of the black man and the degradation of the white man in the social and political status of the country."

2. Favors an armistice and national convention of all the States.

3. Denounces the clergy.

4. Denounces the provost-marshal system as an institution unknown to the constitution, subversive to State rights, dangerous to liberty, obnoxious to lawful resistance, in conflict with civil jurisdiction, and pregnant with demoralization to society.

5. "That we say to the administration that, as the Lord reigns in heaven, it can not go on with its provost-marshals and police officials arresting free white

men for what they conceive to be their duty within the plain provisions of the constitution, and maintain peace in the loyal States. Blood will flow! They can not, and shall not, forge fetters for our limbs without a struggle for the mastery." [Quoted almost *verbatim* from Hon. Daniel Vorhees' speech on the conscript bill, February 23, 1863.]

At the State Democratic mass convention, May 30, 1863, many in attendance were arrested, and 1,500 revolvers were taken on the Central and Peru trains.

Allen county, August 3—States' rights radical. "That, in view of these facts, we declare the proposed draft for five hundred thousand (500,000) men the most damnable of all the outrages that have been perpetrated upon the people by this administration, and we further declare that the honor, dignity, and safety of the people demand that, against ruin and enslavement, they must afford to themselves that protection which usurpation and tyranny deny them."

It would be grossly unjust to the people of the State to say that the old Democratic party, as a mass, entertained these views, or were, in fact, tainted with the disloyalty expressed in these resolutions. The Democratic party, during these troublous times, had several distinct classes that comprised the whole:

First—There was, as in all parties, an honest class that support their leaders, believing in their infallibility.

Second—A class of men who really feared the dangers and hardships of the army, and shrank, coward-

like, from the perils of the hour. This class came from all the old parties.

Third—A deluded class, who believed that the government would prove unsuccessful, and that mountains of taxes would fall upon themselves to defray the expenses of this war.

Fourth—A corrupt set of traitors, many of whom were bribed by rebel gold and led on by partisan hatred, by Southern association and affiliations to support the South. This class, at first far inferior in numbers to any of the others, was more active and untiring, and, by means of secret societies and Southern gold, controlled, as far as they could, the officers of the State. A large portion of the last named class, in the course of time, became active traitors—conspired against the government, received over \$500,000 of rebel gold to arm their societies, formed their companies and regiments, divided the State into districts, appointed their officers, including one Grand Commander, Harrison H. Dodd; one Deputy Grand Commander, Horace Heffren; four Major-Generals, Bowles, Milligan, Humphreys and Walker, and had made all the preparations for involving in its treasonable plans the entire Democracy of the State. Many of the “Sons of Liberty” had intended to create a rebellion in the State on the 16th day of August, 1864, by concentrating a Democratic mass-meeting at Indianapolis, seizing the United States arsenal, liberating 5,000 rebel prisoners then at Camp Morton, and with fire and sword pressing forward to join Buckner in Kentucky. Several events frustrated this plan:

First—The rebels of Illinois and Missouri were to rise at the same time, and meet General Price, who was to invade Missouri. Price, as is well known, was unable to make the invasion as contemplated, only reaching the western boundaries of that State.

Second—General Buckner's forces, a part of which was composed of Colonel Seipert's and Colonel Johnson's commands, commenced conscripting men for the rebel cause in Kentucky, and threatening our border on the Ohio river. With the Forty-sixth and Thirty-second Indiana Volunteers, and militia raised in Posey and Vanderburgh counties, I drove these forces back from the banks of the Ohio, on the 14th of August, which had a decided effect upon public feeling in Indiana. A report of this affair has already been made to the Adjutant-General.

Third—And probably the strongest reason, in this State, why the outbreak did not occur at that time, was the fact that the Hon. M. C. Kerr, member of Congress, Second Congressional District, and Hon. Joseph E. McDonald, and others, who were leaders of the Democracy at the time, learned the fact, called a meeting at Indianapolis, and prevailed upon those commanding the conspiracy to desist.

Arms of the conspirators had been seized at Indianapolis, and others were known to have been scattered throughout the State, and placed in the hands of the disloyal. Rebel emissaries and officers had been sent by President Davis to lead the rebel forces that might be liberated, and those who might volunteer from this State to join the flag of the rebellion. With the full

knowledge of the presence of these officials in Indianapolis, the chairman of the Democratic Central Committee, the editor of the Democratic organ in this State, Joseph J. Bingham, remained silent, permitted them to mature their schemes, and unmolested to depart. Repeatedly denying the existence of the secret order of the "Sons of Liberty" in his paper, while he was a member, he continued denouncing the administration, and in many and indirect ways opposing the draft, until he was arrested for conspiracy. It is but justice to him to say that, brought to the stand, he testified to the facts that he had long been a member of the order, knew the treasonable designs of some of the members, the presence of rebel officers in the city of Indianapolis, and that he did all in his power to prevent the contemplated outbreak on the 16th day of August.

I mention these facts with no partisan feeling, and "more in sorrow than in anger," and I regret that I am compelled to name parties in this connection, and only do so to present a clear understanding of my position during my command in this district. Mr. Bingham is still chairman of the Democratic Central Committee, and chief editor of the *Sentinel*. This may mean something or nothing, as the wise historians of the future may determine.

In this condition, with the government denounced and the laws defied, the record of the crimes of the conspirators is still to be enlarged by wanton murders of officers and soldiers in several parts of the State. The following, among others, may be mentioned :

January 30, 1863.—A detail of soldiers, arresting deserters at Waverly, Morgan county, fired on by rebel sympathizers.

January 1.—Deserters rescued by an armed force in Noble township, Jay county.

June 12.—Resistance to the enrollment by armed men in Johnson county.

June 15.—Fifty armed men attacked the house of James Sill, enrolling officer of Marion township, Putnam county, and demanded the enrollment lists. Sixty shots were fired at the house after leaving. At the same time the enrollment books and papers were destroyed in Jefferson township, Putnam county.

The same week the books of Cloverdale township, Putnam county, were stolen.

June 15.—The enrolling officer of Whitestown, Boone county, was interfered with by rioters, to prevent an enrollment.

June 18.—Fletcher Freeman, enrolling officer of Sullivan county, shot dead.

June 11.—The enrolling officer of Waterloo township, Fayette county, was fired on while in the discharge of his duties.

June 10.—Hon. Frank Stevens killed and Craycraft wounded near Manilla, while enrolling Walker township, Rush county. A short time before this the Rushville *Jacksonian*, a Democratic paper, had advised the enrolling officers to insure their lives before commencing the enrollment.

June 20, or about that time, the enrollment was re-

sisted in Indian Creek township, Monroe county, and papers destroyed.

June 16.—The enrolling officer of Daviess county was notified not to enroll the county.

October 3, 1864.—Captain Eli McCarty murdered in Daviess county while serving notices on drafted men.

With their hands red with the blood of these innocent officers and men, their unlawful combinations were drilling for warlike duty in several counties in the State, and defying those who attempted to enforce the law. With secret societies numbering about 40,000 members, meeting at midnight, plotting treason, and threatening the life of the Governor of the State, I was, by special order from the War Department, placed in command of this district, with power to make military arrests.

Great excitement prevailed. The elections for Governor and State and Federal offices were being canvassed, and both parties expressed great fears of fraud and force being used at the polls. On the Democratic State ticket three prominent gentlemen known to belong to the "Sons of Liberty" were candidates for reelection. The conspirators were defiant, and sanguine of defeating the Union candidates with the Democratic nominees. During this exciting period I deemed it necessary, for the purpose of bringing the great criminals of this State to justice and opening the eyes of the honest, to arrest Harrison H. Dodd, L. P. Milligan, Andy Humphreys, Horace Heffren, James Wilson, M. D., William A. Bowles, Stephen Horsey, and

others, as officers of the army of conspirators, and Joseph J. Bingham, and others, as aiders and abettors of the treason. The trials of some of those arrested have become historical, and need no further mention. The evidence elicited made patent the treasonable designs of the conspirators, and the people who were opposed to the prosecution of the war of the rebellion, as manifested by their representatives in 1862, returned triumphant majorities for Governor Morton and the Union candidates in 1864.

Bingham, Wilson, Heffren and Harrison were used as witnesses in the trials of Dodd, Bowles, Milligan, and others, not only to prove the conspiracy, but to convince the public mind, and were in consequence released from arrest. Many more instances of outrage against the agents of the government, and many additional resolves, might be recited which would clearly show the evil acts and designs of rebel sympathizers in Indiana.

The history of every county is filled with the memory of their disloyalty. Enough has been shown, I think, to exhibit the spirit of the hour and the age, and justify the military authorities in taking active steps to crush this home rebellion, and in bringing the guilty conspirators to justice. Courts, composed of the bravest, the purest and the best of the land, have sat in judgment, and their sentences are now a part of the history of the country. With a clear understanding of the events of the past, I have nothing to fear from the judgment of the present or the future.

Knowing the people of my native State, knowing

the ability of those who led the opposition to the suppression of the rebellion, knowing the danger and the necessities of the hour, I smote as many of the heads of the hydra as my saber could safely reach; and though, as in ancient days, they seemed for a while to multiply, there are but few now to be found who will willingly admit that *they* sprang from the monster.

I may have erred, but have not yet been made conscious of the fact. Drafted men, and others who were fearful of being compelled to enter the army under the last conscription, raised the prices of substitutes in this district in the autumn of 1864, and large amounts were paid, in some cases reaching as high as \$1,800. This drew to this State from Canada and the North hundreds of professional bounty-jumpers—no less than 350 of whom were arrested and imprisoned during my command.

The evil of “bounty-jumping” became very great. At least 1,000 had received the bounties and deserted from the draft rendezvous, then under command of Brigadier-General Carrington, so that I deemed it necessary to resort to the most severe measures to prevent it. Accordingly, on the 23d day of December, 1864, I caused three of the most infamous of this class, after being tried and condemned, to be shot to death. This, with sending about 260 to the front in chains, had the desired effect, and “bounty-jumping” ceased to be a crime in this district.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALVIN P. HOVEY,
Brevet Major-General U. S. V.

Six years after the war Lambden P. Milligan brought suit against General Hovey and others to recover damages for alleged false imprisonment under the finding of the military commission in 1864, and for personal injuries alleged to have been caused thereby.

The suit revived the memories of the war and of the events herein referred to. The late Hon. Thomas A. Hendricks appeared for the plaintiff, and General Benjamin Harrison was appointed by President Grant for the defense. It was the old issue, with two of its old representatives pitted against one another. On the part of the defense, it was a future Republican candidate for President defending a future Republican candidate for Governor against a claim for damages on account of acts done in the line of his duty and in the service and defense of the government during the war.

The trial took place in the United States Circuit Court at Indianapolis, beginning May 16, 1871, and ending May 29. The testimony covered a wide range, and brought out in vivid colors the history of the military trial and the situation in Indiana during the war. General Harrison's address to the jury was a masterpiece of forensic eloquence.

The plaintiff laid his damages at \$100,000. The jury gave him a verdict, and assessed his damages at five dollars. This was about as plain a verdict of guilty as that rendered by the military commission.

The Indianapolis *Journal*, in publishing General Harrison's speech, June 1, 1871, said :

We commend the speech to the careful consideration of our citizens. It recounts in a graphic manner the perils which environed our fair city and State during one of the most trying periods of the war, and while it will serve to revive the hatred and indignation which every patriot should feel for the bloody-minded men who were preparing to deliver over our city and State to the miscreants who murdered and starved prisoners of war, it will kindle anew the gratitude of our people to General Hovey and his patriotic comrades who, by their prompt action, thwarted the designs of the conspirators.

Of the merits of the case, the *Journal* said editorially :

Concerning Milligan's connection with the military plans of the Sons of Liberty there will always be a diversity of opinion. We have always regarded him, and still believe him to have been, one of the worst, guiltiest and most dangerous men of the band, and have always considered it a misfortune that he was not arrested, tried and hung by the civil authorities in 1864. If Milligan and his associates could have had their way in Indiana, a formidable rebel army would have been turned loose upon the inhabitants of the Northwestern States, then comparatively defenseless, and war in its worst form would have devastated Indiana, Ohio and Illinois. That this scheme was not realized is owing altogether to the patriotism, vigilance,

courage and decision of General Hovey, General Car-
rington, and their military associates, who assumed
the responsibility of seizing the principal conspirators,
and thus struck terror to the hearts of the misguided
men who had joined them in their treasonable designs.

General Hovey's military record was without a
blemish. The only attempt ever made to assail his
record or belittle his services was based on the follow-
ing letter, written by General W. T. Sherman :

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MIS- }
SISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR ATLANTA, GA., }
July 25, 1864.

*Colonel James Hardie, Inspector-General, Washington,
D. C.:*

I have your dispatch of yesterday. * * * I wish
to put on record this, my emphatic opinion, that it is
an act of injustice to officers who stand by their posts
in the day of danger to neglect them and advance such
as General Hovey, who left us in the midst of bullets
to go to the rear in search of personal advancement.
If the rear be the post of honor, then we had better
all change front on Washington.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General Commanding.

This letter found its way into print, and long after
the war it was used by General Hovey's political en-
emies as the basis of a cowardly attack on his military
character. It was not exactly an attack in the rear,
but a stab in the back. General Sherman's letter did
General Hovey injustice, as Sherman himself virtually

admitted later. That great and gallant soldier sometimes spoke hastily, and even wrote without duly weighing his words. This was one of the instances. Many years later, in his published "Memoirs," he alluded to the matter as follows:

"On the 24th of July, 1864, I received a dispatch from Inspector-General James A. Hardie, then on duty at the War Department in Washington, to the effect that Generals Osterhaus and Alvin P. Hovey had been appointed Major-Generals. Both of these had begun the campaign with us in command of divisions, but had gone to the rear—the former by reason of sickness, and the latter dissatisfied with General Schofield and myself about the composition of his division in the Twenty-third Corps. Both were esteemed as first-class officers, who had gained special distinction in the Vicksburg campaign. But up to that time, when the newspapers announced daily promotions elsewhere, no prominent officers serving with me had been advanced a peg, and I felt hurt. I answered Hardie on the 25th, in a dispatch which has been made public, closing with this language: 'If the rear be the post of honor, then we had better all change front on Washington.' To my amazement, in a few days I received from President Lincoln himself an answer, in which he caught me fairly. I have not preserved a copy of that dispatch, and suppose it was burned up in the Chicago fire; but it was characteristic of Mr. Lincoln, and was dated the 26th or 27th of July, containing unequivocal expressions of respect

for those who were fighting hard and unselfishly, offering us a full share of the honors and rewards of the war, and saying that in the cases of Hovey and Osterhaus he was influenced mainly by recommendations of Generals Grant and Sherman. On the 27th I replied direct, apologizing somewhat for my message to General Hardie, saying that I did not suppose such messages ever reached him personally, explaining that General Grant's and Sherman's recommendations for Hovey and Osterhaus had been made when the events of Vicksburg were fresh with us, and that my dispatch of the 25th to General Hardie had reflected chiefly the feelings of the officers then present with me before Atlanta."

This extract from Sherman's Memoirs, written many years after the letter, explains it in a way entirely creditable to General Hovey. It will be observed that the letter contains no word of censure on Hovey. If it was a censure of anybody it was of the President, from whom all promotions came. Second, the letter embraced another brave and capable officer besides Hovey, of whom Sherman says: "Both were esteemed as first-class officers, who had gained special distinction in the Vicksburg campaign." Third, the President turned the tables on Sherman by citing his own written recommendation for Hovey's promotion. Finally, General Sherman wrote to the President, apologizing for his hasty letter, and stating that his letter

to Hardie "reflected chiefly the feelings of the officers then present with me before Atlanta." This is equivalent to saying that it did not reflect his deliberate judgment. At all events, his written recommendation for Hovey's promotion silenced him. As a matter of fact, the real injustice was to Hovey in not receiving an earlier promotion, for Grant and Sherman had recommended it in July, 1863, and he did not receive it till July, 1864. A short time before he did receive it, being in Washington, he called on the President to ask why he had not been promoted when others recommended for promotion at the same time had been. President Lincoln, anticipating his complaint, said: "Your commission has long since been made out and signed, and you are a Major-General already."

"I do not question your word," said General Hovey, "but your mails seem to be a long time coming. I have never received a commission to be Major-General, although my juniors have been appointed over me."

The astonishment of President Lincoln was great. He bade General Hovey to return to his home and be reconciled, assuring him that there had been some great wrong committed; that the commission for him as Major-General had been directed from the White House long before, and that some one was to blame. General Hovey retired to his home, and shortly after that his commission as Major-General reached him.

In the light of these facts, and of General Sherman's explanation of the letter in his "Memoirs," it can not be construed as in the slightest degree discreditable to General Hovey. In fact, as General Sherman distinctly terms him a first-class officer who had gained special distinction in the Vicksburg campaign, the whole incident inures to his credit.

After General Hovey's nomination for governor some attempts were made to misrepresent or belittle his military record. One of these called out the following letter to the *Madison Courier*, from General George F. McGinnis, who, as already stated, commanded a brigade in Hovey's division. His letter, dated Indianapolis, September 1, 1888, is as follows:

A friend of mine has sent me two slips cut from the *Herald*, a Democratic paper published at Madison, Ind. From one of the slips I read as follows: "Hovey ran at the battle of Champion's Hill." From the other the following:

"HOVEY AT CHAMPION'S HILL.

"The record shows that General Hovey, through his stupidity and bad generalship, caused over 1,200 of his soldiers to be slaughtered at Champion's Hill, and had not General Grant arrived when he did, and took command of the Twelfth Division, that part of our army would have met the same fate of Custer's men—there would not have been one left to tell the

tale, unless, perhaps, a few sutlers and quartermasters, skulking in the rear, might have escaped to tell what they knew of the great battle they smelt from afar."

I am informed that the editor of the *Herald* claims to have been a participant in that celebrated battle. I do not believe it, for if he was he knows of his own knowledge that the charges above quoted are absolutely, maliciously and wickedly false, and, to the best of my information, he is the first and only man (is he a man?), soldier or not, who has ever stooped so low, or has so little regard for his integrity and the respect of his fellow-men, as to make such charges against General Hovey. I had the honor of commanding a brigade in Hovey's division from the beginning to the close of the Vicksburg campaign; was at Champion's Hill, engaged for four solid hours in a continuous battle, and say emphatically that General Hovey displayed neither stupidity, lack of courage nor bad generalship in that battle. On the contrary, he showed good judgment and skill in the management of his division, and his exhibition of nerve and gallantry was equal to that of any man engaged in that battle. He knew just what to do and when to do it, and it was through his efforts, courage and determination, more than any other one man, that Champion's Hill resulted in a victory to the Union cause, and gave us Vicksburg and the Mississippi river from source to mouth.

Hovey's division went into that battle to fight and to win. Every man knew that the success of the campaign depended upon the result. They did fight and win. In order to win the battle it was actually necessary that

Hovey's division should lose 1,200 men (or more, if the circumstances and urgency of the case required it), and rather than fail it would have lost twice 1,200 men. Hovey knew that reinforcements were coming, and that victory depended on his division holding its ground and the enemy at bay until the reinforcements arrived. He held his troops bravely and steadily to the work until help came. No man during the war staid in a battle more bravely and persistently than did General Hovey at Champion's Hill. General Grant says "Hovey's division stood the brunt of the battle." Its loss of more than 1,200 men, one-half of the total loss, is sufficient proof of it.

The twaddle about General Grant taking command of the Twelfth Division during the progress of the battle is simply ridiculous, and a lie, as every one knows who was there. He did not do so, for he knew that in General Hovey he had a division commander that could be trusted under any and all circumstances. He had been with him in battle before, and knew he could be relied on.

Grant, in his *Memoirs*, speaking of the disposition of the troops after the battle, says: "Hovey remained on the field where his troops had fought so bravely and bled so freely." No higher praise was ever bestowed by General Grant upon any officer or division than that. After the fall of Vicksburg Grant recommended Hovey for promotion, which is the best evidence that he recognized him as a brave and competent officer.

If the *Herald* man was at or near Champion's Hill

on the day of the battle, he must have been with "a few sutlers and quartermasters skulking in the rear," otherwise he would have known better than try to belittle General Hovey's military record.

I hope and trust that the *Herald's* cowardly attack of Hovey will be put into the hands of every Indiana soldier who marched and fought with Grant, Sherman, Logan and Hovey in the Vicksburg campaign.

General Dan McCauley, formerly Colonel of the Eleventh Indiana Regiment, who served under General Hovey, having had his attention called to this same newspaper attack on his old commander, wrote as follows:

The one who can deliberately asperse a splendid soldier's military record because he happens to be a candidate for office merits the contempt of every Union soldier, regardless of politics or location. General Hovey was a gallant fighter and a skillful officer, ranking deservedly among the best and bravest of those who saved this nation. Soldiers everywhere, for their own fame, should make common cause, and cover with shame and confusion every such slanderer of honorable comrades. As one proud to have fought under General Hovey at Champion's Hill and elsewhere, I offer my indignant protest.

General W. J. Landram, of Lexington, Ky., who was with General Hovey during the Vicksburg campaign, writes:

Among the many distinguished officers who served in the Army of the Tennessee, none was more popular or more universally respected than General Hovey. He commanded the division that bore the brunt of the battle of Champion's Hill, and if the corps to which he belonged, or a reasonable portion of it, had been sent to his support, in addition to the assistance furnished him from McPherson's corps, Pemberton's army would have suffered a rout, and the siege of Vicksburg have been averted. In consequence of the great loss sustained by Hovey's division in that engagement, it was left encamped on the field of battle, to look after the wounded and take charge of the prisoners. It was not long, however, before it took its place in the line of the besieging army, where it remained until the close of the siege.

The morning of the 22d of May was the time fixed for the assault upon the works at Vicksburg; and, while standing upon an eminence in the rear of my brigade that overlooked the Confederate line for a long distance on our right and left, General Hovey came up the hill on foot and stood by my side. The hour of ten was the time the assaulting column was to start, and we were looking at my watch so as to be on time in giving the order to advance. Not a flag could be seen upon the Confederate works, nor were there any evidences that there was a single soldier in the rifle-pits. The General remarked to me that he believed they had evacuated the city, and would give us no fight. An old building on fire in the suburbs of the place served to strengthen our conviction that

they had abandoned the place. A few moments later convinced us of our error, for the enemy had only been keeping under cover to avoid the fierce fire of our artillery and to be ready for the terrible assault they knew would certainly follow. When the assaulting columns were within good rifle range, all the flags around their line went up, and a deadly fire was poured upon our troops from every direction. What brought General Hovey to my side was somewhat a mystery to me at the time, but I found out afterward that his desire to participate in the engagement was such that he could not be kept in the rear, and came to the front and asked to be assigned to duty in some capacity, and General McClelland placed him in command of all the artillery of the Thirteenth Corps during the assault. He performed his duty nobly, and won additional honors by his courageous conduct and admirable management of the forces under his command.

CHAPTER V.

DIPLOMATIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE.

General Hovey's war record had given him a wide reputation as a soldier. As he was known to possess the requisite qualifications for public office, in addition to his military service, it was natural that he should be included in the distribution of civil honors after the war. On the 12th of August, 1865, he was, entirely without solicitation on his part, appointed United States Minister to Peru. He received the appointment from President Andrew Johnson, but it was made upon the recommendation of General Grant. President Lincoln was assassinated in April, 1865, and President Johnson had not yet cut loose from his Republican advisers. General Grant still had influence with his administration.

All old soldiers, and all patriotic Americans, will admit that no higher compliment could be paid to any man than his voluntary recognition and recommendation for office by the great patriot and soldier, General U. S. Grant. This compliment came to General Hovey.

General Grant was a good hater and a good lover. He never forgot his enemies nor his friends. He was not vindictive, but he made a distinction between

those he liked and those he did not like. He never forgot those whom he had learned to admire and like in the war. He never wanted any additional information in regard to them. He knew them; at least, he thought he did, and that answered the same purpose. An acquaintance formed at the front when the fate of a campaign is hanging on a battle or a charge is not easily forgotten.

The friendships of the war were lasting. The tie of comradeship was very strong. Men who met in the trenches did not require an introduction, but they became friends. It was the same with officers. Friendships begun under fire, on the march, or the bivouac, proved very lasting. Grant did not want any better friends than those he made at the front; and those whom he learned to like and trust there had his friendship and trust always. His recommendation of General Hovey for Minister to Peru was a high indorsement of the latter's military record from the highest possible source.

Shortly before his appointment to this position, General Hovey had married, at Indianapolis, for his second wife, Mrs. Rosa Vallette, a daughter of Hon. Caleb B. Smith, a distinguished lawyer and politician. At New York, on their way to Peru, she was taken sick and died. General Hovey, thus a second time widowed, went out to Peru accompanied by his daughter, as elsewhere mentioned.

General Hovey arrived at Lima, the capital of Peru, on the 20th of November, 1865. Peru, at that time,

was in a state of revolution, and Spain was seeking to overturn the existing government. A battle had recently been fought, and the dead were yet lying in the plaza when General Hovey arrived there. His military reputation had preceded him, and insured him a friendly reception from the authorities. Owing to the revolutionary state of affairs, he did not present his credentials for several months, but in the mean time he was taken into the confidence of the Peruvian government officials.

On the 1st of May, after Mendez Nunez, the Spanish Admiral, had announced his intention to bombard Callao, as he had done Valparaiso, President Prado sent for General Hovey to meet him. The President was found surrounded by his Cabinet and several of his staff. When General Hovey entered the room the President approached him and said: "I have sent for you to advise with you, not as a diplomate, but as one of the best friends of America, in our great emergency. What do you think of to-morrow?" General Hovey replied that, as an officer of the United States government, which held friendly relations with both Spain and Peru, he had no right to advise him. "But," said the President, "tell me privately, as a friend, what are your opinions?" General Hovey replied: "If the fleet fight you with vigor, and in the proper manner, they ought to whip you in fifteen minutes." The President and entire Cabinet seemed surprised, and desired to know the reasons for this statement. "The Spanish fleet can fire ten guns to your one," was the reply, "and if they close upon you so as to

effectually use shell, grape and canister, I believe they will silence all your batteries and destroy your town. Your only hope is to make them fight you at long range." The Secretary of War dissented from this view. "Very well, Mr. Secretary of War," said General Hovey, "Peruvians may be able to meet ten guns with one, but my people, though I have seen some little service, are not so firm and brave." President Prado then asked General Hovey what he thought should be done. "Make them, if possible, fight you at long range," was the reply, "and then you are sure of victory." To the inquiry how this could be done, he answered: "It is not for me to say; but torpedoes are dangerous, and ships and sailors have a holy horror of them." The torpedo suggestion was adopted. That night forty barrels of powder, connecting by wire with an electrical battery on shore, were sunk in the bay. The next morning the fight opened, and the fleet bore bravely up toward the forts, reaching within three-quarters of a mile. Then, as they were exchanging shots, two torpedoes exploded, throwing a column of water one hundred and fifty feet in the air. The whole Spanish fleet immediately retired, and did the rest of their fighting at long range. A long-range fight was what the Peruvians wanted. They had only a few guns for defense, but they were very heavy and were exceedingly destructive at long range, so that when the Spanish fleet withdrew to a distance for the purpose of bombarding the capital, the long-range cannon planted on land opened with terrific violence and drove the enemy to sea.

General Hovey, from a vantage point on the United States man-of-war Powhatan, viewed the effects of his plan, and, although he was not personally interested in the success or defeat of either side, he could not but help admire the general result.

When General Hovey started to go ashore the Dictator signaled him and met him at the water's edge, and, throwing his arms about the General's neck, thanked him again and again, and kissed him fervently.

This military introduction put General Hovey on the best possible footing with the Peruvian authorities, and his subsequent relations with them were very friendly. Nearly two years later, when another revolution occurred, and President Prado was pursued and stoned by the populace, he sought refuge with his family in the American legation, where General Hovey and two or three other Americans, armed with revolvers and rifles, protected them for two days and nights.

While Minister at Peru General Hovey's correspondence with the State Department embraced various points of international law, and matters of interest to American citizens. Peru had a foreign war or revolution on her hands during most of his stay, and it was necessary to keep our government advised of military movements and administrative changes. His dispatches showed an intimate knowledge of the shifting phases of Peruvian politics, and those of Secretary Seward in reply showed that his information was duly appreciated, and his course approved. Among his more important dispatches were several relating³ to

the claims of American citizens against Peru for losses sustained on account of the revolution; relating to the mediation of the United States in the war between Spain and the allied republics of South America; regarding the recognition of the newly constituted government of Peru, and other matters of similar import.

On the 13th of August, 1868, a very destructive earthquake occurred in some parts of Peru, by which several towns were wholly or partially destroyed, thousands of lives lost, and millions of dollars' worth of property destroyed. Great distress and suffering followed in some localities. General Hovey sent very interesting accounts of the disaster to the State Department. He also, in connection with United States naval officers, exerted himself for the relief of the sufferers, and dispatched a government vessel to Arica to assist in alleviating the distress. In the bay of Arica two United States ships were cast on shore by the convulsion and lost, with nearly forty men. General Hovey's prompt and generous conduct in this crisis was subsequently recognized by a formal expression of thanks from the President of Peru through his Minister of Foreign Affairs. Secretary Seward wrote General Hovey, under date of September 30, 1868: "The appalling calamities which have befallen Peru have deeply moved the sympathies of the President and the people of the United States. Your own proceedings, in connection with Rear-Admiral Turner, in relieving the sufferers, are entirely approved and commended." The Peruvian Congress also unanimously adopted a vote of thanks to the American Minister for

his sympathy and services in this behalf. In transmitting the action of Congress the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs said: "The celerity and zeal with which your excellency and the estimable officers of the American navy hastened to relieve the necessities of the south, in the most pressing moments, fully justify this solemn manifestation of gratitude, which causes me such pleasure and honor in communicating to your excellency." Secretary Seward, on learning of the action of the Peruvian government, wrote General Hovey, November 20, 1868: "It is gratifying to learn that the generous and spirited efforts of the diplomatic and naval officers of the United States in that quarter toward the relief of the sufferings of Peruvian citizens from the effects of the late terrible earthquakes have been thus acknowledged."

All this time General Hovey was conducting an active correspondence with the State Department and the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs relative to the rights of American citizens, their claims for property destroyed in the revolution, etc. In this correspondence his legal training and knowledge of international law came in good use, and his dispatches show thorough knowledge of the legal questions involved.

Once during his service in Peru General Hovey was censured by the newspaper organ of a revolutionary faction for his refusal to recognize a revolutionary government. He declined to recognize it without instructions from Washington. He sent a translation of the censorious article to the State Department, and in reply Secretary Seward wrote, March 4, 1868:

“Your account of the partisan discontent which was manifested in Lima in regard to your omission to recognize at once, without instructions from your government, the military chief of a successful armed revolution in Peru has been read with careful attention. Your proceeding on that occasion is again approved and confirmed. The United States could have no motive to intervene between the political parties of a sister republic. They have every possible motive for sustaining, in every case, the deliberate and final action of the whole constituent people in every such republic.” Subsequent events fully justified the course pursued by General Hovey.

General Hovey grew tired of foreign residence, and in July, 1870, he tendered his resignation, which was accepted in September. In a dispatch, shortly before his departure from the country, dated August 22, 1870, he said: “I have called Peru a republic. These words are too strong, but as she so styles herself I have used the phrase. As I understand the word, there are no republics in South America. In my opinion, the people do not govern, constitution and laws do not control. The will of a few families alone is the law. Still, the shadow of freedom is exhibited on every occasion to the public gaze, and the people cling to and adore it. I can only hope that the shadow may, some day, become a substance; for, in the fullness of my heart, my best wishes are for the future progress and welfare of Peru.”

Upon his return to the United States General Hovey resumed the practice of law at Mount Vernon. It had been just ten years since he left his home and profession at the beginning of the war. During that period he had had a varied experience, and his public services had formed no inconsiderable part of the history of the times. In resuming the practice of law he formed a partnership with Hon. G. W. Menzies, who had married his daughter in Peru.

During the next fifteen years General Hovey was not in public life, and did not take a prominent part in politics. He had enjoyed enough of the excitement and honors of military and civil life to make him relish the pleasures of retirement.

In 1886 he was nominated for Congress by the Republicans of his district, and accepted the nomination in the following letter :

“GENTLEMEN—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 20th ult., informing me that the Republicans of the First Congressional District of Indiana, on the 29th of July, 1886, selected and nominated me as their candidate for Representative for Congress of the United States, and inclosing copies of the resolutions passed by said convention. I accept the nomination and approve the resolutions.

“It may not be improper to state my views more at large upon some of the subjects referred to in the resolutions.

“I do not agree in full with the theory of civil service proclaimed by the President, and far less with the

action of the administration in ignoring and trampling that service under foot. I am opposed to quasi life tenures of office, save those provided for in the constitution, and believe that every person holding an office, whether Democrat or Republican, should have the right to enjoy the same for the full term for which he may have been commissioned, unless he forfeits it by some illegal act, and do not believe that either religious or political opinions can constitute such illegal acts. The thought that political parties are to Mexicanize our government, and fight for office and place only, is too degrading to be entertained by any man who loves his country. Let 'the spoils go to the victor,' but do not claim the offices until they are legally vacant. The immediate surrender of all the offices of the government to a successful party is the bribe offered by demagogues, and can only lead to fatal results. Let the examples of the South American republics be a warning. As long as our parties divide for the sake of political principles the republic is safe; but when the contest is for office only, we are making a wide departure from free institutions and the practice of our fathers.

"The President has placed himself in opposition to a Democratic House of Representatives and a Republican Senate, and sneeringly vetoed pension bills passed by large majorities of both, on technical and trivial pretenses. Widows and orphans must suffer to permit the great head of the nation to ventilate his wit and override the legislative branch of our government. He has already vetoed more bills than all the Presidents

from Washington down. Now let us look at some of these vetoes from an equitable stand-point:

“ A soldier has volunteered to defend his country, and taken the oath prescribed by the articles of war. He must serve for the period of his enlistment. Desertion before the expiration of the term is a disgrace, to which may be added the punishment of death. He is compelled to serve, though the government should pay him nothing, and his family should be in want and destitution at home. As a matter of fact, in the late war he received his pay in greenbacks, which were only worth about thirty-five cents on the dollar, when he was entitled to have that dollar paid in gold. If such a contract had been made with a private person no court of law would refuse to give judgment for the loss sustained by the payment made in depreciated currency; but now the President narrowly scans every little pension bill with a technical microscope, and refuses to the widow and the orphan a few dollars per month that should, in all honesty, have been paid to the dead soldier! I am most emphatically opposed to such statesmanship. The country depends upon the volunteers for its protection and defense, and every law passed in their favor should be most liberally construed.

“ There is one class of men that, in my judgment, have been most shamefully treated—the men who fought, conquered and acquired a territory as large as an empire. They have brought millions into the treasury of the United States, and they are yet unrecognized, and many of them poor—I mean the heroes

who marched from the Rio Grande to the halls of the Montezumas. The man who never served knows nothing of the privations and sufferings of the common soldier.

I can not concur in the efforts made by the administration to demonetize silver. How could such an act be done without injustice and loss to the holder of the silver? The government has received for each dollar 100 cents in value. Would it be just upon the part of the United States to pass any law that would lessen that value unless the government should redeem such depreciated coin in gold dollar for dollar? No such justice has yet been suggested or dreamed of by this administration. Wall street, with her bankers and brokers, would grow richer and fatter, while the laboring man would find his silver dollar cut down to about seventy-five cents! There can be no disturbance of the currency by the government, either in greenbacks, silver or gold, that will not result in loss to the classes who are not brokers, bankers or millionaires. The greatest loss would naturally fall upon the laboring class, who receive a large part of their wages in silver.

The greatest question of the hour and the age, which is now just beginning to show its head above the political horizon, is the question of labor. The adjustment between capital and labor will require all the wisdom, forbearance and patriotism of our wisest and best men. The question is surrounded with great difficulties, and will be found of no easy solution. The rapidity with which millions are now accumulated, the

tendency of favoring and fostering great monopolies, the greed of gain, and the wide-spread intelligence among the working-classes, present phases and problems of life unknown to any former period in the history of the world. Members of Congress will have much to do in the solution of these grand problems, and they should be men familiar with every condition of life, and in morality and honesty beyond the reach of the millionaire. We should pause when we remember how the Roman purple was once sold for corn. Does not history repeat itself, and is there no danger now? We must not forget that we can not hope to find a political panacea in anything not founded on the principles of right between man and man.

It is the duty of every elector to choose the best men, whoever they may be, to aid in the adjustment of this important question, which rises above all party and party names of the past. An aristocracy of wealth must not be built upon the ruins of our institutions, nor a thoughtless and blind force used to paralyze and destroy the progress of our wonderful nation. Law should always shield and protect the feeble and the weak, and curb and restrain the strong and aggressive. We should not forget that capital is the child of labor, and that neither capital nor labor can prosper and continue unless the relations between the two shall be harmonious. No duty is more plain than that a child should protect its parent, and capital, being the offspring of labor, should protect and shield the working classes. Like the Siamese twins, their separation

would be the death of both, and anarchy would inevitably follow.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

ALVIN P. HOVEY.

General Hovey was elected by a majority of 1,309, although the district usually gave a Democratic majority.

On taking his seat in Congress he did not forget the professions of friendship made for the workingmen and old soldiers previous to his election. In the contested election case of Thoebe *vs.* Carlisle, he voted in favor of the contestant, a workingman, thereby incurring the dislike of the Speaker, who can always find many ways of making his displeasure felt by those who have incurred it. General Hovey said in a recent speech: "I wanted only a full and free vote and a fair count, but we did not get it. The consequence was that I have paid somewhat of a penalty. By the kindness of Speaker Carlisle I have had to fight my way in that hall to be heard. I have had to fight even to get the least recognition from the chair. And why? Because I had the manhood to back the poor man who labored with his hands, and earned his living in the sweat of his brow." But General Hovey rather enjoys a fight, and the weight of the Speaker's displeasure was not sufficient to keep him down. For a new member, he managed to make himself heard and felt in Congress to a remarkable and unusual degree.

On the 4th of January he offered a service pension bill, granting a pension of \$8 per month for life to every honorably discharged officer, soldier or sailor

who had served not less than sixty days between March 4, 1861, and July 1, 1865. This bill was referred to the Invalid Pensions Committee, of which Hon. Courtland C. Matson was chairman. On the same day General Hovey offered a bill granting 160 acres of land to every honorably discharged officer, soldier or sailor who served during the late rebellion. He also introduced a bill "to equalize the payment and do justice to the officers, soldiers and sailors of the United States in the late rebellion who were paid in currency commonly called 'greenbacks,'" which was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

General Hovey embraced the first opportunity he could get to impress upon the House his views relative to the duty of Congress and the country toward its defenders. On the 20th of April, 1888, the House being in Committee of the Whole, and having under consideration an appropriation bill, General Hovey delivered an eloquent speech upon the rights of ex-Union soldiers and sailors, and the duty of Congress to pass a liberal service pension bill. In the course of this speech he said:

On the 4th of January last I offered a service pension bill, No. 1,320, granting a pension of \$8 per month for life to every honorably discharged officer, soldier or sailor who had served in the army of the United States not less than sixty days between March 4, 1861, and July 1, 1865. This bill was the same day referred to the Invalid Pensions Committee. On the same day I offered bill No. 1,319, granting a bounty of 160 acres of land to every officer, soldier

and sailor engaged in the military or naval service of the United States during the late rebellion of the so-called Confederate States. On the 16th of January last I offered a bill, No. 5,052, "to equalize the payment and do justice to the officers, soldiers and sailors of the United States in the late rebellion who were paid in currency commonly called "greenbacks," which was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

I had hoped that at least one of these bills might possibly meet with the favor of one of those omnipotent committees, and be reported to this House for fair discussion, so that a vote on the ayes and noes might be taken; but, like many other bills which have been introduced for the relief of the ex-soldiers of the late rebellion, neither of them has been reported, and they, too, have been smothered or filed in the unremembered pigeon-holes of the committee-rooms. Our ex-soldiers and sailors seem to be forgotten. Even the President, in his message, made no allusion to them, their services or their sufferings, and his henchmen and partisans are following silently and closely in his footsteps.

The Committee on Invalid Pensions is composed of nine Democrats and six Republicans, the Committee on Public Lands nine Democrats and five Republicans, and the Committee on Military Affairs eight Democrats and six Republicans, so that the Democrats of those committees have the power to report to this House any bill referred to them; or, they can crush, by refusing to report, every bill offered in favor of the ex-soldier. The responsibility is theirs, and I assure them they will be well remembered hereafter by

the men whose rights they have so unfeelingly ignored.

Now, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the committees to whom those important bills have been referred dare not bring one of them before this House for fair discussion and action. The people who do not understand the gag rules of this House are watching with wonder, and blaming their representatives for not forcing a vote on the most important questions of the day.

Let us have a full hearing and a fair vote on the bills I have offered, and the "Boys in Blue" next autumn will bury more Congressmen politically who vote against them than ever fell upon any field of battle. The people do not understand the meshes with which the majority of this House have entangled legislation. Sir, we may talk about the power of the veto, the power of the President, the power of the crowned heads of Europe, but I greatly doubt if either has as much power in directing and molding legislation as the Speaker of this House under the parliamentary rules which have been adopted. He forms and selects the committees at his pleasure, and can so compose and arrange them as to favor or defeat the most important legislation. No member can be heard without his consent, and he can refuse for a whole session to recognize or hear the ablest orators on this floor.

But we are asked, What have the ex-soldiers and sailors done that they now so imperatively demand legislation? The great ship called the "South" had lost her bearings, and was drifting, without compass or pilot, in storms and tempests, in the midst of rocks

and shoals, near the great maelstrom of certain destruction. Her great danger was seen by thousands, who rushed to her rescue. Many perished in their gallant effort to save her, while thousands returned from that terrible storm wounded, maimed, and with broken and shattered constitutions. But they saved the old ship from destruction. They brought her safely out to navigable waters and into the open and placid seas of sunshine and prosperity. And now the salvors of that old vessel come into this great court and ask that their services may be recognized by our government, and for a small salvage that will keep many of the maimed and wounded from the chilling blasts of hunger and adversity. They are not asking alms, nor begging to be placed upon the lists of pensioners for charity; but they demand that all shall be treated alike for their gallant services.

Would it be unjust to demand salvage from the owners of that old ship alone? No one asks it; but all should willingly join in doing justice, and in conferring that honor upon them which their daring, their gallantry, their sufferings and their sacrifices have so richly deserved.

* * * * *

We are flippantly told that our pension laws are ample and the most beneficent in the world, and that no ex-soldier has the right to find the least fault with the generosity and paternal care of our government.

Yes, we have pension laws where the red-tape appendages, employés and machinery alone, not including any pensions, cost our government over \$1,000,000

annually to dole out a pittance that would starve a dog to thousands of helpless men, widows and orphans.

Sir, we ought to be ashamed of our niggardly legislation, for our nation is too great for such pitiful parsimony. The 151 rounds in the Jacob's ladder which leads the veteran to the Pension Department are simply ridiculous.

I have read where the noble Brutus proposed to "coin his heart and drop his blood for drachmas," but it was reserved for our Solons who framed our pension laws to measure the value of our veterans' blood by the fraction of one copper cent!

Only think of the blood and wounds of our soldiers being valued at \$2.12 $\frac{1}{2}$ per month; at \$2.66 $\frac{2}{3}$ per month; \$4.66 $\frac{2}{3}$ per month. The fraction of one copper cent by halves and thirds being set apart in fifteen of the 151 grades to our maimed, broken-down and wounded soldiers! These wise men must have had Shylock's famous "balance" to weigh their brother's blood, and after they had weighed the blood they must have examined every wound with a strong political microscope before they could figure pensions down to the fraction of one copper cent!

* * . * * * *

What a contrast between the first and last President of the United States! Washington, at the head of a nation with an empty treasury, without credit, and a worthless currency, with a sparsely settled country, not exceeding 4,000,000 of people, begging, insisting and demanding that the officers and soldiers who served

under him should be pensioned with full pay during the term of their natural lives.

Cleveland, at the head of the richest and greatest nation upon the face of the earth, containing a population of 63,000,000, with unbounded credit and resources, with a treasury filled to repletion, and the vaults almost bursting with gold and silver—Cleveland, stubborn, stern and heartless, refusing even a mite of charity to the men who wrecked their fortunes and their constitutions that our government might live. Cold and unshaken, with the greed of a miser, he has denied the demand of the people, and vetoed and trodden down the acts of the Senate and Representatives of the people of the United States!

When party passion and all individual hatreds shall have passed away the merciless pen of truth will draw the parallel and paint the contrast. The only palliative to the darkness of the picture will be found in the fact that Washington knew what the services and sufferings of the soldier were, and President Cleveland did not.

The weary march, day and night, through heat and cold, in dust, mud, snow and rain, with hunger and thirst, and a damp earth for his bed; the lone, dark watch on the picket line of death; the skirmish, the battle, with its hail of musketry and roar of cannon; the dead, the dying, the wounded, in the thick smoke of battle, may be faintly sketched by the poet, the orator and the painter, but can never be understood or realized by any man who has not been a soldier in battle. I am sure President Cleveland can not.

The *Congressional Record* of Sunday, July 29, 1888, contained a speech purporting to have been delivered in the House the day before by Hon. C. C. Matson. On the 2d of August General Hovey replied to it at considerable length, making another eloquent appeal in favor of justice and generosity to the old soldiers. In this speech he said:

We are told that our revenue is now derived from "war taxes." Mr. Mills and his colleagues on the tariff debate have repeated this over and over again. "The war tax!" "the war tax!!" "the war tax!!!" has been ringing through this chamber for the last month, until the walls almost retain and reverberate its echo.

Now, it must be clear that if it is a war tax, our great surplus in the treasury, which now amounts to over \$130,000,000, should be primarily expended for war debts.

1. To the ex-soldiers who made it possible for our government to pay any debts; and,

2. To the bondholders who supplied our government with the "sinews of war" during the late rebellion.

The bondholders should be fully paid, but we should not entirely forget a little of the inside history. Bonds were bought with "greenbacks" at a discount; many of them were purchased at 70 cents to the dollar, when greenbacks were not worth more than 60 or 70 cents, thus making the actual cost to the bondholders about 50 cents to the dollar. These bonds have since risen in value until they are now held as high as \$1.28

in gold, and they have drawn interest from the date of their issue.

The soldier, in his financial operations, has not fared quite so well, for he was compelled to receive his "greenbacks" when, on a general average, they were not worth more than 60 cents to the dollar, and he has never received either principal or interest for his losses on his depreciated paper. If the ex-soldier did not love "Uncle Sam" so well, and if a suit at law could be brought for the difference between the greenback and the gold dollar, there is no court in the world where justice is administered where he could not obtain a judgment. There can be no shadow of doubt upon his rights.

The pension bill vetoed by the President in 1887 only provided for ex-soldiers where there was a "total inability to procure their subsistence by daily labor."

The Grand Army bill referred to by my colleague [Mr. Matson] defines the disability to be that "which totally incapacitates them for the performance of manual labor." The substitute reported to this House for the Senate bill also defines the disability to be that "which totally incapacitates them for the performance of manual labor."

But my colleague, the chairman of the Invalid Pension Committee [Mr. Matson], leaves no room to doubt what his views are in regard to pensions which should now be given to his comrades.

In his House bill No. 1,329 he clearly draws the line that would cut off all from such relief except those "who are now disabled, and are dependent upon charity

for a subsistence," and requires that the disability must be such "as would incapacitate them for any manual labor, and who are dependent upon public charity for their sustenance."

In other words, no ex-soldier, under his bill, could apply for a pension without first swearing he was a pauper, and then sustaining his claim by proving that he was an object of charity and wholly unable to perform any manual labor.

I can not concur in favoring such a bill, but on the contrary would most gladly extend and grant a pension to every soldier who has served sixty days and who has received an honorable discharge. That service, discharge, and proof of his identity, would be all the red tape that I would require. But my gallant comrade and colleague draws a line where supplication and beggary begin, and charity comes with open hand to the rescue. I want no charity for the men who fought with me; I want justice, that justice which has been meted out to all the soldiers of the United States who stood by the stars and stripes in other days. God forbid that any soldier who fought by my side, or under our glorious banner, should be compelled to beg our government, which he faced death to save, for a pittance to keep him from the poor-house.

The men who stood shoulder to shoulder on the crimsoned fields of death for the preservation of our government should never be required by any act of Congress to beg their bread like paupers. Such laws, in my opinion, would be deep stains upon our statute, and I can not understand how any true soldier could

consent to place his comrade in that degrading condition.

Sir, I deeply regret the position of my colleague [Mr. Matson], for, with his prestige as a soldier, his talent, force, ability, and position, he may be able to check and defeat the enactment of laws which would throw rays of sunshine over many a now gloomy household of his comrades, who boldly faced death under his commands.

My colleague warmly espouses the principles of the Mills tariff bill. He says:

“I am now, and have been constantly since that overshadowing issue was made, a consistent and earnest friend of every measure that has been proposed for relief from overtaxation. I yield to no one in devotion to this cause, for I believe it to be the cause of all the people, and the soldiers are only a part of the great body politic.”

The substance of this, if I understand it, is that the ex-soldier's rights must give way to the omnipotency of the Mills tariff bill, to the wisdom of free-trade reformers. This, no doubt, is loyal and true Democracy as held and taught by the leaders of the party. But my friend, seeing the effects of the Mills bill in reducing the revenue out of which pensions must be paid, as a panacea, threatens to tax the rich men of our country to raise the funds out of which the soldier shall be paid. That is a long way off; we have the surplus now; why wait “for dead men's shoes?” I will admonish my friend that before such an act will ever pass this House the last tombstone placed above

the graves of our veterans will have its marble crumbled into dust. Such promises are more than vain.

* * * * *

The President's vetoes are defended by my colleague, and eulogized as being the essence of perfection. He says:

"And so the President, in the discharge of his duty, not with malice or ill-will toward the claimant, but with a desire to do his duty only, states the facts upon which he founded his objections. I challenge any of his loud accusers to show any single instance in which he has animadverted unnecessarily against the claimant. When this wholesale charge is made, ask for the specifications. Let the case be cited, and the facts and the criticism go together."

Yes, let us have the facts where such facts are fairly and legally obtained; but it must not be overlooked that much of what the President calls facts is procured by the Pension Department and is entirely *ex parte*. The soldier is seldom present, nor has he a chance of meeting his accusers face to face and cross-examine the witnesses who testify against him before the inquisitorial examiners of the Pension Department.

Remembering this, the President should not unnecessarily tarnish the character of any one. His exalted position should forbid it. But he has not hesitated to to give such loose evidence or statements all the sanction of his high official authority.

I will quote a few of his charges, flings and sarcasms that he has used in vetoing the pension bills of poor and broken-down ex-soldiers who were defending

our country while he, the President, was out of danger and at his ease in Buffalo.

In the veto of the bill passed for John W. Ferris, June, 1886, he uses the following language:

"The ingenuity developed in the constant and persistent attacks upon the public treasurer by those claiming pensions, and in the increase of those already granted, is exhibited in bold relief by this attempt to include sore eyes among the results of diarrhea."

Again, in the case of John W. Luce, June, 1886:

"It is alleged that the examinations made by the Pension Bureau developed the fact that the deceased soldier was a man of quite intemperate habits."

In his veto in the case of Alfred Denny, June, 1886, who swore that he was injured by being thrown forward on the pommel of his saddle, the President becomes facetious, and says:

"The number of instances in which those of our soldiers who rode horses during the war were injured by being thrown forward on their saddles indicates that those saddles were very dangerous contrivances."

The innuendo clearly points to the charge that many claimants of that kind were perjured. I most earnestly advise the President not to try any saddle of that kind himself, or he might change his opinion.

In the case of Edward Ayers, May, 1886, the President in his veto says:

"It is reported to me by a report from the Pension Bureau that after the alleged wound, and in May or June, 1863, the claimant deserted, and was arrested

in the State of Indiana and returned to duty without trial."

Here the President fastens on the ex-soldier a stain and a crime, the penalty of which would have been death, on the authority of a mere report.

In the case of David W. Hamilton, May, 1886, he says:

"If he had filed his application earlier it would have appeared in better faith, and it may be that he would have secured the evidence of his family physician, if it was of the character he described."

His delay in filing his claim, in the mind of the President, seems conclusive proof of perjury.

Every soldier who has served in the army will realize the injustice of the charge as made by the President. Many poor soldiers, from pride, have been restrained for years from presenting their just claims for a pension.

The wit and humor of the President rise again to the surface in his veto of the bill of Andrew I. Wilson, in June, 1886.

"Whatever else may be said of this claimant's achievements during his short military career, it must be conceded that he accumulated a great deal of disability."

Other cases might be multiplied in his numerous vetoes, but I deem it unnecessary to make more public his charges against soldiers of drunkenness and loathsome diseases.

It should not be forgotten that in all his vetoes of private pension bills he virtually accuses every claim-

ant and many witnesses of willful perjury, and the reports upon which he promulgates his libelous charges are founded on one-sided reports and rumors. If he were not shielded by his Presidential mantle actions for libel could be successfully brought against him on many of his vetoes. It should be remembered that he judges the claimant from his stand-point, and not by the testimony of the claimant and his witnesses under oath, backed by the full indorsement of the Senate and House of Representatives. Surely, in such cases the power and cruelty of the one man are very great.

My colleague goes into ecstasies over the approval by the President of the following acts: Widows' act, March 12, 1886; act of August 4, 1886, increasing pensions to crippled soldiers; act granting pensions to Mexican soldiers; act of June 7, 1888, granting arrears to widows of soldiers. If these acts were approved by the President without the coercion of political pressure, he is entitled to credit for simply performing a humane duty; but it might be important to inquire who formulated those bills? Did the President ever suggest or recommend the passage of any bill or measure for the relief of the soldier? "I pause for a reply."

I should be pleased if some great statesman would inform me where the difference is between a private bill for a pension and a general pension law, so far as it relates to the power of Congress in making such enactments. Why should the President hold that the general law controlled all subsequent legislation? Surely, Congress has power to pass either, and complaint can not be made because the later law differs

from a statute formerly enacted. The President seems to treat the general pension law as a constitution, and annuls by its force all subsequent minor acts that do not conform to it.

I have but a few more words to say in regard to the extraordinary speech of my colleague. It is evident on its face that it was not made to be heard in this House; and it was not. Between the lines it has the ring of "stump oratory," as though it had been manufactured for that purpose. It will not be misunderstood by any one who takes the trouble to read it. No difference now whether its publication was regular or irregular; it is in the *Congressional Record* of Sunday, and can be transmitted by mail under his frank to all his constituency, and unanswered it is a pretty good electioneering document.

There are some seeming inconsistencies in my colleague's remarks and different bills that I do not fully understand.

He admits that a universal pension bill "is fast approaching and will soon become a law." Why not now? Will there ever be a better time? In his pauper bill (No. 1,329), which I ask to be printed with my remarks, he allows pensions only to those who are incapacitated from the performance of any manual labor, and who are dependent on public charity for their sustenance and \$8 per month; but to accommodate all, in the bill reported by him from his committee as a substitute for the Senate bill, he cuts down the pension to a cent a day for services performed!

He admits that with the grand surplus in the treas-

ury we could easily pay all the arrearages of our ex-soldiers; yet during all these months his party, or he himself, has failed to procure any days for the consideration in this House of any of the more important bills that have been referred to his committee. It is strange how badly he, or we, have been treated; but facts are stubborn things. His committee has had more bills referred to it than all the other committees combined. They have nearly all had their days set apart to them, but he has had none for general pension legislation. The ex-soldiers seem to have no rights that this House is bound to respect.

Mr. Chairman, a grand panorama seems passing before me. There are nearly 1,000,000 men in the column. They look worn and thoughtful, and prematurely old. Many of them are poorly clad, and some are in tatters. About 20,000 have fallen by the wayside and been carried to the poor-houses. Some are armless, some on crutches, some emaciated and writhing with wounds long since received in battle, and which are still running and unhealed! But few of the great mass seem prosperous, for all have passed through that ordeal which leaves poverty behind it. Still, they march forward with heads erect. Their step is the proud, measured step of the soldier. There is still pride in their bearing, for they know they are the remnant of that band of heroes who saved our nation from ruin and wreck.

Mr. Chairman, these are the men whose petitions by hundreds of thousands remain in our archives unread. These are the men whose just prayers are

unheeded and unanswered by the nation they have saved.

These extracts from General Hovey's speech in Congress show how earnestly he espoused the soldiers' cause.

On the 8th of August, 1888, while still in Washington, and attending to his duties as Representative in Congress, General Hovey was nominated for Governor by the Republican convention at Indianapolis. The nomination was made on the first ballot, amid great enthusiasm and unbounded applause. Like every other civil office or honor that General Hovey has enjoyed, it came to him entirely unsolicited. He was not seeking the nomination, nor was he a candidate in the ordinary sense. He accepted it as the call of his fellow-citizens and his party to the performance of a public duty, and entered upon the canvass with his accustomed vigor.

This hastily prepared sketch presents but an outline of the life and career of one who has served his State and country faithfully, and left his mark on the times in which he lived. General Hovey has had an exceptionally varied and interesting career, and, if time and space permitted, the story of his life could be extended much beyond the scope of such a sketch as this.



Genl. Chase

SKETCH OF IRA J. CHASE.

It has ever been the tendency of historians to award the main credit of successful wars and great victories to the leaders and officers of the victorious army. None know better than the leaders and officers themselves that a very large share, if not the main portion, of the credit and glory is due to the privates—the men who carry the muskets and knapsacks, who make long, forced marches, who work in the trenches and do the fighting. It is but just to say that officers always seem willing and glad to accord the full measure of credit to the privates.

Among the vast number of those who composed the rank and file of the armies of the Union was Private Ira J. Chase, present Republican candidate for Lieutenant-Governor of Indiana. He was born in the village of Clarkson, Monroe county, New York, December 7, 1834. Three months later his parents removed to Medina, New York, where he was reared to the age of twenty. He had an honorable lineage. One of his ancestors, Samuel Chase, was a signer of the Declaration of Independence. Another, his great-grandfather, Rufus Chase, was one of twenty-four revo-

lutionary patriots who stole after night into the British camp, captured General Prescott, and brought him into the American lines. It is said that General Washington, on hearing of this daring exploit, condemned it, on the ground that the chances of a fatal termination were ten to one against its successful execution. He tempered his disapproval, however, by adding that men of their heroic caliber were too scarce to be spared for such hazardous enterprises. Still another ancestor, his maternal grandfather, the Hon. Ira Mix, after whom he was christened, twice represented the county of Rutland in the Vermont Legislature prior to the war of 1812.

Benjamin Chase, the father of Ira J., died ten years ago. He was a man of sterling integrity, and highly esteemed by all who knew him. The mother, now in her seventy-eighth year, and a lady of rare intelligence and most amiable character, makes her home with the son.

Ira's early life had its full share of struggles and privations. While he was still a mere lad, the failure of his father's health threw the responsibility of supporting the family mainly upon his mother and himself. His aged mother speaks with affectionate enthusiasm of the heroic manner in which the boy grappled with his destiny.

When he was twelve years of age the family moved to Milan, Ohio, where Ira attended school three years under the direction of Rev. Lemuel Bissell, a Presbyterian minister, who is now and has for thirty-eight years been a missionary to India. The boy improved

rapidly by the help of this good minister, who became greatly attached to him, often begging the parents to turn over their son to his care, and promising to adopt and educate him. But the mother would not yield, and at the expiration of three years the family returned to Medina. The youth continued his efforts to obtain an education, and, entering the Medina academy, he worked his way through, under the encouragement and assistance of the principal, Major Thales Lindsey, a graduate of West Point, and a scholar of rare accomplishments.

In 1855 the family removed to Illinois, locating first on a small farm near Barrington, thirty miles from Chicago, where they struggled along with only tolerable success.

In the mean time, Ira, after spending a year with his uncle, Ira Mix, at Jefferson suburb, now incorporated within the limits of Chicago, began teaching school, the delicate condition of his health forbidding manual labor. While engaged in this work, on March 24, 1859, he married Miss Rhoda J. Castle, of Palatine, Ill., who, like himself, was engaged in teaching.

The beginning of the war found them as it found thousands of other young couples and happy little families, and with like results. Though loath to leave his wife and home, the prompting of patriotism and duty was too strong to resist, and he enlisted in Company C, Nineteenth Illinois Volunteer Infantry, on the 17th of June, 1861. The regiment was commanded by Colonel J. B. Turchin, later known better as General Turchin, by promotion.

The Nineteenth Infantry left Chicago on July 12, 1861, for Quincy, where it arrived the next day. On the 14th it received orders from General Hurlburt to relieve the Twenty-first Illinois, under Colonel U. S. Grant, posted on the Hannibal and St. Joe Railroad, from Quincy to Palmyra. "During two weeks' stay in this locality," says the Adjutant-General's report, "besides guarding several important bridges, they chased the newly organized rebel companies out of the various plantations, destroyed their barracks and provisions, obliged the citizens to pledge their allegiance to the government, encouraged the formation of home-guard companies at Palmyra and Newark, and suppressed the secessionists."

General Fremont was then in command of the Department of Missouri. "The concentration of a strong rebel force at New Madrid, Missouri, obliged Fremont to concentrate a sufficient force at Bird's Point, opposite Cairo, on the Missouri side." The Nineteenth joined this expedition at St. Louis, and embarked with 9,000 or 10,000 other troops on a large flotilla, arriving at Bird's Point about the first of August. The Nineteenth Regiment was immediately detailed to Norfolk, six miles below, is an advance guard, "where its duties were quite difficult and arduous." A week or two later the regiment joined an expedition to intercept General Pillow, who was reported as moving toward Ironton. On the 14th it was ordered to move to Jackson as advance guard to General Prentiss' army, then expecting to meet the enemy at Dallas. No engagement occurred, and the Nineteenth (on the

8th of September) took boats again and returned to Cairo. After a series of other marches and maneuvers the regiment experienced a frightful disaster, by which twenty-four men, including Captain B. B. Howard, were instantly killed, and 105 wounded.

The regiment had left Cairo on the 16th of September, and was proceeding toward Cincinnati on the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad. When forty-six miles east of Vincennes the second train, containing four companies and regimental staff, broke through the bridge over Beaver creek. The scene was appalling, and the loss of life (says the Roster of Illinois) "was nearly as great as the regiment suffered in any battle during its term of service." Private Chase barely escaped this disaster, having been detailed the day before to do recruiting duty.

On the 25th of September the regiment went into camp at Lebanon Junction, thirty-five miles south of Louisville, relieving the Louisville Legion. "Thus," says the report of the Adjutant-General, "after thousands of miles of traveling by river and by rail, the regiment at last got into a somewhat permanent camp, where it could drill, and improve itself in guard and picket duty, and in battalion movements."

Among the officers and privates of the Nineteenth Infantry were a number of well-disciplined soldiers who had belonged to the original company of Ellsworth's Zouaves. At all convenient seasons these efficient drill-masters employed the time acquainting the regiment with regulation tactics. Among other members recruited at Chicago, Private Chase became

greatly enamored of the zouave drill, and in order to become proficient therein he hired Corporal Bishop, of his company, to give him private lessons. Within a year his progress had become so apparent that General Turchin recognized it so far as to appoint him Orderly Sergeant, and detail him to drill raw recruits. His military aspirations were, however, destined to end in disappointment. His health, which had never been rugged, declined after his first year's service, and he was finally sent to the hospital for treatment. This occurred while he was with his regiment at Huntsville, Ala. While in the hospital there he was given up to die by his surgeon, Dr. R. G. Bogue, but he afterward recovered sufficiently to bear removal to Nashville. Here he continued to improve, and at last became well enough to do hospital duty. He was appointed hospital clerk in the latter part of the summer of 1862.

When it became apparent that Private Chase was physically unfit for army service his surgeon advised him to retire from the army or he would soon be a dead man. Accepting the inevitable, he received his discharge papers November 7, 1862.

Returning to Barrington, Illinois, he joined his wife, and as soon as he was able to attend to business stocked a hardware store and decided to try his hand at "merchandising." A year or two later his wife was prostrated with small-pox, and as she was the only victim in the town their house was shunned by all their neighbors, and Mr. Chase's business was ruined. He attended upon his wife constantly, and after a ter-

rible experience, lasting five months, she arose from the bed blind and crippled. One of her eyes has since been partially restored, but the other was totally lost, and she has not read a line for twenty-three years.

After this last failure of Mr. Chase's business prospects, he determined to act upon the suggestion of friends and study for the ministry. He began preaching in the Christian Church twenty-one years ago, and has followed that profession with great credit to himself ever since. As a minister he is widely known throughout the West. His first charge was at Mishawaka, Indiana. Subsequently his appointments were as follows: 1867, La Porte; 1869, Pittsburgh, Pa.; 1871, Peoria, Ill.; 1880, Wabash; 1884 and afterward, Danville, where he now resides. He has been prominent in State evangelical work since his campaign against Matson for Congress.

Five years ago he moved to Danville, Ind., and took charge of the Christian Church there. In February, 1886, he was unanimously chosen by his Grand Army comrades, assembled at Indianapolis, as Chaplain of the Department of Indiana. Five months later he received the nomination as Republican candidate for Congress from the Fifth District of Indiana. He made a thorough canvass against Colonel C. C. Matson, and succeeded in reducing that gentleman's gerrymandered majority from 1,365 to 532.

In February, 1887, he was elected at the grand encampment of the G. A. R. as Department Commander, with a whirl of enthusiasm. While acting in this capacity he endeared himself more than ever to his com-

rades, and when his term expired, last February, they re-elected him to the position of Chaplain. This was a surprise to him, and the unanimity with which it was done was only surpassed by the action of the State convention in June last, which gave him the nomination for Lieutenant-Governor by acclamation and with great enthusiasm.

Private Chase possesses natural social qualities to a degree rarely found, even in public men whose interest and business it is to cultivate them as an art. These traits were born in him, and hence never had to be acquired. He is kind-hearted, unsuspicious, and ready to believe every man as honest as himself. He is only intolerant of wrong, abominating nothing more than insincerity. As a speaker, he is persuasive and eloquent. Candid to the point of simplicity, he has sometimes excited the criticism of professional politicians as wanting art; but what he lacks in policy is more than made up in cordial frankness and genuine sincerity.

If elected Lieutenant-Governor he will make a good and conscientious public officer, and will be found broad enough to represent all the people whose interests it shall be his duty to subserve.

Since Mr. Chase's nomination he has received many congratulatory letters from old comrades and friends in Indiana and other States. As a specimen of comradeship, the following, from the Nineteenth Illinois Infantry Veteran Club, at Chicago, will serve. It is signed by the secretary of that organization, T. M. Beatty, and reads:

“The Nineteenth Illinois Veteran Club desires, through me, to tender their most hearty congratulations on your nomination to the honorable office of Lieutenant-Governor of Indiana. They sincerely hope the people of Indiana will do themselves the credit of electing you to that office by a large majority, as we feel that, with you as the incumbent, the duties of the office will be performed with that ability, fidelity and patriotism which characterized your service in the regiment.”

General John B. Turchin, his old commander, wrote a congratulatory letter, in which he expressed the hope that Mr. Chase's nomination for Lieutenant-Governor would be confirmed by the votes of the citizens of Indiana. “You belong to those patriotic men,” the letter continued, “who at the first call shouldered the musket to fight the country's cause and to preserve the Union. You have done fully your duty while in the army, and although being worthy of promotion, your own advancement, like that of many other worthy comrades, was prevented by injudicious regulations adopted by the Governors of Western States. But shoulder-straps can not be considered as premiums on patriotism; the honor of saving the country belongs by right rather to the men of the ranks than to those who commanded them, as they had the heaviest load to carry. Your industry, perseverance and worth as a citizen, since the late war, have put you forward ahead of many others who were your superiors in the army. Hence, more honor to you and others like you. As for me, I can not but be proud, seeing one

of the boys of my own regiment get promoted by his fellow-citizens to the exalted position of Lieutenant-Governor of the great State of Indiana."

GEMS FROM GENERAL HARRISON'S SPEECHES.

From the day of General Harrison's nomination until that of his departure from Indianapolis for a short vacation, that is, from June 26 to August 18, he made forty-one speeches. These speeches were made to visiting delegations from this and other States, including several clubs and special organizations, but mostly unorganized masses of people. Sometimes their coming was announced a few days in advance, and sometimes only a few hours. In every case there was a spokesman on behalf of the visitors, whose speech preceded that of General Harrison. The latter never knew in advance what the spokesman was going to say, but always shaped his own speech somewhat with reference to what had been said. General Harrison's speeches were, in every instance, extemporaneous, that is, delivered without manuscript or notes. The speeches

were reported in short-hand, and given to the press just as delivered, excepting such slight verbal alterations as are almost always found necessary in proof-reading. They covered a variety of topics, and, though touching on many points, each one was short. The following sentences indicate the general line of thought in the speeches. Without including all the speeches, or all the striking sentences, they form an interesting collection of campaign texts. They are not selected because they are better than other sentences that might have been selected, but because each one is complete in itself, and a sort of key-note to the speech from which it is taken :

“Kings sometimes bestow upon those whom they desire to honor decorations. But that man is most highly decorated who has the regard and affection of his friends.”

“The comradeship of the war will never end until our lives end.”

“We could always depend upon the faithfulness of the black man. He might be mistaken, but he was never false.”

“I do not know why we can not hold our political differences with respect for each other's opinions, and with entire respect for each other personally.”

“Any development that does not reach and beneficially affect all our people is not to be desired.”

“Any policy that transfers production from the

American to the English or German shop works an injury to all American workmen."

"A manly assertion by each of his individual rights, and a manly concession of equal rights to every other man, are the boast and the law of good citizenship."

"The gates of Castle Garden swing inward. They do not swing outward to any American laborer seeking a better country than this."

"The Republican party stands for the principle of protection."

"There is a sense of justice, of fairness, that will assert itself against these attempts to coin party advantages out of public wrong. The day when men can be disfranchised or shorn of their political power for opinion's sake must have an end in our country."

"We believe it to be good for the whole country that loyalty and fidelity to the flag should be honored."

"Our party stands unequivocally, without evasion or qualification, for the doctrine that the American market shall be preserved for our American producers."

"My countrymen, it is no time now to use an apothecary's scale to weigh the rewards of the men who saved the country."

"It is one of the best evidences of the prosperity of our cities that so large a proportion of the men who work are covered by their own roof-trees. If we would perpetuate this condition we must maintain the American scale of wages."

"The laboring men of this land may safely trust

every just reform in which they are interested to public discussion and to the logic of reason."

"It can easily be demonstrated that if our revenue laws were so adjusted that the imports from Great Britain should be doubled it would be good for the workingmen of England, but I think it would be hard to demonstrate that it would be good for the workingmen of America."

"Education is the great conservative and assimilating force. Therefore, in our political campaigns let men think for themselves, and the truth will assert its sway over the minds of our people."

"The home is the best and is the first school of good citizenship. It is the great conservative and assimilating force. I should despair for my country if American citizens were to be trained only in our schools, valuable as their instruction is. It is in the home that we first learn obedience and respect for law."

"The protective system is a barrier against the flood of foreign importations and the competition of underpaid labor in Europe. Those who want to lower the dike owe it to those who live behind it to make a plain statement of their purposes."

"Every safeguard of law should be thrown around the ballot-box until fraud in voting and frauds in counting shall receive the sure penalties of law, as well as the reprobation of all good men."

"The disastrous effects upon our workingmen and workingwomen of competition with cheap, underpaid labor are not obviated by keeping the cheap

worker over the sea if the product of his cheap labor is allowed free competition in our market. We should protect our people against competition with the products of underpaid labor abroad, as well as against the coming to our shores of paupers, laborers under contract, and the Chinese labor."

"The Republican party has never found it necessary or consistent with its great principles to suppress free discussion of any question. There is not a Republican community where any man may not advocate, without fear, his political belief."

"Do not allow any one to persuade you that the great contest as to our tariff policy is one between schedules. It is not a question of a seven per cent. reduction. It is a question between wide-apart principles—the principle of protection, the intelligent recognition in the framing of our tariff laws of the duty to protect our American industries and maintain the American scale of wages by adequate discriminating duties on the one hand, and on the other a denial of the constitutional right to make our customs duties protective, or the assertion of the doctrine that free competition with foreign products is the ideal condition to which all our legislation should tend."

THE CONFEDERATE IDEA.

The following formed part of the revenue article of the Confederate constitution :

“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises for revenue necessary to pay the debts, provide for the common defense and carry on the government of the Confederate States ; but no bounties shall be granted from the treasury, nor shall any duties or taxes on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry ; and all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout all Confederate States.”

This effort to introduce free trade proved unsuccessful, but the same men who made the Confederate constitution are trying to accomplish the same object by forcing the Mills free trade bill through Congress.

SPEECH OF PRINCE BISMARCK IN REICHSTAG, MAY 14, 1882.

“The success of the United States in material development is the most illustrious of modern times. The American nation has not only successfully borne and suppressed the most gigantic and expensive war of all history, but immediately afterward disbanded its army, found employment for all its soldiers and marines, paid off most of its debt, given labor and homes to all the unemployed of Europe as fast as they could arrive in its territory, and still by a system of

taxation so indirect as not to be perceived, much less felt. The United States found every year a great and growing surplus in the treasury, which it could expend upon natural defenses or upon natural improvements. While the American republic was enjoying this peculiar prosperity, the countries of Europe which America most relieved by absorbing their unemployed population were apparently continually getting worse off. * * * Because it is my deliberate judgment that the prosperity of America is mainly due to its system of protective laws, I now urge that Germany has reached the point when it is necessary to emulate the tariff system of the United States."

REPORT OF PRESIDENT OF GERMAN COMMISSION TO U. S. CENTENNIAL EXPOSITION.

"The present condition of American manufactures shows the fallacy of the free-trade doctrine that the productions of a country are raised in price by protective duties."

WE raised 457,500,400 bushels of wheat in 1887 and exported 33 per cent. of the quantity. In 1879 we exported 40 per cent. of our wheat product. This means that our home market is gradually becoming large enough to absorb our total wheat production, and that we shall soon retire from the business of raising a surplus that the foreigner may profit.

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